

# THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF  
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
The Real Police Force	103
The United Nations Today	107
Commonwealth and the Crisis	114
The Watch on the Elbe	121
Enosis and Its Background	129
The Eisenhower Doctrine	141
The South African Senate Act	148
A Trade Unionist's Appeal	152
Ireland: Conflict, Confusion and Crisis	159
Australia: The Suez Canal Crisis	165
Pakistan: Rebuffs from Egypt	172
Canada: A New Leader of Opposition	176
South Africa: The Treason Trial	183
New Zealand: Echoes from the Middle East	185
East Africa: Elections and Electorates	190
United Kingdom: A New Prime Minister	196

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# THE REAL POLICE FORCE

## DISILLUSION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

THE great lesson of recent years has been that dependence on the United Nations cannot be a substitute for foreign policy." Since the *Sunday Times* of February 17 selected this observation by the Secretary of State for Scotland for inclusion among half a dozen notable utterances of the week, the editor presumably considers it something more than a truism; but those who still needed the lesson must have rapidly dwindled in numbers during the four months that have elapsed since the General Assembly of the United Nations established its "police force" in the Sinai Peninsula and thereby assumed responsibility for curing the chronic neurosis of the Middle East. The force remains in position, and while it is there active military operations on land between the Egyptian and Israeli armies are suspended. That is the limit of U.N. achievement. The command to Israel to withdraw her troops behind the armistice line has been disregarded, like the earlier command to Egypt to abstain, according to treaty, from discrimination against Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal. The Egyptian blockade is now extended to the Gulf of Aqaba. The clearance of the Canal proceeds at a pace convenient to Colonel Nasser, without effective assistance from U.N. or deference to its wishes. No progress has been made towards settling the conflicts of financial rights between the Egyptian Government and the former shareholders in the Canal, or towards providing a substitute for the international guarantees of freedom of traffic that were set aside by the act of nationalization. The Users' Association is still in being, but no one knows if it can ever become effective. The flow of foreign arms into the Middle East has not been stemmed.

It is unfortunate for those optimists who looked to the expedition to demonstrate an enhanced moral authority for the U.N. that its sojourn in Sinai has coincided with two of the organization's most notable rebuffs. The Soviet Government, contemptuously ignoring the meek expostulations of U.N., has bloodily suppressed the Hungarian people's desperate bid for liberty; and Mr. Nehru, while loudly applauding the U.N. censures of Great Britain and France, has equally ignored the U.N. proposals for the future of Kashmir in favour of a unilateral settlement in his own interest. Against these manifestations of U.N.'s incapacity to influence the behaviour of members who choose to see their vital interests involved in an act of aggressive policy, the withdrawal of Great Britain and France from intervention in Egypt is hardly to be reckoned at all. It is true that the withdrawal was made, in form, in order to comply with the ruling of the Assembly (whose directions, by the way, as distinct from those of the Security Council, the two Powers were not bound by their signatures to the Charter to obey); but in reality it is not disputed that the retreat was compelled by two principal factors, the relative weight of which is variously judged. One was the threat of intervention by Russia, possibly leading to world war, which could certainly not be interpreted as an act within the U.N. system of collective security; the other was

the discovery that the enterprise of Great Britain and France was opposed by their principal ally, the United States, which at an earlier stage had been mainly influential in discouraging their desire to refer their dispute with Egypt to the U.N. It is clear that the issue would have been much the same if U.N. had not existed: it was determined on a calculation in power politics, the two Powers finding that they had undertaken a task beyond their strength.

This conclusion from the most recent events in Sinai, Hungary and Kashmir, that U.N. is ineffective against substantial Powers that choose not to be compliant, unless their position is otherwise insecure, is also the conclusion of a contributor to the present issue of *THE ROUND TABLE*, who surveys\* the working of the organization over the twelve years of its existence. He writes:

The U.N. is not, any more than was the League of Nations, a World Government. It is merely a meeting place for the representatives of eighty sovereign independent Governments to discuss and wrangle in their several and conflicting interests.

That this would be the nature of U.N. should, and but for the emotion of the time would, have been foreseen at San Francisco, when the organization was deliberately founded upon sovereignty, because that was the only foundation that was acceptable to the members. The independence of States being *prima facie* inviolable, except under the conditions contained in the constitution of the Security Council, with its entrenched veto for the Principal Powers, development into a world government was ruled out from the beginning. In a secondary sense, two tendencies that have become apparent in its conduct prevent it from even moving in that direction. First, there has been little attempt to make debate the basis for a collective judgment on the merits of an international case. Delegates speak to briefs prepared by their governments with an eye only to national interests, and decisions are reached less by discussion than by a process of bargaining between them, which can be favourably viewed as negotiation, and less favourably as intrigue. Secondly—and especially since the attempt has been made to evade the inhibitions of the Veto by activating the General Assembly—decisions are taken by majorities made up of small States which have neither the power nor the intention to contribute to the action necessary to give them effect. Where the few bear all the responsibility and the many take the decisions, nothing resembling government by discussion can come into being.

What in fact is happening, especially since the emergence of the so-called Afro-Asian group, is that the United Nations provides a perpetual forum in which the many small States can continually advertise their grievances against the few Great Powers; particularly, the States opposed to 'colonialism' range themselves in a permanent majority against those with imperial responsibilities. That this majority exists does nothing to prove a moral case against colonialism; nor does the perpetual dichotomy on this issue correspond at all to the real schism threatening the peace of the world, which U.N. was created to protect—the division between its Communist and free halves.

When, however, our contributor, contemplating this frustration of the

\* See "The United Nations Today", p. 107.



prime purposes of U.N., suggests that the organization has become a dangerous delusion, it is unnecessary to draw the extreme inference that it ought to be dissolved. Rather should the danger be exorcized by dispelling the illusion. If these grievances of small Powers exist, it is all to the good that there should be maintained a theatre in which they can be brought into the open. The delusion that has to be dispelled is that a majority vote, the resultant of the conflicting self-interests of eighty heterogeneous units, of all sizes and degrees of civilization, is in any sense an expression of the conscience of the world.

The conclusion for Great Britain, or any other Power with major responsibilities for world peace, is that the machinery of U.N. should be used for its full diplomatic value, but cannot be made the starting-point of foreign policy.

The object of policy remains to preserve the peace of the world while withstanding any encroachment of Communism upon the area of liberty. To do that it is necessary, not to manoeuvre for votes in an undifferentiated assembly, but to rally the friends of civilization for the defence of specific interests, geographically defined. If the idea is abandoned that eighty sovereignties, professing fundamentally opposed political philosophies, can ever co-operate to regulate the affairs of the world as a whole, there are definite and critical regions where it has been proved by experience that a limited number of sovereignties can co-operate for limited objectives.

One of these is the Middle East. The treaty of 1888, which established the international constitution of the Suez Canal, provided for nearly seventy years an orderly regulation of one of the most critical areas on the face of the globe. That well-trying system is now in ruins, and a substitute as enduring has to be sought. Great Britain has to face the task of rebuilding stripped of the special authority in the area that was derived from the inheritance of the past. But we remain the third armed Power of the world, and have still a vital interest, both in the oil-bearing regions that sustain our domestic economy and in the principal node in the lines of communication of the Commonwealth. We cannot afford to have less than a leading voice in whatever settlement is now attempted; and this means that no effort may be spared to re-establish full mutual confidence with the United States, which under the Eisenhower doctrine is prepared to assume major Middle Eastern responsibilities. One element of the new order must be a harmony between the new entente of America with Saudi Arabia and the established system of the Baghdad Pact. The Baghdad powers are the realists of Asia, and it is largely upon them that the Middle East must depend for ballast when swept by gusts of "Afro-Asian" emotion. (Only two of them were represented at Bandoeng, the Mount Sinai of Afro-Asia.)

The second great area for co-operation—second in topical urgency though second to none in importance—is the continent of Europe. This is a region in which British policy has never been much influenced by U.N. considerations. It is a British as much as a continental interest that there should exist a combination, articulated for economic intercourse as well as for defence, capable of moving in its own orbit between the two great gravitational masses of the United States and the Soviet Union; and the fostering of its growth in both

aspects must be a major preoccupation of foreign policy in the immediate future.

Whatever progress may be made towards the closer integration of Western Europe, and whatever leadership Britain may be able to impart to the movement, it will need to be buttressed at every point by the strength of the Atlantic Alliance. Grave as are the dissensions between the N.A.T.O. Powers that were provoked or revealed by the Suez adventure, they have fortunately not resulted in any serious divergence of policy in the area the organization was primarily designed to protect. Mutual confidence has no doubt been shaken; but time and enduring community of interest should suffice to restore it, and it may be hoped that the Prime Minister's forthcoming meeting with President Eisenhower will hasten the process.

N.A.T.O.—United Europe—new guarantees for the Middle East—the Baghdad Pact—and through it a link across Asia with S.E.A.T.O. in the Far East: these are the interlocking elements in an international system that can effectively police the danger zones of the world. It is evident that at present the chain is broken by the lacuna where the middle link should be. It cannot be filled by the United Nations, but only by restoring the most intimate co-operation between the United States, the Power now preparing by virtue of the Eisenhower doctrine to assume new responsibilities in the Middle East, and Great Britain, the world Power with most vital interests and longest experience in the region.

The whole needs to be sustained, as always, by the co-ordinating influence of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Another article\* analyses in the light of the Suez imbroglio what is the proper function of the Commonwealth in maintaining the international rule of law, what it should do, can do and cannot do. All its members now belong to one or more other combinations, and it has become inevitable that there shall be occasions when not only is there no concerted Commonwealth policy but members are actually arrayed against one another in international debate. All of them, however, stand on the same side (Indian "neutralism" apart) in the fundamental division of the world; and the prime service that the Commonwealth can and should render to the cause of liberal civilization is that it maintains in every regional association members in such constant and intimate communication with one another that no initiative by one of them will ever take the rest by surprise. If that daily, and if need be hourly, communication, the very lifeblood of the modern Commonwealth, is kept flowing, then there should be no need for any of its nations to pause and consult the rest specifically in an emergency when it judges immediate action to be required. Whether the action taken in the Suez crisis was right or wrong, the collective conscience must not be allowed to make cowards of us all individually. But if there can be no legitimate complaint of Sir Anthony Eden's failure to consult his Commonwealth partners, all of whose reactions could be reasonably foreseen, the failure to inform is another matter. It is in this regard that the affront has been felt, particularly in Canada, and that the damage to Commonwealth confidence has been done. But the damage is limited, and the lesson has surely been learnt.

\* See "Commonwealth and the Crisis," p. 114.

# THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY

## A CRITICAL VIEW

THE history of the search for a method of organizing world peace has been long and rather sad. The urge to contrive such an organization has generally been provided by war's devastation. The plan for the League of Nations, coming after the First World War, went much farther and was more ambitious than any of the preceding attempts.

Its failure was generally ascribed to the non-participation of the United States, the defection of Japan, Italy and Germany and the absence, during the greater part of its life, of Soviet Russia. There is of course much truth in this, and the moral to be pointed is that without co-operation between the Great Powers any world organization on such lines would be likely, if not certain, to fail.

At the end of the Second World War, when the United States appeared as the protagonist of a new world order, and when the Soviet Government seemed ready to co-operate at least in its organization, there appeared to be a good hope that an improvement on the League of Nations might be devised. It is true that, during the early discussions of the draft Charter of the U.N. at the Dumbarton Oaks conference in 1944, there were occasions when it was revealed that the Soviet Government's views on the true democratic control of world affairs differed from those instinctively held in the free countries of the West, but the chasm did not yawn until the U.N. was in being and confronted with its first problems.

Much has been written and said on the subject of the "Veto", of which the Soviet Government was by no means the only advocate. But in the light of subsequent events it will perhaps be admitted that the provision of the Veto in the Charter meant that the members of the U.N. (many of them reluctantly) were looking the facts in the face and taking account of realities.

The Veto arises from the fact that the Security Council alone of the organs of the U.N. is empowered to take *decisions* for the maintenance or restoration of the peace. That body is composed of five permanent members, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, and six elected members. Under article 27 (2) of the Charter "Decisions of the Security Council . . . shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members *including the concurring votes of the permanent members.*" Thus any one of the permanent members, even if in a minority of one, could thwart the will of the other ten members. In practice, this Veto has been used upwards of seventy times in eleven years, in the overwhelming number of cases by the Soviet Union. During the twenty-year life of the League of Nations, there were only two occasions when a resolution was defeated by a solitary vote. (Be it noted that in the League *every* member had a Veto, because all substantive resolutions of that body had to be voted *unanimously*.) This is proof, if proof were

needed, that a World Organization can work satisfactorily only so long as the Principal Powers are united in purpose.

### The Case for the Veto

ARTICLE 27 of the Charter might appear to be an anomalous and undesirable provision, but there are arguments in favour of it. In the first place, it could hardly be expected that a Great Power would bow to a bare majority decision in a matter which it regarded as affecting its vital interests. It would certainly resist by force any attempt to impose such a decision upon it, more especially if it happened to be associated with one or more of the other Great Powers, and the World Organization would go down, like its immediate predecessor, in a third world war. It would be hardly better if the Great Power or Powers simply ignored the decision and the remaining members did not seek, or dare, to enforce it. The loss of prestige which the Organization would thereby suffer might well be decisive and final. Again, much has been spoken and written about "collective security". This has been generally interpreted to mean that every member was entitled to make a claim on the assistance of all the others in the event of its becoming the victim of aggression. But in the existing state of the world such *assistance* could hardly be "collective". The brunt of action would fall upon the Principal Powers. Other States might be able to make their contribution, large or small; still others (and there might be many of them) could make none at all. This did happen in the case of Korea, but the circumstances in that case were peculiar. The Soviet member of the Security Council happened to have "walked out" some months previously in protest against action of which his Government disapproved. He had not resumed his seat when the Korean war broke out, and consequently the Security Council was able to adopt a resolution in his absence which his Government would certainly have instructed him to veto if he had been present. The Council was thus able to take rapid and appropriate decisions to which effect could be given mainly, and promptly, by the United States, which later received backing from a number of other members. There have been other instances of U.N. "Forces", in Palestine, and now in Egypt; but these are misleading analogies, and more will be written of them later. The point, in the present context, is that the burden of action in the name of "collective security" must be expected to be borne mainly if not entirely by the Principal Powers, and these should have therefore the prevailing voice in the decision to take such action. A classic instance was that of Japan's aggression in Manchuria in 1931. If the Council of the League had on that occasion decided on military sanctions against Japan, the whole burden would have fallen on the United Kingdom, for the whole action in those days would have depended on sea power: the United States was not a member of the League, and not very effective assistance could have been expected from France and Italy. The matter never came to a vote, but it is difficult to believe that such a decision could have been taken unanimously. It is true that at first sight it might be thought that all members could have joined in applying economic sanctions, but it has to be remembered that without the United States such sanctions would not have been

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very effective, and also that it was held in many quarters that effective economic sanctions would quite likely result in warlike action. When Mussolini committed aggression against Abyssinia some economic sanctions were decreed, and even applied, but they were ineffective because they did not include the particular sanctions that would have been decisive or vital for Italy.

### Schism of East and West

THE League of Nations had at one time a seemingly successful period. Apart from the good work which it achieved in the economic and social spheres, it scored successes also in the political field, and notably it can probably be said with truth that it prevented a war between Bulgaria and Greece in 1925. But it is to be noted that, during that period, the Great Powers members of the League were acting generally in concert. Japan, by her invasion of Manchuria in 1931, dealt the first serious blow. Italy followed with her invasion of Abyssinia; perhaps encouraged by these examples, Germany finally struck, and the League was in pieces.

The U.N. was from the very first hamstrung by the cleavage between East and West. Even while the San Francisco Conference was in session in 1945 certain symptoms showed that co-operation between West and East was going to be difficult, but it was not until the first session of the Security Council, which began in London towards the end of that year, that it became clear that the Soviet Government were bent on obstructing its work. They found in the U.N. a good platform for their own propaganda and for the denigration of the Western Powers. From the beginning they used the Veto freely and cynically. They even went to the length, on one occasion, of vetoing a resolution of the Security Council, not because they were not in sympathy with its object, but because they preferred their own more extreme and violent draft, thereby rejecting the proverbial half-loaf and leaving the world with no solution. At first this use, or abuse, of the Veto excited much criticism, but with the passage of years the world became accustomed to it—just another Veto to be added to the lengthening list. That is one way of using the Veto. When, as has recently happened, France and the United Kingdom resorted to it (for the first time in the latter case), it brought down upon them a storm of indignation and rebuke.

Another device employed by the Soviet Government, when the Security Council adopted a resolution of which they disapproved, was to "walk out" of the chamber. This has already been referred to above in connexion with the Korean affair.

Towards the end of 1950, after the Soviet Government had belatedly returned to the Council, the same old obstructions hampered the work of that body, with the result that the General Assembly determined to find some way of circumventing the Security Council by developing the Assembly's powers of intervening to maintain or restore the peace, and a resolution resulted which was designed for that purpose. It tended, broadly, to encourage resort to the Assembly in case of a dispute or a breach of the peace, and armed that body with certain procedures and machinery to assist it in its

task. This decision was taken rather in despair at the frustration of the Security Council and with perhaps not enough consideration of the possible countervailing disadvantages of enhancing the power of the Assembly. For that body, by its composition and procedure, is hardly fitted to usurp the critical functions of the Security Council. It now consists of no less than 80 member countries. To adopt a substantive resolution a two-thirds majority has to be mustered, and when we reflect that there are 21 "Afro-Asian" members and 10 of the Soviet *bloc*, to say nothing of 20 Latin-American members, it can be seen that it may not be difficult to muster a vote sufficient, or more than sufficient, to defeat any proposal; and indeed it is possible to imagine that such a combination (with fortuitous and scattered support from other quarters) could carry what it would by a two-thirds majority. It would be difficult to contend that such a result would represent two-thirds of the combined wisdom or maturity or experience of the totality of the members of the United Nations. And in the event that such a combination could manage to carry a resolution calling for *action* by the U.N., it must be remembered that only a very small contribution could be made by those forming the majority of it.

### The General Assembly

IT is of course an anomaly that each of the eighty members, from the United States down to the smallest and weakest neophyte, should have equal voting power. That is plainly ridiculous. Many studies have been made of a variety of plans for "weighted" voting. Many of them were ingenious, based on a combined reckoning of population, geographical area, material resources, national income, armed forces and other factors. Some of them would appear, in theory, to give the right answer. All of them have one feature in common, and that is that no one of them has any chance whatsoever of being adopted and incorporated in the Charter. That, of course, was one of the reasons for the Veto.

Then there is the fact that the Assembly can only make "recommendations" (articles 10, 11, 13, 14 and 18). It cannot decide matters or issue orders. It is maintained that, none the less, such recommendations have a certain "moral" force, and so they do, with "moral" Governments, but not with others. Colonel Nasser has for several years ignored with impunity a decision of the Security Council relating to the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal. Mr. Nehru has allowed himself to put his own interpretation on a number of decisions of the same body relating to the Kashmir issue. The Soviet Union treats with brash contempt all representations regarding the forcible repression of the Hungarian people. The U.N. is so impotent in this matter that it has to turn its face the other way, and is now practically silent under the rebuffs it has received. Is this how "justice" is to be sought? In the Suez case, we had certain compliant Governments which accepted and acted on decisions and recommendations of the U.N., and against which those decisions and recommendations were punctiliously, if not spitefully, applied. On the other hand, we have the Soviet Government a law unto itself, its outrages at first eliciting disapproval, but later apparently forgotten.



The General Assembly of the U.N. is not a World Government: it is not even a Supreme Tribunal, at least not worthy of that name. By its very composition, and by its procedure, it is unfitted for the task. The number of its members make it far too unwieldy a body to be capable of the administration of justice. And there is no real accepted code of law. The eighty delegates represent many different races and creeds; they are composed of individuals of diverse traditions and outlook; they are from many lands at various stages of development; they speak for their respective Governments and their instructions are in most cases framed to secure advantage for the Government which they represent or to make propaganda on its behalf, or against other Governments represented in the Organization.

### **Temptation of Publicity**

THAT is one of the dangers besetting any World Organization consisting of representatives of sovereign independent States. This was recognized to some extent in the early days of the League of Nations, when the Council, consisting of only a handful of delegates, sat round an oblong table in a comparatively modest hall of the League Building at Geneva. Two or three of the members actually sat with their backs to the public, but this arrangement gave the appearance (and perhaps something more than the appearance) of a personal exchange of views between men sincerely seeking a just solution of a problem. There were generally no set speeches, and the arts of the orator, or demagogue, were not practised to influence or bemuse public opinion. With the passage of time and the pressure in favour of increased publicity, the inevitable happened. The Council was installed in a larger hall with a bigger table, which eventually assumed a horseshoe form, to focus the stream of oratory on the public. And this setting was adopted and raised to a higher power at the U.N. Debates there are conducted with a steady eye on the public and harangues are devised, by those with the talent for it, to make the strongest appeal to sentiment in a manner that we do not associate with the administration of justice.

While the draft of the Charter was under discussion, much was said of the necessity of "putting teeth into it", and a section of that document is devoted to prescribing in rather general terms how that should be done. The delegations of the Principal Powers that went to New York early in 1946 for the first session there of the Security Council included numerous and impressive representatives of their naval, military and air staffs. These at once embarked on discussions of the manner of giving effect to this section of the Charter. They at once met with Soviet obstruction at every point, procedural or other, of a nature to excite admiration if it had not been so discouraging and frustrating. And that endured for as many months as had to elapse before the patience of the other delegations gave out, and the service sections gradually dwindled away. Thus it is doubtful whether, in anything like present conditions, an organization on the pattern of the League or the U.N. can be provided with a permanent military force such as was intended by the Charter.

As mentioned above, there have been instances of U.N. "Forces", in

Palestine and Egypt, but these were more in the nature of police forces, or mere observer corps, and in neither case were they designed or equipped for serious warlike operations. It is true that such a force may have some "moral" effect (though that was not sufficient to prevent the murder of Count Folke Bernadotte, the commander of the force in Palestine). It might be assumed that any national force, and any Government under whose orders it was operating, would hesitate to put a bullet through a U.N. steel helmet, for fear of bringing down upon it the wrath and retribution of the respectable majority of the other nations. It is incredible, for instance, that our Government would not take every precaution to prevent such a happening. But is it certain that this could be said of all Governments? In Korea the North Koreans and the Chinese fought determinedly against forces which, though they may not have worn U.N. armbands and helmets, were fighting under the flag of the U.N. Would the U.N. General Assembly today have the nerve to order the U.N. "Force" to advance across the Austro-Hungarian frontier into Hungary?

### Not a World Government

ALL the foregoing may be thought by some to be ultra-pessimistic at a time when there is a tendency to hail U.N. action in the Suez affair as demonstrating an accession of strength and authority to the U.N., and the establishment of the U.N. "Force" as a welcome and encouraging outcome of the crisis. But to be realistic, we must remember that the U.N. has sought to maintain or re-establish the peace only where the path of peace has been made smooth for it, and has turned its back on other conflicts in other regions where it has found the path too rugged. It makes a useful contribution with its "Force" where that "Force" is welcomed and meets with loyal co-operation. Does this represent any sort of advance in the enforcement of justice throughout the world? Has not the U.N. proved its inability to discharge this function? To put it bluntly, has it not proved itself to be a delusion? And all delusions are dangerous.

We have to ask ourselves whether, at this stage, the world has yet reached a point of development where it is possible for such ambitious schemes of world organization to be reliable and successful. The U.N. is not, any more than was the League of Nations, a World Government. It is merely a meeting place for the representatives of eighty sovereign independent Governments to discuss and wrangle in their several and conflicting interests. It may be that in a century or more hence, if this planet survives, it will be possible to establish a World Government. It is to be feared that the time required for this stage in evolution may be cut short by some ultimate disaster, which may leave so few of the human race alive and so few shreds of what we have come to regard as civilization that the world will have to go back to the beginning and start again. Perhaps we have proved our failure: a fresh start may be part of the Great Design.

Meanwhile is there no other way to progress towards peace and the brotherhood of man? The only hope appears to be to follow a different method. Perhaps the great experiments of the League and the U.N. were too

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ambitious and premature; perhaps we were wrong in dreaming that a Palace of Peace could be brought into being at the wave of a magic wand; perhaps it has to be built laboriously, from the ground up, brick by brick. Associations of like-minded peoples can be created, based on a certain identity of aims or compelled by a common danger. The British Commonwealth of Nations is an example, which was once boldly held up to a rather disconcerted Assembly of the League of Nations by the late Sir Austen Chamberlain. In those days it might have been argued that the Commonwealth was a peculiar association based largely on common racial origins and common traditions and linked by the Crown. But the Commonwealth, like any healthy organism, grows and develops, and today it counts among its citizens millions of men of different races and creeds. N.A.T.O. is another example, based primarily on defence against a clearly seen danger. But it too, it is to be hoped, may grow and develop in other directions, and efforts were made in the spring of last year to give more attention to the non-military objectives which are assigned to it.

There is of course the risk that groups of this kind may only increase the cleavages and sharpen the enmities between nations, but dangers lurk alongside every path, and it is possible to hope, at least, that if some of these separate associations prove that their way of life is better than some others, they may gain an attractive force and eventually draw into their orbit the greater part of mankind. At the present stage the chief emphasis must be upon defence against present perils, which threaten to bring disaster upon the whole of mankind. Behind this shield we can only hope and pray that it may prove possible slowly to construct a system that will win the acceptance of all and assure them a safe refuge. We must build upon a solid foundation, and at present it does not seem that that can be found in the welter of the U.N.

# COMMONWEALTH AND THE CRISIS

## BONDS STRAINED BUT UNBROKEN

A WRITER in the June 1956 issue of THE ROUND TABLE on "The Future of the Commonwealth" observed that

when two ideologies are so flatly contradictory as that of neutralism and independence and that of the Commonwealth—belonging together—one or other must be preferred and win. The time is coming . . . when the question will need to be put to the constituents of the Commonwealth: do you, or do you not, accept that this belonging-together involves both rights and responsibilities? At least the responsibility of consultation as the obverse of the right to be consulted?

This problem has been illustrated in a most vivid and realistic way by events that have since occurred.

The ROUND TABLE writer evidently had in mind that the newer Asian members of the Commonwealth would be the ones that would hesitate to answer "Yes" to the question about rights and responsibilities. But the second question, about consultation, might suggest to some minds, in the light of the Suez crisis, that the older, "white" members may themselves be unwilling to fulfil the responsibilities of "belonging together" if these require consultation before deciding upon any international action or policy. For one of the many charges of mishandling levied against the United Kingdom Government for its conduct in October–November 1956 is that it failed to consult even its fellow member governments of the Commonwealth before acting, outside previously declared policies, in a way that intimately concerned their interests, and might have provoked war.

In order to weigh this charge justly we must consider the facts as they occurred. In the situation that confronted Britain and France in the last days of October there were certain new factors, but a great deal also that was not new. The Arab-Israeli conflict had been bitter and violent ever since the foundation of Israel in 1947. Egypt and her other Arab neighbours had never accepted her legitimacy, and talked freely of a "second round" in which they would eliminate her by force of arms; and the "second round" prospect was also deeply and hopefully embedded in the Jewish outlook. The Tripartite Declaration pledging British, American and French support for Israel against aggression was six years old. In the Arab countries latent anti-Western mass feeling had been steadily seeping to the surface: it was on March 2 last, as one of many portents of this, that the King of Jordan dismissed Lieutenant-General Glubb.

On June 13 the last British troops left the Suez Canal base, ahead of the time fixed by treaty engagement, to the sound of boastful and hostile Egyptian propaganda. Egypt was now receiving arms from Russia and the Communist countries on a big scale, and a catastrophic arms race between the Arab

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States and Israel was threatening, despite the pacifying policies of the Western powers. Such was the Middle Eastern scene that confronted the Commonwealth Prime Ministers when they met in London at the end of June for their seventh post-war conference. At least up to that point we may assume that there had been the fullest Commonwealth consultation.

On July 26 Colonel Nasser seized the Suez Canal, which had always been regarded as a life-line not only of Britain but of the Commonwealth itself, and whose security had repeatedly figured as a declared common objective of its members' defence policies. This might have seemed, *prima facie*, an occasion for calling a special Commonwealth meeting. The reason for not doing so, however, was overwhelmingly strong. This was much more than a Commonwealth problem, and the 22-nation London conference was not only the right response but largely comprehended the Commonwealth alternative; for Australia, India, Pakistan and New Zealand were members of the Conference, as well as the United Kingdom. It was at this time that the radically different approach of India to the Canal situation from that of her fellow members of the Commonwealth, indeed that of the vast majority of the nations concerned, became apparent. This, it should be emphasized, was not an "Afro-Asian", "anti-colonial" or racial division: Pakistan and Ethiopia, for instance, were actually members of the Menzies mission which took the 18-nation plan to Cairo.

After Colonel Nasser had rejected that solution, there was a short phase in which the Users' Association plan invented by Mr. Dulles was first embraced by Britain and then deflated by its own author; this was followed by reference to the United Nations—always regarded by the theorists of Commonwealth consultation as the greater comprehending the less. There is no reason to suppose—nor is it suggested by the critics—that during all this period, up to late October, when the Suez Canal direct negotiations were laid in suspense, there was any lapse of the system of continuous interchange of information on the developments of international affairs between members of the Commonwealth through the usual and ample channels.

### The Eve of Intervention

SUCH was the background to the dramatic events of the last days of October. It may be well to summarize how matters then stood, as seen by any Commonwealth member thus kept informed.

1. Egypt and the Arab League countries had sworn to exterminate Israel, to whose defence all Commonwealth members were bound under the United Nations Charter, and the United Kingdom specifically bound under the Tripartite Declaration.
2. Both sides were breaking the Israeli-Arab truce with provocative and retaliatory border raids.
3. Egypt was receiving arms from Russia and Czechoslovakia on a large scale with the open object of securing a preponderance over Israel.
4. Egypt, having already acted persistently in breach of the 1888 Canal Convention and in defiance of the United Nations by stopping the transit

of Israeli ships or cargoes, had seized the Canal from the international concessionnaires.

5. The British Government had repeatedly declared that a situation in which the control and management of this international highway remained in the hands of one country was "intolerable".

6. Since the rape of the Canal a mobile Anglo-French force had been assembled in Cyprus and at other Mediterranean bases, against eventualities that might require its use in the Middle East.

7. It had also been a cardinal point of British policy, explicitly emphasized to Messrs. Bulganin and Krushchev when they visited London in April, that Middle Eastern oil was a literally vital interest for Britain, which she would defend as she would her own territory.

A realistic view of these facts must have led inexorably to two prognostications: that sooner or later there would be large-scale war between Israel and her Arab neighbours; and that when that happened the British and French would intervene under some banner or other, and in so doing would seek to safeguard their interest in the Suez Canal. It must be assumed that every Commonwealth government was as cognizant of this as were intelligent newspaper-readers everywhere. Military plans—which would have to take account of various possible events—would not, of course, be exchanged. But again certain known facts spoke for themselves.

The British and French action when Israel launched an invasion of Egypt on October 29 can hardly, therefore, be regarded as surprising or contrary to open policies. Whether it was wise is not the question now under consideration. The point here is that Commonwealth governments had a long period through the summer—the build-up of military forces adequate for the kind of action contemplated took the unconscionable time of two-and-a-half months—in which to make any representations to London by way of objection to the actual or probable course of policy, or of support for alternative ways of dealing with the situation.

Whether they did so or not we do not know. What we do know is that they were not given any opportunity of pressing such representations at the eleventh hour. The Anglo-French ultimatum of October 30 was delivered to Egypt and Israel without, it is understood, any previous notification to Commonwealth members or to the United States. Time was short, events were moving very fast, but the loss of a couple of hours while the Government performed the minimum courtesy of informing fellow members of the Commonwealth in advance of so drastic a stroke of policy does not seem too high a price to have paid for avoiding the recriminations that have since been heaped upon them on this score.

That there was time for consultation, as distinct from information, is quite another proposition. It could be sustained only on the assumption that there was sufficient common ground to enable the consultation to be very quickly completed. Seeking opinions that there is no intention of accepting is humbug; seeking opinions that are known in advance to be fundamentally hostile to action already, in the broad, decided upon, is futile. The absence of

Commonwealth consultation in either of those senses would not be a matter for regret.

### Perplexities of the White Members

THE actual reactions of the various Commonwealth members suggests that even with all the expert advice and inside information available to them they had not drawn the inferences as to probable British policy that in retrospect seem so obvious; for there is in them a strong element of puzzlement and surprise. Thus even Mr. Menzies, while announcing\* the Australian Cabinet's unanimous support of Britain's action, found it desirable to excuse her—on grounds of great emergency and vital interest—from blame for having decided to use force without first seeking the consent of the Commonwealth countries and the United States. And Mr. Holland, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, giving equally loyal support, used language† about disturbing features in the situation, having "full confidence in Britain's intentions", and hopes that in due course there would be wider understanding of her motives, which plainly suggests that he was taken aback, and himself felt greatly in need of explanation.

There seems little doubt that those two countries would, if informed and consulted in time, have treated Britain's intended action with comprehension and sympathy. What indication have we on this point as to the other members? South Africa's reaction was epitomized in the statement by Mr. Erasmus, Minister of Defence in the Union, on November 1, that "South Africa was under no obligation to take part in clashes in the Middle East". Morally, she washed her hands of the matter, we are led to conclude; indeed a country that had been harried by the United Nations for year after year about what it considered its domestic and sovereign affairs was hardly to be expected to regard that body as an infallible repository of moral obligation.

The Canadian Government's reaction was quite different. So hostile was it initially to the Anglo-French action that when Mr. Lester Pearson, the Minister of External Affairs, said‡ that the crisis threatened to cause a split in the Commonwealth (and Mr. St. Laurent, the Prime Minister, used similar terms) it was widely understood both in Canada and in Britain and elsewhere that he referred to the possibility of Canada's seceding. Much later he explained that he was thinking only of the position of the Asian members. Canada was, of course, powerfully affected by her position as a North American power: it would have been surprising to find Ottawa completely contradicting Washington on such an occasion. Nevertheless there was a very real difference between their two attitudes. In the first place, any personal feelings of disgruntlement or affront were quickly submerged in Canada, and at no time was it impossible for Mr. Pearson and the United Kingdom representative at the United Nations to have amicable and constructive discussions; whereas one of the most conspicuous aspects of Washington policy was the way in which personal pique appeared not only to mould

\* See also p. 165.

† See also p. 185.

‡ See also p. 178.

policy but to petrify it in hostility long after the cause had disappeared. In the second place, there was a distinct difference in attitude towards the United Nations. For Canada, the United Nations is an essential practical part of that internationalist structure whereby the American and the British gravitational pulls upon her are reconciled, and she herself prospers as a small power, though rich, vulnerable and immense in geographical size between two oceans. It is no mere form, for her, no mere rubric in the ritual of world peace, as it has been for the United States in the sacerdotal phase of Eisenhowerism. It has not only to be respected, and kept alive, but made to work; and Canada's efforts in the Suez crisis were soon bent to making the United Nations an effective solvent of the problems precipitated, through the formation and deployment of the Emergency Force. In this she was helpful to Britain and to the Commonwealth as a whole.

### The Anti-Colonial Motive

THERE remain the Asian members of the Commonwealth. For Ceylon, Mr. Bandaranaike said on November 1 that while he felt that Britain and France had attacked Egypt without adequate justification, Ceylon would maintain her position of strict neutrality. Not so India, who frankly abandoned her neutralism and came down flatly against Britain and France. A strong protest was delivered to the United Kingdom Government; an official statement expressed the hope that all freedom-loving countries would strongly condemn this "naked aggression", and Mr. Nehru sent a personal message of sympathy to Colonel Nasser. All this was before the United Nations had debated the matter, before the cease-fire resolution, and therefore was a unilateral Indian view.

Pakistan's attitude\* was by comparison restrained, though she had the special tie of being like Egypt a Muslim country, and had more than once pledged her solidarity to the Islamic ideal. Pakistan, said her Prime Minister, Mr. Suhrawardy, would in no circumstances uphold recourse to force; and he called at once for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign troops.

One more thing, and it is important, remains to be said about the immediate reactions of the Commonwealth members to the Suez crisis. On November 1 the United Nations General Assembly voted by a majority of 62 to 2 (Britain and France) to put the Middle East issue on its urgent agenda; there were seven abstentions, including Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The next day it passed a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire. The minority of five (against 64) included Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and there were six abstentions, including Canada and South Africa. No one, looking at those facts, could claim that the Commonwealth connexion had been ineffective in a crisis, at least as regards the older "white" member nations.

As to the newer, Asian members, the obvious truth is that their Asian and "anti-colonial" connexion had the upper hand. There is nothing surprising, and certainly nothing reprehensible, in this prevailing of the one influence over the other. On occasions the United Kingdom, or Canada, say, has been

\* See also p. 173.



moved by a regional interest to the detriment of a Commonwealth interest, or has found the Commonwealth interest divided and has chosen that part of it which conformed to her regional or similar motives. (A classic example is the Washington Conference of 1920, at which the United Kingdom, under pressure from the United States and Canada, accepted a Far Eastern and disarmament policy which Australia and New Zealand thought inimical, and which certainly was not a Commonwealth policy as such.)

What is interesting, and more surprising, is the firmness and zeal with which the leaders of those Asian countries—Mr. Nehru, Mr. Suhrawardy and Mr. Bandaranaike—defended their policy of remaining in the Commonwealth notwithstanding their acute differences with Britain and her friends. Mr. Nehru had to repel a particularly strong demand for India's resignation from so "colonialist" and aggressive an association.

That the Commonwealth in its present multi-racial form should have withstood this assault on its coherence, its sense of "belonging together", is itself a remarkable tribute to its viability. Its bonds, slight as they appear to be, have evidently a tenacity that may have surprised many outside observers. In particular, the reactions are proof of the worth that the experienced leaders of the Asian member countries attach to their membership. We in Britain who speak of the value to ourselves of keeping this peculiar and irreplaceable link with countries of Asia, as a bridge across the gulf between races and continents, often forget that the bridge renders the same service for those on the other side of it.

On the other hand, the question has been raised in Britain whether, though India may want the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth wants India. India, in this context, is distinguished from Pakistan and Ceylon because her hostility to British policies went far beyond dissent, and extended to active efforts to frustrate them and to bring aid and comfort to those who at the moment appeared as Britain's enemies. Attention has already been drawn to the contrast between Indian and Pakistani attitudes towards the redressing of Colonel Nasser's seizure of the Canal. Indian courting of Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev, and of Mr. Chou en-Lai, and Mr. Nehru's blocking of the United Nations over Kashmir after using the United Nations as a heavy stick with which to beat Britain and France, have helped to form the emotional atmosphere in which this question has been raised.

### A Nursery of Nations

IT is enough to say at the present stage that the issue is very real, and will continue to rear its head. If there is no community of outlook or approach whatever, if all the meetings and exchanges of information at various levels can produce no effect in a mutual moderation of policies, then the Commonwealth, it is felt, must become a mockery; would it not be better to face this fact before it expires miserably in some unforeseeable but inevitable circumstances?

The argument from fundamental differences of international outlook could obviously be extended to fundamental differences over the problems of race and colour. Those people in Britain (not to mention the non-white countries

of the Commonwealth) who demand the expulsion of South Africa, because her racial policies are incompatible with the ideal of human equality and non-discrimination by race on which the modern Commonwealth is founded, are far from being the same people as those who would like to exclude India: but both argue in effect from the proposition that a minimum assent to certain common principles ought to be the condition of membership of a club or community of this sort.

Both groups of critics, however, would probably admit the force, from their different points of view, of a counter-argument based, not on the Commonwealth's immediate past, but on its immediate future: not looking back in anger, but forward in hope. The period that saw the Commonwealth riven by the Suez crisis saw also the bringing to birth of its first African autonomous member, Ghana. To be born into this established international and multi-racial community is a benefit of enormous value to this new nation, as it will be for others that will follow. A split of the Commonwealth on grounds either of racial policy, or of international policy which in the circumstances would be given the hue of racial bias, would shatter and destroy much of this value. If the Commonwealth has no other mission, it has at least this for the next decade or more, to be progenitor, sponsor and home-maker for new nations in Africa, the West Indies and Eastern Asia. They are the unborn infants in the womb whom parental divorce, as in the domestic home, could turn into problem children. For their sake at least it may be counted a blessing that the Commonwealth survived the Suez crisis without irreparable damage.



# THE WATCH ON THE ELBE

## DEFENCE AT THE GERMAN POLLS

GERMANY with her problems has become a bore. This is a bald statement, but few would dispute that it accurately reflects the views of many people who even a few short years ago would have been willing to admit that the future of Germany was of the utmost concern to the free world. Britain and France have been baffled by the insolubility of the problem of Germany's reunification, annoyed by the slowness of German rearmament and by the rapidity in the increase of German exports, and overwhelmed by their preoccupations either in the economic field at home or in the Middle East and in their dependent territories oversea. It would no doubt be helpful if the heavy demands made by these problems on the energies of Western statesmen could be eased by a corresponding load-shedding of the German problem. Unfortunately, history and politics do not work that way. The general irritation with German problems is no constructive contribution to their solution. We are in some danger of repeating the mistake of the twenties, when nobody bothered about German developments and people were much surprised when they were suddenly faced with the Third Reich.

Not that there is any danger of a national-socialist revival today. However, no student of German affairs can doubt that German democracy and German links with the West—the two things are more closely related than people here or in Germany like to admit—could be severely strained by an economic slump. There is a difference between economic and political consolidation in the Federal Republic. The first is more impressive, but for this very reason it makes both German and foreign observers overlook that political consolidation of the new German democracy has not yet been achieved. Gallup polls are of doubtful value; nevertheless it is of some significance that such a poll undertaken at the height of the Suez and Hungarian crises in most European countries proved that German public opinion was by far the most unbalanced and frightened.

When the first Minister of Defence, Herr Blank, was replaced by the youthful and ebullient Bavarian, Herr Franz Strauss, there was some hope in N.A.T.O. that the German "economic miracle" might be followed by an equally miraculous increase in German military strength. Yet progress is still very slow with Germany's rearmament and the contribution it is expected to make to the easing of the economic burden of this country. The reasons are composed of an emotional reaction against "militarism" and a fear of the economic consequences resulting from the diversion of German financial and industrial resources to rearmament. Many thoughtful Germans are also worried by the lack of comprehension their new allies show for their fears that, in view of the long German historic tradition of weakness in civil government, Germany's free institutions may not be sufficiently firm to be able to prevent the military from once again succumbing to the "Nemesis of Power". Anyone

who has been present at international discussions and has seen how Western representatives, worried by their own economic and industrial problems, are apt to push aside these German arguments with a mixture of irritation and incomprehension can only marvel at the shortness of our collective memory. The West is on much firmer ground when it points out to the Germans that all these obstacles to a quicker and stronger German defence contribution are nothing new. The German Government ought not to have entered into its commitments if it did not feel reasonably certain that it could carry them out.

Nowadays a new brake has been applied to the German defence effort. This is a suggestion that any moment now the West, which spent the first six years after the war telling the Germans that it was wicked for them to want an army, and the next six years telling them that it was wicked not to want one, may be willing to come to a deal with the Russians which would require not only a neutralized but a disarmed Germany. We are here faced with a seeming paradox. The same Germans who have convinced themselves and are trying hard to convince their allies that the new German *Wehrmacht* is almost too heavy a burden to bear, are the first to react against any suggestion that as a result of some general easing of international tension this burden may be lifted from them. They protest that to prevent Germany from having her own forces would be an unjustified discrimination and would lead to a lack in *Gleichberechtigung*, a word dear to German politicians between the two wars which, to borrow a slogan from British education, may best be translated by "parity of esteem". Illogical as this attitude appears it is only fair to admit that it is understandable. It is one thing freely to decide the level of one's own defence expenditure, it is quite another to be told that there is to be none.

National pride is apt to be most sensitive during election campaigns, and Federal Germany will be going to the poll in the autumn of this year to elect its third parliament since the war. The parties are going to have a fine old time. For the election campaign is not going to be restrained by any pusillanimous consideration for legal limits to electioneering finance, which might restrict the free flow of propaganda. The Germans, believing in a free economy, find restrictions on the money that candidates may spend during the campaign, such as are enforced in Great Britain, odd and old-fashioned. Furthermore, the Federal Parliament recently passed a law which permits every penny of financial support for political purposes to be set off against income tax. For those willing to give but afraid of thereby revealing their political sympathies, various harmless and "non-political" organizations have been created to which they may contribute in safety.

### Prestige of Dr. Adenauer

DR. ADENAUER's party has decided, wisely one feels, to run its campaign once again on the Chancellor's tremendous reputation. It is true that amongst the politicians of his own party and of the government coalition his glory has somewhat palled. It is equally true that for the broad masses of the electorate he is the symbol of peace and prosperity. Germans with their

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different political tradition do not share the almost automatic feeling of Western electorates that, after a period, it is time for a change. On the contrary, there are many who would hold it to be their patriotic duty to vote for the Chancellor because he is the Chancellor. No outside observer with any sense likes to commit himself by forecasting election results in other countries half a year ahead. Nevertheless it may be doubted whether the widespread belief based on recent local elections, that the Social Democratic Opposition will become the majority party, is likely to be justified by the event.

Dr. Adenauer, with all his gifts of a statesman, is also a very shrewd politician. During the next months we may have to put up with some surprising pronouncements from him. He will feel that he deserves the fullest confidence of the Western Chancelleries, and that the West ought to understand that if he says some odd things this is simply to ensure that their truest friend shall lead the German Government after the elections. The campaign is bound to emphasize the differences between the Christian Democratic Government and the Social Democratic Opposition; and it is thus just as well to remember the common ground between them, a common ground that is much bigger than one would suppose from electioneering speeches and literature.

The Christian Democrats (C.D.U.) and the Social Democrats (S.P.D.) are united in their opposition to Soviet Communism. Many thoughtful supporters of the Chancellor have never been happy about his attempt to sow doubts as to the "Western" reliability of the S.P.D. Both parties are, in fact, agreed that rather than accept German unification on Soviet terms they prefer the present arrangement. Both are agreed that the Federal Republic must have a Western orientation in its political structure and in its economic relations. There are different views on how far this implies also links with the Western defence effort and, in particular, with N.A.T.O. Socialist propagandists in the field go very far in their readiness to jeopardize N.A.T.O., since they feel that only by offering German neutrality is there the slightest hope that Russia would agree to let its occupation zone go. At headquarters, however, Socialists are much more cautious, and say that there can be no question of a unilateral withdrawal by Germany from N.A.T.O. if they form the next government.

Thus the alleged difference in loyalty to the West between the two main contenders is more apparent than real. Both feel themselves bound by Germany's present agreements with N.A.T.O. All one can say is that a Germany governed after September of this year by the C.D.U. will be on the side of those in the Western camp who would be very cautious in dismantling N.A.T.O. while not ruling out such a possibility as a result of a general settlement. If, as is unlikely, the S.P.D. led the next government, they would obey their N.A.T.O. obligations but would be amongst those Western statesmen who might feel it worth while to make an offer of sacrificing N.A.T.O. on the altar of a general European Security Pact.

German Socialists point to the many tentative proposals emanating from both sides of the Atlantic which, albeit vaguely, talk of a neutral belt in the centre of Europe within the framework of disarmament and security

agreements. In this connexion Herr Ollenhauer, the Socialist leader, recently declared that while the Federal Republic would always stand by its N.A.T.O. commitments his party felt that the creation of a united Germany, joining the Federal Republic with the Soviet Zone, would create new circumstances which would make N.A.T.O. membership for such a united Germany impossible. Before the West gets too alarmed by this pronouncement it is as well to remember that reunification of Germany is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future, and that it will only be brought about by such a far-reaching and complete change in East-West relations that others besides the German Social Democrats may feel that N.A.T.O.'s military provisions, at any rate, have lost their usefulness. After all, N.A.T.O. was created as a bulwark against Soviet aggression. So far as can be foreseen German reunification and with it German lack of interest in N.A.T.O., can only follow the general conviction in the Western world that Soviet Russia has ceased to be aggressive.

In fact, therefore, Government and Opposition hold the same fundamental views on German membership in N.A.T.O. and, linked with it, on German reunification in freedom. Judging by the election campaign so far, this almost complete identity of views is not going to prevent the party machines from making reunification the main foreign policy issue. Whether the electorate will be with them is another matter. Although most German politicians would throw up their hands in horror at the suggestion, it may be said that many Germans are beginning to get bored by the attempts of each party to show that they are keener on reunification than their opponents. People begin to feel that ten years of talk, conferences, plans and proposals have not brought reunification any nearer. There is a growing realization that it will not come about simply by wishing for it from the bottom of one's heart, nor will it come about simply by the will of Germany's new allies. The Soviet Union holds the key to any solution.

### Revival of Stalinism

**D**OUBT and despondency about a quick result have been increased now that the talk of co-existence, which reached its peak at the Geneva conference in 1955, has given place to the deep freeze of revived Stalinism in Russian foreign affairs. Events in Hungary and Poland make it appear much less likely to the Germans that Russia will be willing in the near future to give up its zone of Germany, since this would clearly imply the end of Russia's European satellite empire. Doubt and despondency about the chances of a purely European security system, which was to bring about Russia's agreement to reunification, have also increased. It has not escaped some German observers that such European security agreement would be worthless from the Western point of view unless it were underwritten by the United States. Europe west of the Iron Curtain, however united, would be no match for direct or indirect Soviet penetration unless the United States continued to defend it. It is only a small step from this thought to the next that is haunting many Germans. Given the fact that European security against the Soviet Union cannot be achieved without active American backing, what is there to

prevent the Americans from coming to a direct agreement with the Soviet Union without regard for German reunification? This view overlooks the obligations that America assumed when she joined N.A.T.O. Nevertheless, those Germans who see nothing odd in the suggestion that the West should have changed sides in April 1945 and marched with the remnants of Hitler's army against the Soviet Union think a "switch of alliance", to give such betrayal a polite name, a perfectly respectable move of *Realpolitik*.

The attitude of the German electorate is also much influenced by the growing realization that it will not be possible to achieve the reunification of the Federal Republic with the Soviet Zone without an agreement on the territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line. Spokesmen both of the German Government and of the Western allies have a patent solution to this vexed problem: the delimitation of the Eastern frontiers of a reunited Germany must be left to the peace congress. Most people now have realized that this easy way out leads into a *cul de sac*. It is almost impossible to imagine a situation in which Russia would be willing to give up its puppet régime in the Soviet Zone of Germany without the most binding guarantees for the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line, both by a reunited Germany and by the Western powers. As an essay in political speculation one could imagine a situation in which Soviet Russia in order to make sure of the loyalty of the Gomulka Government in Poland might take the desperate course of allowing German reunification while leaving the new Polish-German frontier undefined. Even to mention this speculation is to show that it has no political chances of being realized.

Both the German Government and Opposition are convinced that there is no historical justification for the Oder-Neisse Line as Germany's Eastern frontier. Nevertheless there have been some indications that both might be willing to accept it if this proved to be the only way to achieve reunification. Such statements have always been tentative. They have always been followed by an outcry from the organizations of the refugees from the territories beyond the Oder-Neisse Line. It is easy to overestimate the political weight of these organizations since the vast bulk of the refugees have now been happily integrated in the West German economy, which is one of the most remarkable achievements of German post-war history. It is also easy to over-estimate the numbers of these refugees. They are terribly high in all conscience; but they have been artificially inflated by the simple device of counting as a refugee every child born to parents who lived in the territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line before the outbreak of war in 1939. Many a German boy or girl who has no experience whatever of the Eastern territories, who has been brought up, gone to school, and by now even found a job in the Rhineland or in Bavaria, would no doubt be as surprised as are students of German political statistics if he were told that he was a "technical" refugee.

In spite of this it is unlikely that during the election campaign either the Government or the Opposition will be willing to risk a loss of votes by further announcements indicating readiness to accept, if need be, the Oder-Neisse Line. Thus in Germany a discussion on Germany's Eastern frontier

will remain taboo, as taboo as it is for the Polish Government or for the Poles in Exile. And Germans begin to realize that as long as this state of unreal if understandable silence continues they cannot hope to produce constructive proposals for the solution of the problem which everyone in Germany proclaims to be their problem No. 1, the reunification of the Federal Republic with the Soviet Zone.

The recognition of the present stalemate on this question does not mean that German politicians of whatever party are likely to resign themselves to an acceptance of the division of their country. It would not be fair for us to expect them to do so. But it is fair to expect that the Germans will realize the desperate difficulty created by Hitler's war and will cease to maintain, as the great majority of them now do maintain, and as their children are taught in school, that the division of their country is all the fault of the Allies, who gratuitously yielded to the Russians at Yalta. The Yalta agreement has now few admirers in this country; but to consider it the *causa causans* of Germany's division, and to refuse to acknowledge that without Hitler's war there would have been no Yalta, is not likely to create trust and confidence between Germany and her Western allies.

### Economic Recovery

FOREIGN policy always held pride of place in German political discussions. What distinguishes the present election campaign is the startling fact that, for the first time, social affairs bid fair to claim in equal measure the attention of the German electorate. The West today admires the "economic miracle" of the German recovery. To many of us Germany is now the most stable, economically healthy and trustworthy bulwark against Bolshevism on the Continent; and some Americans would even rate her strength higher than that of this country. But international relations are frequently bedevilled by a time-lag between the true position of a country and the picture of its position created abroad. Thoughtful Germans dislike the very term "economic miracle" and like to point out that the gross national product of the Federal Republic is even today less than three-quarters of that of the United Kingdom.

Certainly German recovery since the war has been quite remarkable. Yet there is increasing support in Germany for the view that the summer of 1955 has seen the end of the rapid rise in the German economy. German reconstruction has often been financed by methods that are safe as long as prosperity continues but make her economy highly vulnerable should confidence cease. As in the heyday of the Weimar Republic short-term loans have been used to finance long-term projects, and some leaders of the German business community are eloquent in their description of the potential dangers arising therefrom. Some economic indicators lead to conclusions about the health of the German economy that provide food for thought. Since the middle of 1955 the rate of increase in productivity and savings has dipped. The rate of increase in government expenditure has almost doubled (while in this country this has happened to the rate of decrease). The rate of consumer spending has also gone up somewhat in Germany. Above all, the rate of increase in



hourly wages, in relation to the cost of living, has soared both absolutely and when compared with Great Britain.

Now the climate of industrial relations is changing. The docility of the German trade unions since 1945 has been noted abroad with admiration or impatience according to the point of view of the observer. No one is likely to underestimate the part played in German recovery by the tremendous drive of German industrialists and by foreign aid, mainly American but also, in the earlier years, British. The fact remains that currency reform, which is the foundation of German recovery, could not have been a success if German workers had not forgone their share of the advantages that particular type of currency reform brought to German industry. It now seems that this honeymoon is over. Those who are charged with keeping the German economy on an even keel are faced by the same difficulties with which successive Chancellors of the Exchequer in this country have had to cope when they found that employers and trade unions were pressure groups of roughly equal strength.

### A Test Strike

FOR the last three months the metal-workers' union has led a strike in Schleswig-Holstein which is generally recognized to be a test case for the whole of Western Germany. They have chosen Schleswig-Holstein because it is by far the poorest district of Germany. They argue that, if the employers in that area can be forced to agree to their demands, those in the wealthier parts of Germany will have no chance to resist. There is another argument for having picked on Schleswig-Holstein, although it is generally not stated so loudly—the workers in the richest part of the Federal Republic, on both sides of the Rhine from the Dutch to the Swiss frontiers, have had such a rise in their standard of living that they do not show much stomach for an industrial fight that might endanger their hire-purchase contracts. These well-to-do workers are causing some anxiety to Socialist Party headquarters; not that they are ever likely to vote for the C.D.U., but they may have become complacent enough to abstain from voting altogether. Not so in the far North of the Federal Republic, where workers have never been allowed to forget the precariousness of their position, and where even at the height of German prosperity, in September 1955, the population of Schleswig-Holstein, which is now 5 per cent of the total population of the Federal Republic, provided 12 per cent of all the unemployed.

The long-drawn-out metal-workers' strike has, somewhat surprisingly, provided more evidence of the influence of American ideas and methods, which have been such a noticeable feature of post-war life in Western Germany. The metal-workers have run their strike strictly on the latest American model. Trade unions did not demand an increase in wages, in order not to forgo the sympathy of the general public, which might have held them responsible for a subsequent rise in prices. Rather did they ask for "fringe benefits" effecting longer annual holidays and sick pay. The solidarity of the strikers is assured by generous strike pay, which gives the workers almost their average weekly wage packet. The German trade unions have gone

beyond the conventional armaments of the industrial war. They have learnt from their American mentors that in prolonged strikes wives and children of the strikers matter at least as much as the men themselves; thus they provide free cinema performances, sing-songs, tea parties, children's entertainment and, in certain cases, good meals at 6*d.* a head. The German employers are well aware of the crucial nature of this strike and they in turn are doing all they can to keep the front of the employers solid. For the first time the Federal Government has found itself compelled to intervene. The Chancellor himself has presided over a meeting, the result of which has been the granting of most of the workers' demands. At the time of writing it is not known whether both sides of industry will accept this result. Whatever the decision, it is unlikely that any German Government will find life on the economic front as easy in the future as it has been in the past.

The repercussions of this strike are affecting the election campaign. They may well be responsible for Dr. Adenauer's decision to push through the Federal Parliament now the most remarkable piece of social legislation that has been undertaken since the days of Bismarck. Its ramifications go very deep, its high spot is the "productivity pension". This provides, in principle, for future social benefits to be on a sliding scale linked with the nation's wealth. It will not matter if such wealth is real as a result of an increase in the gross national product, or only apparent as a result of slow inflation.

The full economic and financial implications of this revolutionary method are not yet fully understood even by many experts. Certainly the German electorate does not grasp the details of this Bill. But it is equally certain that amongst the masses of the people the Bill has had the same electrifying effect as had the Beveridge plan in this country during the war. Thus for the first time in German parliamentary history, during a period of peace and prosperity, the home front may become the effective theatre of the election campaign. Dr. Adenauer looks like having stolen the clothes of the Socialists while they were bathing in the hot water of foreign policy.



# ENOSIS AND ITS BACKGROUND

## RACE AND RELIGION IN CYPRUS

"I HOPE", said Mr. Lennox-Boyd in the statement accompanying Lord Radcliffe's "Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus" published by Her Majesty's Government on December 29, 1956, "that we are on the eve of a new and happy chapter in the long history of Cyprus." And if things go reasonably well, the Radcliffe proposals may indeed inaugurate a new and more hopeful phase of the island's troubled modern story. It is a story that tends to puzzle those unfamiliar with Near Eastern history, particularly with the aspect of it concerned with the régime of the Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire, of which Cyprus was an integral part for more than three hundred years. Although the island has figured prominently in the public eye since terrorism began to rear its ugly head in 1955, it is evident that the background to Enosis\* is not always fully understood, for unofficial pronouncements upon it in Great Britain and elsewhere often take the form of an extreme over-simplification. The racial origins and cultural development of the Cypriote Greek are complex; and what he understands by and expects from Enosis is complex too. Why did Enosis, after a sharp but brief flare-up in 1931, relapse into dormancy until 1950, to erupt with unprecedented violence in 1955? Why do the partisans of Enosis who are not Communists accept the Church of Cyprus as their political organ and its Primate as their acknowledged and acclaimed political leader and spokesman? Why was it necessary for the Government of Cyprus to deport Cypriote bishops from the island twice in twenty-five years?

These and similar questions have confused public opinion in the West, unaccustomed to episcopates that engage in that sort of activity and undergo that sort of experience. But their answers become more clear in the light of Cypriote history and of the so-called *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire, under which Ottoman Christians enjoyed a considerable measure of autonomy on certain well-understood conditions, invariably exacted, and never disregarded with impunity.

The one constant factor in the long and variegated history of Cyprus, whose records go back to the fifteenth century B.C., is that it has been a meeting-place of races and tongues, of races that met but did not mingle. Of its aboriginal inhabitants we know little: the earliest identifiable stocks came from Asia Minor. As mythology merges into history its cosmopolitan character gradually takes shape: influenced by Crete and Mycenae on the west, Cilicia and Phoenicia on the north and east, Egypt on the south, it received something of the cultures, arts and languages of lands of three

\* This representation of *Enosis*, omitting the aspirate, which is still written in Greek though no longer pronounced, has passed into the British political vocabulary, and THE ROUND TABLE conforms, though reluctantly. Written Henosis, a word that puzzled many when it first became current would have been self-explanatory to all readers accustomed to the established system of transliterating classical Greek.—*Editor*.

continents. It is typical of the persistent international quality of Cyprus that its most famous son, Zeno of Kition, the founder of the Stoics, should have been partly of Greek, partly of Phoenician descent.

By the beginning of our era the Cypriote people, as it emerged from a confused past, had received a cultural and linguistic impress predominantly Greek. Oriental—that is to say, Assyrian and Phoenician—influences had receded or were receding, as was the influence of Egypt. The blood-stream of the human product of Cyprus's cosmopolitan past was fed, indeed, by many sources, as was its speech a blend of many Greek dialects with other admixtures. "At no time", says Sir George Hill in the fourth and last volume of his *History of Cyprus*, "has the island of Cyprus been a constituent part of Hellenic Greece. It was absorbed along with but not as an integral part of Greece by the Byzantine Empire." Yet the influence of the Greek world—first introduced into Cyprus in the era of Mycenae by Achaean colonists who mated with the earlier inhabitants, renewed under Alexander—advanced and endured until it permeated the whole. Geography decreed that the form of Christianity which the Cypriote came to adopt should be that of the Greek-speaking world, but what geography prescribed was consistent with the linguistic orientation to which his cultural development had guided him.

Non-Greek strains were, however, reintroduced when the advent of Islam brought upon Cyprus a long series of Arab invasions; and other, less ephemeral ones were brought in with the Frankish occupations that endured from 1191 to the Ottoman conquest in 1571: three centuries of the French Lusignan monarchy and eighty-two years of Venetian domination, heralded by Richard Cœur de Lion and the Knights Templar. The Frankish barons and knights withdrew when the Lusignan kingdom came to an end in 1489, and no Venetians remained after the conquest. But the Turkish conquerors imported a new extraneous stock in the persons of soldiers of their invading army, many of whom were given fiefs in the island by Sultan Selim II; these were reinforced from time to time by immigrants from Anatolia and Turkey in Europe. The Turks thus became a permanent element in the island's population. They naturally refrained from intermarriage with their Orthodox compatriots, and they preserved their Moslem faith and the purity of their Turanian tongue. But they maintained relations with their Greek neighbours which, while not intimate, were on the whole quite amicable until the relationship was embittered by Eoka terrorists. The estimated total population of Cyprus on January 1, 1956, was 523,800, with the Greeks accounting for approximately 421,000 and the Turks for 92,000. There are also smaller Christian communities of Maronites and Armenians long established in the island.

### The Occupation in 1878

**E**NOSIS is not a new idea; only its present tempo and excesses are new. The idea was already expressed—with moderation—at the outset of the British occupation in 1878, when the Bishop of Kition is recorded to have welcomed Sir Garnet Wolseley on landing at Larnaca with the words "we accept the change of government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain

will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected". Archbishop Sophronios's allocution in Nicosia made no reference to union with Greece, confining itself to the hope "that the people would learn to walk in the right way, the way of truth, duty and freedom".

Those seeking to study the development of the movement between 1878 and 1948 must do so in the fourth volume of the *History of Cyprus*, where Sir George Hill has given in eighty-one quarto pages the first detailed, scholarly, objective and documented account of this political movement that has been written or even attempted. Hill's narrative is the *sine qua non* for the student, who will find there, and there only, the full record not only of the manifestations and fluctuations of Enosis in Cyprus itself but the reactions to these of the people of Greece and their successive Governments.

The only period in its long history when Cyprus formed a part of a Greek political organization was that of its inclusion in the Byzantine Empire. But it was through the action of a Greek that it broke away from Byzantium, of a Greek, moreover, who was a member of the ruling house, one Isaac Ducas Comnenus, who appeared in the island in 1184 with forged imperial letters purporting to appoint him its Governor. Having established himself there, Isaac renounced his allegiance to his sovereign, proclaimed himself Emperor of Cyprus and misruled the island until 1191, when he was overthrown by King Richard, to whom he had offered provocation. From 1571 until modern Greece received its formal independence of the Ottoman Empire in 1832, Enosis would have had no *raison d'être*, since Greek Cypriotes and the Greeks of Greece were living under the same rule as fellow-subjects of the Sultan.

Whatever the strains that have contributed to the physical make-up of the Cypriote Orthodox, the most enduring cultural impress upon them was the Greek; and, as Sir Ronald Storrs observed in his brilliant autobiography *Orientalism*, "a man is of the race of which he passionately feels himself to be". There is no doubt that the Greek of Cyprus passionately feels himself to be a Greek in speech, thought, faith and way of life; and "no amount of argument", as Sir George Hill has commented, "will convince a people who speak the language and hold the faith of a particular race that they do not belong to that race".

It would be entirely wrong to doubt the intense Greek consciousness of the Greek Cypriotes of today, but it would be equally mistaken to suppose that this consciousness has always flamed at the same white heat or that it has always manifested itself in the same politically nationalistic form. Under Turkish rule, as has been pointed out, no clamour for Enosis could arise, seeing that it was already there to the extent that Greeks of Greece and those of Cyprus shared the same nationality. At the British occupation and for some years thereafter, relief at the substitution of British for Turkish administration was uppermost in the minds of Cypriote Greeks. Until recently the feelings of the great majority of them for Hellas, particularly in the villages, were based primarily on a cultural, social, sentimental, emotional urge of kinship born of a common language, a common faith (though not of a common ecclesiastical authority) and, above all, of common customs and a

common way of life, which include (an important item) the same habits in eating and drinking. They were based far less, except in the minds of some of the lawyer-politicians, on a conscious wish to become the inhabitants of of a new *nomos* (province) of the Greek State, accepting the officials, laws, taxation, conscription and other circumstances and obligations of that political entity. Most of them wished, while identifying themselves in spirit with "Mother Greece", to continue to live under British rule with its security, its incorruptibility, its even-handed justice, its low taxation, its emancipation of the villager from bondage to the money-lender, its concern with public health, its scrupulous regard for human rights.

But the rise in the war-disrupted mid-twentieth century of a frenzied political nationalism, a rise fostered by Soviet Russia's untiring propaganda against what it denounces as "the colonialism of the imperialistic Powers" (in cynical disregard of the fact that the only evil form of colonialism practised today is its own), has led to a different and more sinister form of Enosis. Here be it said that Great Britain is not wholly without blame for the situation that has arisen. The attitude of the successive home and local governments towards representations and agitation for Enosis has often given the impression of a policy of *laissez-faire* scarcely consistent with the reiterated official statements that "no change in the status of the island is contemplated". The flying of Greek flags was sometimes tolerated, sometimes restricted.

#### British Educational Policy

MORE fundamental in a way was the British Government's reluctance in the early days of the occupation to afford the facilities the people wanted for the teaching of English. Even if Cyprus was then still under a nominal Ottoman suzerainty, this diffidence, while honest, was certainly misplaced. It was held that, as Great Britain was then no more than the trustee for Cyprus, it must avoid even the suspicion of wanting to anglicize Cypriote Greeks and Turks and ram English down their throats. This was the converse of Mussolini's educational policy in the Dodecanese, which had even less to commend it, and it resulted in Greece's supplying Cypriote Greek schools with teachers who were apostles of Greek nationalism in an extreme form. It seems anomalous that secondary schools in a British colony should even now be under the control of the Ministry of Education in Athens. The charges of "de-Hellenization" often levied against the Cyprus Government by the Enosis press are the very converse of the truth, as even casual visitors to the island's towns can see for themselves when they observe the street-names given by the Greek majorities in the Municipal Councils to the predominantly Greek quarters. Many of these commemorate celebrities of Greece ancient and modern, heroes of the Greek War of Independence, recent Greek statesmen, localities in Greece and the like—names that would be appropriate enough in Attica but have little relevance to Cyprus.

As far back as 1879 Sir Samuel Baker, one of the most perspicacious of British travellers in Cyprus in the early days of the occupation, had this to say on the subject:

One of the most urgent necessities is the instruction of the people of Cyprus in English, because it is not to be expected that any close affinity can exist between the governing class and the governed in the darkness of two foreign tongues that require a third person for their enlightenment. The natives dread the interpreters; they know full well that one word misunderstood may alter the bearing of their case. . . . It is highly important that without delay schools should be established throughout the island for the instruction of the young. . . . Until then a void will exclude them from social intercourse with their English rulers and they will naturally gravitate towards Greece through the simple medium of a mother-tongue.\*

Had Sir Samuel Baker's unhappily prophetic warnings been heeded at the time, much subsequent trouble might have been avoided.

The first civilian Commissioners appointed to administer the island's six Districts were mostly picked and dedicated men, classical scholars and gentlemen of means content to give to Cyprus the remainder of their working years, in some cases of their lives. They learned to speak the languages of the country and to know the people. Cyprus is, after all, a country *sui generis* at the meeting-place of the three continents of the Old World, with an ancient civilization and a long and complicated history. These conditions set racial, political and ecclesiastical problems of a specialized kind, which had their counterpart, so far as British colonial administration was concerned, only in the Palestine of the Mandate. Such problems might well have been regarded as justifying the need for specialized handling.

But with the quickened tempo of subsequent less leisurely times and of more rapid transfers within the Colonial Service the Near Eastern expert became rare in the island. Officials tended, particularly in the District Administration, to regard duty in Cyprus more as a stage in their careers than as an end in itself. They came to know less of the local languages; the intervention of interpreters attenuated their contact with the people. And ignorance of the languages of other races can lead all too often to its mischievous corollary, social exclusiveness.

### The Millet System

AFTER the Turks' capture of Constantinople in 1453 the Ottoman Sultans applied to the administration of the Empire's Christian communities what is known as the *millet* system. The Arabic word *millet* means "nation" and the system thus denoted implies that the Sultans granted a measure of autonomy to their non-Muslim subjects, who were grouped not by race nor even by language but according to the ecclesiastic whom they recognized as their spiritual chief. For in the widespread territories of the Ottoman Empire it was by their denominational and not by their racial or linguistic affinities that men were accustomed to be classified; the *rayahs*—the Christian subjects of the Padishah—were people *dont la religion*, in the words of an epigrammatical French writer, *est aussi la patrie*.

The heads of the Christian communities—the Orthodox, Armenian, Jacobite, Assyrian and the several Uniate patriarchs with the Archbishop of Cyprus—received the State's confirmation of their authority in the form of

\* Sir Samuel Baker, *Cyprus as I saw it in 1879* (London, 1879).

the Sultan's *berat* (Commission). The grant of the *berat* did two things: first, it acknowledged the grantees as the ecclesiastical chiefs of their Churches; secondly, it constituted them the civil heads of their nation, *millet* or *ethnos*, the ethnarchs of their community, the spokesmen for their flocks before the imperial throne. Until it had been issued, these prelates could assume neither their spiritual nor their administrative functions nor take charge of the property of their sees. As holders of the *berat* the heads of the Churches became high dignitaries of the Ottoman State, admitted to the appropriate ranks in the empire's civil hierarchy and invested with the appropriate grades (after these were created in the nineteenth century) of the Ottoman Orders of the Osmanieh and the Mejidieh. They formed an essential part of the imperial machinery of government. But these privileges were conditional upon their unquestioned loyalty and upon their obligation to serve the régime in whatever ways they might be called on so to do. Thus they were often the handmaids of the Sultan and the instruments of Ottoman policy. But if they withdrew, or were suspected of withdrawing, their loyalty, the consequences were apt to be drastic. On Easter Day, 1821, after the outbreak of the War of Greek Independence, the Oecumenical Patriarch Gregory V was hanged outside the gate of his palace at the Phanar with six other bishops; a few weeks later the Governor of Cyprus hanged Archbishop Kyprianos and his Archimandrite from the nearest trees to his Serai, and had the other members of the Cypriote hierarchy, the bishops of Paphos, Kition and Kyrenia, summarily beheaded.

During the Ottoman régime the Archbishop of Cyprus represented to his own flock on a smaller scale that which the Patriarch of Constantinople represented to the generality of the Orthodox in Turkey. That is to say, he was not only the spiritual chief of the Cypriotes; he became the ethnarch, the political and national representative of his people in its relation with the Ottoman Government. But in applying to himself, and being accorded by his political followers, the title and attributes of ethnarch, a function known only in the Ottoman Empire, the present Archbishop of Cyprus, Makarios III, who was elected in 1950, affected to revive the Ottoman practice long after the constitutional basis of that practice had vanished. For the end of Ottoman rule in Cyprus meant that the *millet* system no longer applied there; and with the disappearance of the *millet* system the archbishop ceased to hold high office in the State with its attendant privileges and obligations. The last Archbishop of Cyprus invested with the *berat* of an Ottoman Sultan was Sophronios II, who became archbishop in 1865, thirteen years before the British occupation, and held the see until his death in 1900. It is true that Cyprus Law VIII of 1908, which regulated the first archiepiscopal election to be held since 1865—the first, that is to say, under British administration—made provision for the High Commissioner's approval of the election as the pre-requisite to the archbishop-elect's enthronement; Law XXXIV of 1937 similarly provided for the Governor's approval in writing before the election of an archbishop could be consummated by any religious or ceremonial rites. But both these laws have been repealed, the latter in 1946. Occasionally the Cypriote Greek press would apply the title ethnarch to Makarios's immediate



predecessors, but in a less militant manner and never with the implication that the Archbishop of Cyprus was alone entitled to be the mouth-piece of the Orthodox population of Cyprus *vis-à-vis* the Government.

### Political Prelates

THE only situation in the history of British Cyprus at all comparable with the era of terrorism that began in the spring of 1955 was the outbreak of October 21, 1931, when a rioting crowd burned down the inflammable mid-Victorian military wooden bungalow diverted from Ceylon to Cyprus by Sir Garnet Wolseley in 1878 for use as Government House. The then bishops of Kition and Kyrenia were heavily implicated and were put out of the island together with those of the leading politicians most concerned with incitement to violence; the Legislative Council was suspended. Leontios of Paphos would probably have accompanied his brother bishops into banishment (for he shared their views and activities) but for one circumstance. Fortunately for himself he was at the time of the outbreak a guest at Lambeth of Archbishop Lang, and on the strength of so unimpeachable an *alibi* was permitted, after some correspondence, to return to the island in 1932. In 1947 he was elected archbishop with Communist support and died one month later.

The exiles were not deported to a specific destination but could go anywhere they liked outside Cyprus; and in 1946 all the survivors (the Bishop of Kition had died in Jerusalem) were allowed back. These measures proved thoroughly effective. For the island had peace, and the agitation for Enosis lapsed into dormancy until its embers were fanned into flame by the young and politically ambitious Makarios after his election to the archbishopric in 1950. For the two previous years Makarios had been Bishop of Kition, to which see he was elevated at the early age of thirty-five, having begun his ecclesiastical career as a novice in Kykko monastery.

In the Near and Middle East men embark upon the monastic life from one of two motives: either in order to retire from the world or—since only celibate or widowed clerics can become bishops and the hierarchies are therefore recruited almost wholly from the monasteries—for precisely the opposite reason. The Eastern monastery is not only the asylum of the recluse and the ascetic; it is also the nursery and forcing-ground of those eager and enterprising spirits who seek positions of power in the larger world of politics and national affairs. Be it recalled that with the Christians of the Ottoman Empire the criterion of nationality was creed rather than race or even speech; the classification of men was governed less by their political than by their ecclesiastical allegiance. Blood in the Near East is mixed, speech on the frontiers often polyglot; but faith is identifiable.

Thus the Eastern Churches have been in many respects the backbone of national consciousness and hence of national propaganda; their leaders not so much spiritual fathers as political ethnarchs. It follows that Oriental bishops are not only liable, but often deliberately seek, to become involved in activities not generally associated with the Western episcopates of today, with results that have brought them eminence and authority alternating, as often as not, with discomfiture, exile, deposition and even a violent end. Of

the 328 vacancies in the Patriarchate of Constantinople between its foundation and 1884 only 137 were caused by the natural death of a patriarch in office.

The present writer knows no clearer, more succinct definition of the qualities that Greeks expect in their bishops than the following, which he translated from a leading article in an authoritative Athens newspaper in the course of the First World War. This is what the newspaper had to say on the subject:

In regions where races clash and unredeemed populations struggle against a foreign yoke, a bishop must have nothing of the priest about him except his robes. Unless he combines the courage of a soldier with the guile of a diplomatist and fitness for high command, he may be a saint but he is no fit pastor of militant nationalities. So long as the Near East is not delimited according to right and according to race, saintliness is a positive defect unless it is corrected by the masterfulness of a ruler.

Not for nothing is the word for a bishop in colloquial modern Greek *δεσπότης*, "the despot".

The Athens paper's illuminating exposition of a point of view so alien from modern Western ideas should be pondered by those who are puzzled by the activities of Cypriote bishops and by the need for their deportation. Of the five archbishops of Cyprus of this century only one—Cyril III, who as Bishop of Kyrenia unwillingly competed for the throne against his blustering predecessor Cyril II—is entitled to be qualified as a churchman. The others have been politicians totally unconcerned with the spiritual welfare of their flock. As for the present Bishop of Kyrenia, companion in exile of his hated rival Makarios, the reaction of the faithful of his see was relief at the removal of an unpopular diocesan, spiced with sardonic amusement at his sharing a house in a small island in the Indian Ocean with his arch-opponent the archbishop.

### An Archiepiscopal Mischief-maker

MAKARIOS belongs essentially to the political type of Eastern ecclesiastic and is a fisherman in troubled waters. As in other branches of Christendom, the Orthodox make a great deal of Holy Week, but in 1955 that fact did not deter Makarios from abandoning his ecclesiastical responsibilities and from flying on Good Friday of all days to Bandoeng, where his presence had no *raison d'être*. Another of Makarios's motives has been the need he has felt since he became archbishop to keep always a step ahead of Kyprianos of Kyrenia, his most formidable competitor for the archiepiscopal throne and more intransigent and unrestrained in his attacks on Great Britain and British rule in Cyprus than Makarios himself.

Skilfully he carried his campaign into Greece by appealing over the heads of the Cabinet to the mobs of Athens, Salonika, Rhodes and other Greek cities, whom he whipped into the emotional excitement of a perfervid nationalism. He was thus able to stampede the Ministry of the moribund Marshal Papagos, politically none too sure of itself and without confidence in its ability to clamp down on mob passions kindled on a nationalistic issue.



Later, Papagos's successor, M. Karamanlis, had occasion to recognize how profitably this mass hysteria can be exploited by the professional "anarchist" trouble-makers of Greece. Embarrassing as has been the position of the last two Greek governments not only *vis-à-vis* Great Britain, their Turkish partner in N.A.T.O. and the Balkan Pact, but also *vis-à-vis* the politically banned Communists, they knew that they were in no position to follow the example of Eleftherios Venizelos after the riots of 1931. On that occasion Venizelos, strongest of Greek Prime Ministers, declared officially that "the Hellenic Government could not interfere in a question which was an internal affair of Great Britain. There was no Cyprus question between the British and Greek Governments." Here it may be added that what the responsible Greek authorities really thought of British administration in Cyprus, generally described in the Enosis press as "tyranny", was significantly revealed in 1920. In that year the Greek Government requested British approval to their sending a mission to Cyprus to study the administrative system with a view to applying it to their new territories.

How completely Makarios has preferred the political leader's role to the churchman's was first indicated by the Archbishop of Canterbury in the House of Lords, where his Grace quoted Makarios's revealing admission that a condemnation of terrorism on his part "would involve the risk of exposing me rather unprofitably". We know now that his reasons were yet more compelling; but even at that time it was generous to assume no more than that there had grown up with Makarios's connivance a Frankenstein's monster he could no longer control. Such an assumption afforded at least some sort of explanation of his silence when during a service terrorists entered a church in the important village of Kythraea in his own diocese, ordered the congregation to face the walls, then calmly shot dead the man they wanted on suspicion of being an "informer". Sir Anthony Eden, refuting in his speech at Norwich on June 1, 1956, Athens charges that British troops had desecrated Orthodox Churches, pointed out that the only case of the desecration of a church in Cyprus had been this outrage on the part of Eoka, against which no Cypriote bishop had uttered a protest. When Dr. Fisher went on to refer to Makarios "not as a churchman upholding a religious principle but as a politician calculating the risks and chances", that statement could occasion surprise only to those ignorant of the nature and historical development of the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire and its Succession States. But it was not until five months later, in August 1956, that the capture of the diary of Colonel Grivas ("Dighenēs") produced documentary evidence that Makarios was not the abettor of terrorism in Cyprus but its leader.

Archbishop Makarios and the followers who acclaim him as ethnarch find it convenient to forget that ethnarchy, although a Greek word, is not, as applied to heads of Orthodox Churches, a Greek conception. It was an invention of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror after he established the capital of his heterogeneous empire in Constantinople. Under the Ottoman Empire, as has been said, the archbishops of Cyprus were ethnarchs, as in their wider sphere were the Orthodox patriarchs of Constantinople, by creation of the Sultan through the issue of his *berat* (Commission); and they held that posi-

tion only for as long as they fulfilled its essential condition, that of implicit obedience to the State, of which the *berat* constituted them high civil officials. If that obedience was withdrawn, the results were likely to be of the kinds that occurred in 1821.

By no legal right can the present archbishop claim the rights and privileges of an ethnarch, a function known only in the Ottoman Empire. He was not so appointed by the Queen; he is not a functionary of the Government of Cyprus; he does not give implicit obedience to the State. Hence the claim made on his behalf that he alone is entitled to represent Cypriote Greeks in negotiations with the Government rests on no valid constitutional foundation. Perhaps it might be added here that the so-called "Ethnarchy Council" is not an organic body of the Church of Cyprus. It is a self-appointed unofficial political organization under the chairmanship of the archbishop, concerned only with the campaign for Enosis and having no place in the constitution of Church or State.

### Frankenstein's Monster

A FRANKENSTEIN'S monster greater even than terrorism is Enosis itself. The villagers have had to pay lip-service to it when all that most of them have wanted is to be left alone. No one dares to say he is against it for fear of being branded as a traitor, a dangerous thing when the organization that imposes the deterrent is, as in Cyprus, the Church and terrorists are on the pounce for "traitors". As Sir Ronald Storrs aptly remarked in his dispatch on the disturbances of 1931, "it is in this stigma of disloyalty [*sc.* to Enosis] that the strength of the movement chiefly resides".

People who talk of self-determination for Cyprus should reflect that, were a plebiscite on this issue to be held there, it would be regimented and therefore meaningless. When the Church held its so-called plebiscite on Enosis in 1950 the people were threatened with spiritual sanctions—that is, with exclusion from the sacraments—if they did not vote as they were told, an irresistible form of blackmail when applied to a God-fearing people. The signatures in favour of Enosis were openly displayed in every parish church and the penalty for not signing was excommunication. One must ask oneself why the Church should have found it necessary to apply pressure of this sort unless it had felt doubts how the people would cast their votes. The pulpits of Cyprus have become platforms for the preaching of Enosis rather than the Gospel.

The Greek Cypriotes hitherto under discussion are those who follow the leadership of their archbishop. But another type of Greek Cypriote is also clamouring for Enosis, if with a somewhat different Greece—namely, the Communist. The aims of the Communists of Cyprus are wholly logical. If Enosis is achieved, the Communist ranks in Greece will receive a corresponding accession of strength; if it is not, they will at least have troubled the situation in an important military base of the anti-Communist world. By helping to embroil Great Britain with Greece, Greece with Turkey, they will also have made their contribution to the weakening of N.A.T.O. by rendering Greek and Turkish membership of it contradictory and ineffective.

The Cypriote Communist Party, Akel, now banned, was a highly disciplined and well-organized body, and it should be noted that Archbishop Makarios III has been as alive to the value of Communist support as was his predecessor Leontios. "We shall seek", he said in church on his return from the United States in 1953, "the support at the United Nations of every nation and we shall accept support from every hand, even from dirty hands." In 1954 he received at the archbishopric a delegation of the Central Committee of Akel at a meeting held to discuss "the best way of facing the situation. On many points there was agreement". Thus the communiqué in the Communist paper *Neos Demokrates*.

Because Cyprus has always been in the past, and continues to be today, the home of races that meet but do not mingle, there is no sense of Cypriote nationality as there is, for example, a sense of Maltese nationality in Malta. How could there be? The Maltese are a homogeneous people in race, language and faith. The Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, with the smaller colonies of Maronites and Armenians, have nothing in common but the fact that they inhabit the same island. That the compact Turkish minority of some 92,000 souls, representing approximately one-fifth of the population, is bitterly opposed to Enosis goes without saying. The Turks have always loyally supported the British régime, and in the days of the part-elected Legislative Council (suspended after the 1931 riots) their representatives would regularly vote with the Official Members against the Greek Elected Members when the latter were attempting to throw out the budget or other essential legislation.

The Cypriote Turk is anxious for the continuance of British rule but feels strongly that, if there is to be a change in the island's national status, this can only, in the light of its previous history and of geography, be made in favour of Turkey. The people and Government of Turkey share this view with determined conviction. There must be remembered a fact that is not generally realized—namely, that there is a fundamental difference between the Moslems of Cyprus and the Moslem minority of Crete. The former are pure Turks; the latter, Islamized Cretan Greeks.

It is an interesting circumstance that the revival of militant Enosis in Cyprus after 1950 has had the effect of making the Cypriote Turks more Turkish-minded than they have been for centuries. Following the example of the Greeks, Cypriote Turks have now taken to hoisting the red-and-white flag of the Turkish Republic on the minarets of their mosques on Fridays, little as they now attend these in order to say their prayers. Loyal British subjects though they are, they now feel for the efficient Ankara Republic something they were never able to feel for the decaying empire of Abdul Hamid II.

### The Doctrine of Self-determination

IT is to be hoped that Lord Radcliffe's fair and wise proposals will commend themselves to the people of Cyprus when, freed from fear of the terrorists, they feel secure to take part once more in ordinary political life. To the Greek majority the proposals offer a liberal form of self-rule under the British Crown; to the Turkish minority adequate safeguards for their rights and political requirements. There remains, however, the problem of Archbishop Makarios.

(It is noteworthy, by the way, that very little interest has been shown by Cypriote Greeks in the Bishop of Kyrenia since his deportation.)

Makarios III has not only arrogated to himself—and been accorded by his followers—the position of ethnarch. He is also revealed in the Grivas diaries as the supreme director of the terrorist movement. It would seem not unreasonable on the part of Her Majesty's Government to lay down as the conditions of Makarios's return to Cyprus, first, that he should openly abjure terrorism, and secondly, that he should withdraw from political activities in order to devote himself to the discharge of his proper duty, the spiritual care of the Church of Cyprus. In other words, his claim to ethnarchy is an anachronism that should not be tolerated by the Government.

So far as the eventual status of the island is concerned, Her Majesty's Government have accepted the principle of self-determination, the question of its application to be reviewed "when the international and strategic position permits, and provided that self-government is working satisfactorily". But in this connexion there is a consideration which is apt to be overlooked by those who regard self-determination as the answer to every question and the panacea for all ills, forgetting that for some thousands of years before President Wilson insisted on bestowing this concept upon mankind the world got along as well without it as it has got along since. Self-determination cannot be an *absolute* right—that is to say, it is not insusceptible of being modified or overridden in supra-national or international interests. Particularly is this true of a small country like Cyprus, which has never been inhabited by one race only and is geographically so situated as to be of great and possibly vital strategic importance to the whole of the Western world.

The argument scarcely needs elaborating, even without the additional problem in Cyprus of ensuring that people would vote as they really think. It is only necessary to consider what would be the attitude of some of those who regard the principle of self-determination as sacrosanct if a majority of Greek Cypriotes were to vote for union with a Greece that had gone Communist, as she was in danger of going in 1944. For reasons quite beyond the control of the people of Cyprus the future of the island can never be an exclusively Cypriote question.

Great Britain came to Cyprus in order to be in a position to protect the Turks' eastern marches against the menace of Russia, their secular enemy. This was in 1878. Today Turkey is the principal bulwark in the Middle East against danger from the same source in a new form, a danger that now menaces not only Turkey but also her N.A.T.O. and Baghdad Pact allies and the whole of Christian civilization. That is to say that Great Britain has still the same sort of function to perform in Cyprus as she was invited to perform there nearly eighty years ago, with this difference: that Cyprus has become a base serving interests far wider than those of any one country. It is no reproach to Greece to recall, in the first place, that she is not one of the world's strongest powers; secondly, that she might find herself in grave difficulties if a solution of the problem of Cyprus in the sense she desires were to bring upon her the enmity of Turkey and to leave her isolated from her non-Communist neighbours.

# THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

## BEGINNINGS OF A MIDDLE EAST POLICY

IN the dawn of 1957 the United States of America began, at long last, to develop a Middle Eastern policy which could be considered cohesive and consistent.

There are many officials in Washington who will agree that the absence of such a policy previously had contributed, in large or small degree, to the successful Soviet penetration into this oil-rich region, to Colonel Nasser's burgeoning ambition, to the sad disaster at Suez and to the serious rift in the Anglo-American alliance. The Eisenhower Administration, on the other hand, argues that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made valiant if stop-gap efforts to halt the spreading deterioration and the drift toward war.

However that may be, historians are likely to suggest that, since World War II, the American Middle Eastern program had been something of a confused mixture, under both Democratic and Republican Administrations. However wisely Washington had launched a Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey and a Marshall Plan and N.A.T.O. alliance for western Europe, in the Middle East its efforts seemed often to be a compound of moral preachments, impulsive action and idealistic thought. One by one, the United States had encouraged the creation of Israel, urged on the Egyptian revolution, proposed the Baghdad Pact, suggested that Britain get out of Suez and welcomed Moscow's participation in a United Nations resolution designed to promote Arab-Israeli peace.

Before the Suez crisis it seemed fairly clear that Secretary Dulles had no settled policy for filling the vacuum created by the contraction of British power. He is a brilliant improviser, and paid little heed to the telegrams of his Ambassadors in the area. Until very late, he misjudged the intentions of President Nasser.

There is little point, now, in rehashing the recriminations over Suez. It should be said, in defense of Mr. Dulles, that his fault in the gathering crisis was not so much that he successively watered down American proposals after he had made them, such as that for a Canal Users' Association, but that he proposed such alternatives to "force" when he should have known at the outset that they would not work. The fact is that neither Norway, Italy nor several other maritime powers would have supported the strict conception of the Users' Association as originally proposed and as embraced by London. The Association was sinking at the dock before Mr. Dulles opened the seacocks.

But this is past history, and Washington is now in the throes of writing, in the Eisenhower Doctrine, new policy for an area that before late 1956 had nothing of the emotional appeal that China used to conjure in the American mind, and none of the "Atlantic community" associations that European affairs always have had. It is impossible as yet to detail the full dimensions of

Washington's new Middle Eastern plans. But some outlines are distinguishable, thanks to President Eisenhower's "fireside chat" to the nation, Secretary Dulles's testimony before congressional committees, the careful egg-walking of General Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld at the United Nations Assembly—and the visits of Arab monarchs to the United States.

Let us consider first the Eisenhower Doctrine. Quite probably this was exposed to public gaze somewhat before the Administration intended that it should be. An enterprising Washington editor of the *New York Times* learned that Messrs Eisenhower and Dulles had conferred at length concerning the Middle East, and proceeded to make discreet enquiries at the State Department. He added up his bits and pieces of divulged information and deduced that the President intended to ask Congress for authority to use American armed forces in the Middle East, if need be, to maintain peace.

His published story produced an immediate demand by the rest of the Washington press corps for official confirmation and clarification. Secretary Dulles thereupon accorded a special briefing to a selected group of reporters, and the Eisenhower Doctrine was born—at least in bare outline.

### Request for Powers<sup>1</sup>

WHEN later President Eisenhower had spoken to the nation concerning the Middle Eastern crisis, it was clear that the Administration was asking for a three-point authorization from Congress, as follows:

1. It asked that Congress authorize President Eisenhower to use armed forces, as he deemed wise, to resist "overt armed aggression" by "any nation controlled by international communism" in the general area of the Middle East. The United States would come to the assistance of any nation requesting assistance. The exact area of the Middle East was not disclosed.

2. It asked that Congress authorize the President to undertake military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations in the area desiring such training and defense aid.

3. It asked that Congress give the President permission to use up to \$200,000,000 of current foreign aid funds, freed of existing restrictions, to build security and combat disorder in the Middle East. Ultimately \$400,000,000 would be earmarked for this purpose.

This was a surprising request, for an Administration that in the final weeks of the presidential campaign, just two months earlier, had averred that peace was imminent in the Middle East. It was also, quite possibly, a request for military powers that the President already possessed, and for foreign aid authorizations that could be handled just as easily in the regular foreign aid budget.

But it is obvious that what the Administration really wanted was, not legal authorization, but a national mandate, an expression of popular will and determination to undertake commitments in a wholly new global area. This required more than a White House pronouncement. It required an expression of national purpose, a considered command from Congress and the public.



It seems pretty clear at this writing that Congress will provide that mandate. The Eisenhower Doctrine may be slightly revised, to append a termination date and other Democratic details. But Congress has no relish to merit the charge that its refusal to approve weakened or reversed American foreign policy at a critical moment in history.

The first press dispatches to the world concerning the Doctrine emphasized the military aspect. London, Moscow—and the Middle East—read accounts that seemed to suggest that Washington was preparing to send troops to the area. This of course was not so. The nearest American forces would be the United States Sixth Fleet cruising in the Mediterranean. The method of disclosing the Doctrine, not by a careful White Paper or full-dress press conference, but by partial revelations and slow leakage, unfortunately permitted inaccurate representations to get abroad, gave the Communists an opportunity to denounce the Doctrine as American imperialism and stirred Middle Eastern apprehensions and hostility.

The appearance of the Doctrine has broken a long honeymoon of bipartisanship in foreign affairs, which had prevailed between Administration and Congress throughout the whole of Mr. Eisenhower's first term of office. Secretary Dulles has been sharply questioned by powerful Senate Democrats, and on occasion his entire stewardship of foreign policy has been roundly criticized. A central criticism is that the Doctrine asks for authority to oppose the one move that Moscow is not likely to make—an overt attack in the Middle East. Actually what the United States wants centrally to accomplish is to establish its "presence" in the area—to announce in unmistakable tones that it is directly and permanently interested in the Middle East. Under this "presence" or psychological umbrella, Washington will begin to institute development programs and military assistance agreements designed to strengthen native régimes and prosper the whole region.

Testimony by Secretary Dulles before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and by other Administration officials, limns this out in more detail:

1. Obviously the Doctrine means that the United States would, if requested, go to the assistance of any nation threatened with attack either by the Soviet Union or by a Middle Eastern state controlled by "international Communism". Thus, if Russia should threaten to invade Iran, or if Syria should go Communist and thereafter launch armed attack against Iraq, the doctrine would be applicable. But where one non-Communist native state, though leagued with Moscow, attacked another—Egypt against Israel for instance—it would not apply. Soviet "volunteers" would be considered as identical with regular Soviet military forces, if they attacked. But the welcomed arrival of "volunteers" in a State would not invoke the Doctrine.

The military clause would obviously be powerless in the case of subversion. It could not touch a Communist coup inside a Middle Eastern State.

2. However, the plan to offer military assistance programs to native States is designed to render the régimes stronger for coping with internal subversion. It is argued that a well-trained local army and gendarmerie are a stabilizing factor.

3. Finally, the third feature of the Doctrine—economic development

projects—is intended to provide such national improvement, healthier outlook and better living conditions, over the long run, that Communism will lose its appeal and penetrative force in the Middle East. The Administration and Mr. Dulles have chosen to emphasize the threat of Soviet attack rather than the economic aid program, reasoning that Congress will be more ready to vote against bad old Moscow than to approve a good new T.V.A. on the Nile or the Euphrates.

Certainly the force the United States can most effectively wield in the Middle East is its formidable economic power. This was evident recently in the impact on Cairo of the hints that the State Department gave the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington, to the effect that American policy regarding economic assistance and the release of frozen assets would depend a great deal on how Egypt co-operated in Middle Eastern solutions.

### Foreign Aid and Foreign Arms

IT was also apparent in a list of two dozen development projects which the International Co-operation Administration announced that it was studying for possible application—projects ranging from the perennial Jordan Valley irrigation scheme to road and rail links between the various States, and farm and small-business loans to villagers.

When Secretary Dulles was being questioned by the Senators, Mike Mansfield, Montana Democrat, asked him whether anything in the administration plan would stop shipments of Soviet arms to the area—if the countries desired to receive such arms. "No," replied Mr. Dulles, "but you have put your finger on the heart of the problem when you say 'if the countries so desire'." And he went on to argue that the Middle Eastern nations would not want Soviet arms once the Eisenhower Doctrine was in effective operation. This is because, as outlined by officials, Administration policy in the economic realm would concentrate on contributing to Middle Eastern political stability by causing the average citizen to turn from age-old hatreds and feuds and concentrate on improving his lot. And this stability would render the lure of Communism impotent. This viewpoint may be idealistic, but it is a governing philosophy behind the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Actually Secretary Dulles denied in his Senate testimony that the Administration was contemplating any particular development project. But this is because he and the President wish an entirely free hand in the granting or withholding of economic assistance—as for example in the case of Egypt—and they would avoid anything savoring of advance commitment.

A definite if unreasoning hostility to foreign aid programs persists in Congress. This is a legacy from hopeful earlier assurances, distributed by both the Truman and the Eisenhower régimes, to the effect that foreign aid would be tapered off or totally extinct by 1957. The new Soviet policy of economic penetration wrecked all such prospects, but some members of Congress are loath to face the fact. The foreign aid proviso is the part of the Doctrine least palatable to Congress.

Evidently believing that the best defense is a good offense, Mr. Dulles has concentrated on pronouncements of alarm—telling Senators that the Middle

Eastern peril is the most serious in ten years, warning them that if the Doctrine is rejected there is "very great likelihood" that American boys will have to be sent to fight in the area.

The proposed resolution asked of Congress, to support the Doctrine, is somewhat akin to the Formosa resolution of two years ago. The Formosa resolution was geared to a more definite and visible threat, from the neighbouring legions of Communist China. It specified what the American reaction would be. In the present case Mr. Dulles is again adhering to what must seem, to him, to be the first law of diplomacy: that the way to prevent an attack is to warn the enemy what will befall him if he does attack.

The Eisenhower Doctrine has been endorsed by an impressive array of Americans. The two living ex-Presidents, Herbert Hoover and Harry Truman, have given it their blessing. Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Alfred Gruenther, lately Allied Supreme Commander in Europe, have approved it. Representative Sam Rayburn, the "Mr. Democrat" from Texas whose nod can often determine Democratic policy, has passed the word that the Doctrine is acceptable to him, although he is in no precise hurry about the foreign aid clause.

Support from men like Truman and Rayburn cut the ground out from under any effective Democratic opposition. Other Democrats who have felt that the Doctrine gave the President too much of a "blank check", or failed to bring the United Nations sufficiently into the picture, have been unable to agree on a feasible or popular alternative.

### A Vacuum to be filled

**B**ASICALLY Congress and the nation realize that the United States cannot longer avoid giving sustained attention to the smouldering fires of Sinai and Suez. A vacuum exists there. The oil which is the lifeblood of Western Europe and the energizing fluid of the N.A.T.O. alliance flows through its pipelines. The Middle East has at last moved up equal to the Far East as an object of American concern.

For all the fanfare accorded it, the Eisenhower Doctrine does not represent the sum total of American policy for the Middle East. Secretary Dulles has admitted that the Doctrine carries no prescription for settling the Arab-Israeli feud, and no provision for establishing safe transit through the Suez Canal. But Washington is giving these problems close attention, and if the American diplomacy here is less visible and vocal, it is because the Administration is trying quietly to operate through the United Nations. For a time it virtually deputized Secretary Hammarskjöld as part-time Secretary of State.

It gave at least modest—and perhaps too mild—support to the efforts within the United Nations to insert the U.N. Emergency Force into the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba area, until a more permanent settlement between Egypt and Israel should be effected. And if careful Mr. Hammarskjöld could not find sufficient authority in existing United Nations resolutions to bring this about, the United States, along with Canada, Norway and certain Latin American nations, hoped to devise a new resolution which

would authorize U.N. troops to remain stationed along the Arab-Israeli boundaries. The United States is definitely opposed to a return to the pre-Suez status quo. The question of assuring sustained freedom of transit through the canal is a problem equally delicate. Washington is willing to settle for Egyptian control of the canal, plus some form of automatic reference of disputes to arbitration, the solution suggested by the United Nations before the Suez invasion.

Whether Colonel Nasser will accede to such a solution, what temporary roadblocks he may seek to erect, what twists Moscow will try to impose on any settlement—these have been the unpredictables. Here Mr. Dulles is not showing his hand in advance. But Washington has been gradually adopting a stronger line toward Egypt and its ambitious President, and there is always hidden, in the recesses of the State Department's files, Mr. Dulles's incomplete but implementable plan to "bring Nasser down through economic pressure".

The Egyptians are not far off course in suspecting that the United States is preparing—by means of the Eisenhower Doctrine and by such diplomacy as the invitations Washington extended to both King Saud of Saudi Arabia and Prince Abdul Illah of Iraq—to isolate Egypt if it remains intransigent. If Washington can detach Saudi Arabia from its close association with Egypt and Syria, and slow to a trickle the revenue that King Saud has poured into Colonel Nasser's propaganda campaign, this will represent a major victory for the West.

The Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact—Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan—have embraced the Eisenhower Doctrine and expressed alarm at Soviet machinations in the Middle East. If Saudi Arabia, joining with Iraq, is able to prevent the unstable kingdom of Jordan from falling to Egypt and Syria, this would be a major deflation for Colonel Nasser's dreams of expanded influence. Washington policy is not now aimed at the destruction of the Nasser régime. But Washington is not likely to withhold its economic pressures—or its support for super-tankers and internationalized corridors passing the canal by—if President Nasser opposes and sabotages efforts to build peace in the Middle East.

It is not easy to devise a policy that will keep Colonel Nasser within bounds and simultaneously win support in the Asian-African world where he is a hero. And Washington recognizes the perils of the veto power available in the U.N. General Assembly to the Asian-African *bloc* plus the Soviet *bloc*. That is why Washington prefers to be imprecise on some points of its new policies.

It is unthinkable, to Washington officials, that the Soviet Union should move into a position from which it could sever the flow of oil to Europe. It is also unthinkable that Middle Eastern crises of any description should produce a permanent rift in relations between the United States and Britain or the other nations of N.A.T.O.

The drift in Anglo-American relations has been reversed. President Eisenhower has extended "warmest congratulations" to Britain's new Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan. There are new and effective Ambassadors in

both Washington and London. Lower echelons in the State Department and the Foreign Office confer daily on such matters as N.A.T.O. and the Baghdad Pact. In fact officials in the lower echelons say they never ceased conferring.

It may be that the Anglo-American partnership will never, in the conditions of peace and under the Eisenhower Administration, attain to the status of automatic consultation and hearty personal intimacy that prevailed between Roosevelt and Churchill. Mr. Eisenhower is intimate with only a few chosen buddies, and Secretary Dulles is not cast in the mold of a close confidant. But President Eisenhower has a warm appreciation of Britain. And Secretary Dulles has argued privately for special consideration for nations that suffer heavy expense in manning the ramparts of the free world.

Until the delicate negotiations involving frayed Arab sensibilities are past, Anglo-American teamwork in the area will not be openly proclaimed. But there is a genuine conviction among many Washington officials that the United States, by implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine and developing long-range economic policy, can re-establish the Western position in the Middle East and make some amends for the improvised American diplomacy that preceded Suez.

United States of America,  
February 1957.

# THE SOUTH AFRICAN SENATE ACT

## ITS ANTECEDENT HISTORY AND CONSEQUENCES

THE decision of the South African Appeal Court that the Senate Act, 1955, and the South Africa Act Amendment Act, 1956, are valid has resolved the constitutional crisis of the last eight years, of which a brief description is essential to an understanding of the situation in which the Union now finds itself.

At the National Convention of 1908-9, which led to the passing of the South Africa Act by the British Parliament, there were virtually only two rocks on which the negotiations of the pre-Union Colonies might have foundered. The first was the insistence of the delegates from Cape Colony on the preservation of its multi-racial franchise, properly safeguarded by a constitutional amendment; that was achieved by the insertion in the Act of Section 35, which provided that a Bill for the repeal or amendment of such franchise rights should become law only if passed by a two-thirds majority of the total number of members of both Houses of Parliament in joint sitting. The second was the equality of the two official languages, English and Afrikaans; this was enshrined in Section 137. Both Sections were entrenched by Section 152, which was itself entrenched by the same constitutional device as protected the franchise. Without these very limited checks and balances there would have been no Union of South Africa.

In 1926 came the declaration of the Imperial Conference of that year, when existing constitutional practice in the Commonwealth was crystallized in the formula:

*Autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.*

A conference of constitutional experts met in 1929 to draft a Bill to give formal legislative effect to the decision of 1926. The need to maintain delicate balances between Federal and State powers in Canada and Australia led to the introduction into the draft Bill of appropriate limitations upon the grant of the power of constitutional amendment proposed to be conferred upon Dominion Parliaments; New Zealand was satisfied to leave amendments of its Constitution to the Parliament at Westminster; and South Africa expressed her contentment with the existing provision for constitutional amendment conditioned by "the entrenched sections" (i.e. Sections 35, 137 and 152).\*

The Statute of Westminster was drafted and accepted by the Imperial Conference of 1930.

The draft was sent to the Parliaments of the Dominions for approval or dissent. In the Union House of Assembly General Smuts, then Leader of the

\* H.M.S.O. Cmd. 3479.



Opposition and one of the last surviving members of the National Convention, raised the question whether the proposed measure would alter the effect of the entrenched sections. It was General Hertzog's view that those Sections would remain of full legal force and effect. Nevertheless, he accepted a motion in the following terms:

That on the understanding that the proposed legislation will in no way derogate from the entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act, Parliament, having taken cognizance of the draft clauses and recitals which it was proposed by the Imperial Conference of 1930 should be embodied in legislation to be introduced in the Parliament at Westminster, approves thereof and authorizes the Government to take such steps as may be necessary with a view to the enactment by the Parliament of the United Kingdom of legislation on the lines set out in the Schedule annexed.\*

The Schedule was the draft Bill.

The resolution was adopted unanimously by both Houses of the Union Parliament. In the course of the debate the leaders of the Nationalist Party, some of whom are in the present Cabinet, said that the Constitution was sealed with the honour of the Afrikaner people.

The Statute of Westminster, approved by all the Dominions, became law in 1931.

In 1936 the Natives of the Cape Province were removed from the common voters' roll in terms of an Act enacted in accordance with the proper constitutional machinery. The legislation was attacked. The Appeal Court, though the question was not put in issue before it and without hearing argument, decided that the Statute of Westminster had repealed the special safeguards of the entrenched sections of the South Africa Act.†

#### Nationalists in Office

THIS, then, was the constitutional position when the present Nationalist Government took office in 1948. After some preliminary attacks on the presence in the House of Assembly of the European representatives of the Natives elected in terms of the 1936 Act, the Government in 1951 by a simple majority in both Houses of Parliament purported to pass the Separate Representation of Voters Act, which deprived the Cape Coloured voters of their century-old franchise. In doing so they ignored the procedure laid down in the entrenched sections. With an Appeal Court decision in their favour they can hardly be said to have acted illegally. In view of the pledges of 1931 they stood morally, no doubt, on less firm ground. The Act was attacked. The Appeal Court, unanimously reversing its 1937 decision, declared the Act invalid.‡ Here, perhaps, it might be explained that, unlike the House of Lords, the Appeal Court is not bound by its own decisions; naturally it will only depart from an earlier decision if it can be shown to be manifestly wrong. In the view of the Judges of Appeal the Statute of Westminster had left the entrenched sections intact. One of the remarks of the Chief Justice, who

\* Per Centlivres, C.J. in *Harris v. Minister of the Interior*, 1952 (2) S.A. 428 at p. 458.

† *Ndlwana v. Hofmeyr*, N.O., 1937 A.D., 289.

‡ *Harris v. Minister of the Interior*, 1952 (2) S.A. 428.

delivered the judgment of the Court, is worth recalling.

... the authoritative voice of the Union, as embodied in the joint resolution of the two Houses of Parliament, made it abundantly clear that the Union did not desire any amendment of its Constitution and emphasized that the proposed Statute of Westminster should in no way derogate from the entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act.

This judgment was delivered on March 20, 1952. That afternoon the Prime Minister repudiated it in Parliament in the most categorical terms.\* Thus was the constitutional crisis born.

The Government reacted with extraordinary speed. Before the end of the Session it passed the High Court of Parliament Act, which purported to make the members of both Houses the final Court of Appeal in cases involving the validity of an Act of Parliament, but which allowed access to it only by an appellant Minister.

The Act was attacked and on November 13, 1952, was declared invalid by the Appeal Court. The judgments of the individual Judges were rich in their variety of reasoning. Some found that the High Court of Parliament was not a Court at all; others that it was not a Court such as the framers of the Constitution had in contemplation as the judicial power to be entrusted with the duty of protecting the rights safeguarded by the entrenched sections; all held that it was just Parliament sitting in the trappings of a Court.

The Government returned to the constitutional path. Three attempts were made at Joint Sitzings to secure a two-thirds majority for a Separate Representation of Voters Bill. All failed. After the failure of the first attempt a Bill was introduced to reconstitute the Appeal Court. It did not get beyond a first reading but remained suspended over the heads of members during the second and third attempts; the threat failed to influence their decision on either occasion.

In the Session of 1955 the Appellate Division Quorum Act and the Senate Act were passed. Before the introduction of the former, five further Judges of Appeal were appointed, bringing the total up to eleven, and the Act itself then provided that the quorum in appeals relating to the validity of Acts of Parliament should be eleven. In moving the second reading of the Bill, the Minister of Justice did not hesitate to give as one of the reasons for its introduction that it was "connected, of course, with the so-called constitutional crisis which we [have] had in South Africa".† It was an unfortunate observation.

The Minister of the Interior was equally frank in introducing the Senate Bill. Throughout his second reading speech he linked the measure with the crisis.‡ It became law on June 20, 1955.

#### Packed Senate at Work

FROM 1948 to 1955 the Government, having failed to secure the requisite majority at two General Elections to provide a two-thirds majority at a Joint Sitting of both Houses, found itself confronted with a minority

\* 1952 Hansard, cols. 3124/5.

† 1955 Hansard, cols. 4427 *et seq.*

‡ 1955 Hansard, cols. 6003 *et seq.*

sufficient to preserve the rights safeguarded by the entrenched sections of the Constitution. By the Senate Act it ensured itself such a majority by legislation without the intervention of the electorate, and thereby defeated what was thought to be the original intention of the Legislature. That intention was described by General Smuts, speaking in the House of Assembly on September 2, 1948, in the following words:

The manner in which a change could be effected was made subject to such severe conditions that it would be practically impossible for any Party to put it through on Party lines . . . the basic idea was that the matter should be dealt with on a national basis. . . .\*

The Senate Act created a Senate *ad hoc* for the attainment of a particular purpose. This is a courteous euphemism used to describe a "packed" Senate. That it was packed is established by the facts. Before the old Senate was dissolved in terms of the new Act the total number of members of both Houses was 207, made up of 123 Government supporters and 84 Opposition members. After the new Senate was constituted the total became 248, made up of 171 Government supporters and 77 Opposition members. The Act increased Government representation in the Senate from 29 to 77 and reduced Opposition representation from 19 to 12. The Government now had a two-thirds majority in a Joint Sitting of both Houses. It was used to pass the South Africa Act Amendment Act, 1956, and the Coloured people of the Cape Province lost the franchise rights they had enjoyed for a hundred years.

The Act was attacked. The Cape Court repelled the attack. The Appeal Court upheld its decision by a majority Judgment. Ten Judges of Appeal held the Act to be invalid. One, Mr. Justice Schreiner, dissented.†

In terms of one proviso to Section 152 of the South Africa Act the original Senate was frozen for ten years and at any time after expiry of that period could be reshaped by Parliament. In terms of another proviso the entrenched sections were entrenched. The Senate Act did reconstitute the Senate but did so by packing it and thereby enabled the destruction of the safeguards contained in the other proviso. The Appeal Court has virtually found that to create a "packed" Senate for such a purpose was not alien to the intention of the British Parliament in enacting the South Africa Act. Sir Winston Churchill in 1909 piloted the measure through the Commons. General Smuts was one of the architects of the Act. That what has happened could have occurred to either as possible is unthinkable.

The constitutional crisis, then, has been resolved. This multi-racial country now enters a constitutional future with none of the checks and balances that until now have protected, at least to some extent, the language rights of both language groups and the franchise rights of all. A progressive deterioration in race relations has been exacerbated. The gulf between the Nationalist and non-Nationalist elements of the population has been widened. It seems a heavy price to have paid for the attainment of an ideological objective.

South Africa,  
February 1957.

\* 1948 Hansard, col. 1411.

† *Collins v. Minister of the Interior* A.D., Nov. 9, 1956.

# A TRADE UNIONIST'S APPEAL

## OLD SLOGANS AND NEW NEEDS

*(From a correspondent)*

**A**RE our trade unions doing all they could to assist the country in its economic difficulties? If not, what are some of the drawbacks that stop them from giving that bold new type of leadership which without a doubt the great majority of the eight million organized workers are apprehensively awaiting?

Moulded and motivated as they are with their nineteenth-century rules, objects and slogans, is it surprising that they find it increasingly difficult to rise to the needs of the twentieth-century welfare State, a State whose standard of living is dependent more than ever on the size of its production and the price of its oversea selling goods? Do the unions understand that the functions and activities for which they were designed in a different age have ceased to be relevant today? Are there any signs of the change of heart, ideas and motives that alone will equip them to meet the real challenges of their time?

The old slogans that stood the unions in good stead in forming the basis for recruitment of their members, when they had to demonstrate the need for collective bargaining, to energize and unite the workers, are dead with the past and should be buried alongside the old pioneers who raised those slogans and emblazoned them on their union banners, displayed in every branch meeting room and hoisted on every demonstration as the pride and inspiration for the cause of trade unionism. Slogans such as "Join the Union and fight for higher wages, shorter hours, and better working conditions", "Join the Union and help us to fight for T.U. recognition", "United we stand, divided we fall", "Workers unite", "Down with the boss class, up with the Workers": these are some of the many slogans demonstrating the anti-employer class outlook, not one among them symbolizing the case for production, nevertheless slogans that recruited millions to the ranks of trade unionism, enforced the need for collective bargaining, and won the Tolpuddle Medals for those of us fired with the spirit and aspirations of the old pioneers who did the recruiting.

It is all good history, and worth remembering as history; but the truth of the matter today is that the banners displayed in the 1957 branch room still bear those outmoded slogans. They stare the members in the face, not as ghosts or symbols of the past, but as a pointer to the manner in which the branch should argue, or confront Britain's present-day economic problems. Woe betide the new member who should speak on lines diverging from the old aspirations. He will be sharply reminded of the slogans on the banners in the corner.

Let us for a moment take a look at the existing machinery covering industrial relations. The machinery now operating through joint industrial councils, Fair Wage Acts and Trade Board Acts gives adequate protection

and guarantee to practically the entire British working population, for prescribed minimum rates of pay, working hours and statutory holidays with pay. Workmen's Compensation, always a complex problem to the ordinary worker, which provided great scope for the unions in representation and protection, is now completely tied up by statute. Assistance, advice and industrial injuries benefits are all obtainable through the local office of the Ministry of National Insurance. A great number of factories now run their own sick and pension schemes, providing added benefit to their employees in sickness and retirement. Thus again this aspect of social responsibility has lessened the unions' past importance. It was they who provided these schemes in their rules.

A great number of factories run magazines which provide for discussion and an opportunity for the workers to express themselves on subjects appertaining to the factory in general. Here again this development has robbed the unions, especially as producers of the unofficial shop stewards' bulletins, of much of their propaganda weight, and certainly curbed the activities of the Communist type of rank-and-file factory paper.

Employers today welcome the principle of factory or works committee or council, set up for the purpose of discussing joint problems, job grievances, and the whole range of welfare questions. Here again this aspect of factory or shop relations was once the sole prerogative and function of the union stewards, and it all boiled down to a running fight between them and the manager.

Today factory management as part of its training devotes much stress and time to the whole question of social relations with the workers. It is as constant in the training syllabuses as potatoes on the menu.

Responsibility for the workers' welfare and a good working atmosphere is now the key to correct management on the part of those who manage and direct production. In the past this lack of understanding and desire on the part of employers created the gap and mistrust between the workers and management, in which militant shop stewards' committees built their platform. Today in view of the tremendous change described above it is certainly debatable whether the old basic functions and outlook of the present shop stewards' movement are compatible with that type of goodwill and unity between workers and management which is so essential to our factory life.

To a major degree employers in British industry have buried their old ideas and methods with the past; how much the unions have buried is a matter for assessment in the light of the realities of the situation. Can it be sincerely maintained that the unions have turned this change and new relationship to the nation's advantage in overcoming its present-day economic difficulties, which are the difficulties of all levels alike in industry and demand the full resources of all in co-operation?

In spite of all the study pamphlets put out and educational classes taken, the fact is that the existing pattern of trade-union thinking and policies is identified with the nineteenth-century class outlook and rôle of the unions. There exist no real policies or measures to replace the old thinking and theories, which are completely unworkable in our present-day economic

difficulties, and certainly offer no solution to any immediate crisis. On the contrary, the more we cling to these old theories the more impotent we remain in doing anything about a crisis.

### Reasons for Conservatism

THERE are of course certain fundamental reasons and factors which can be attributed to the unions' reluctance in parting with the past or in taking that bold initiative which many of its realists feel to be necessary.

First, it has become apparent that since the introduction of the welfare State with its insurance and security, plus the new technique in the field of factory social relations on the part of management, the unions have felt a considerable loss in prestige and moral authority over the workers, whom they have more than represented in the past, to the point of governing.

It is true of course that over the past few years trade-union membership has increased. This increase can be assigned to definite reasons, first the extension of the closed shop principle, a process of compulsory membership, and secondly to the elimination from factory life of the fear of victimization for joining a union. Employers offer no obstruction to their workpeople against joining a trade union should they so desire. On the contrary, over the past few years all the trade-union fights around the principle of union recognition have arisen from inter-union rivalry. Indeed even prolonged strikes, causing terrible hardship to the strikers and certainly to the nation, have been organized by the workers against their union for the right to leave it and join another.

It is natural of course that any sign that the necessity or importance of the unions to the workers is growing less should arouse a certain jealousy for their vested interests. But, as present-day living standards are it becomes increasingly difficult to create any real enthusiasm at branch meetings for the old slogans and social demands, except of course on an artificial basis for purposes intended to serve other than industrial ends.

The unions, therefore, to stimulate a new importance in function, need to embark on new ideas, objects and policies; to study afresh, and instruct their members in, what ought to be done and is best for all in the present economic situation. Their reluctance to embark upon policies that are desirable on broader economic grounds, but new, can be attributed to the second factor in trade-union life at the present day.

Politically the trade unions are affiliated to the Labour Party. Naturally the Labour Party expects of the unions primarily to assert their power and influence over the entire membership for the three main objectives: first, to assist the party financially, secondly to build the membership of the party, and thirdly and most important to support the party in winning parliamentary power—not that when they obtain that power they can offer the trade unionist any better working conditions than he now enjoys. There are other aspects of this affiliation that decide to a large degree the unions' attitude to many of the problems, which they must know by now that they cannot solve or contribute towards solving, whilst in allegiance to political theories and



principles in the main class-biased and as outdated as their own slogans of the Tolpuddle era.

This is expressed in their policies for production, its distribution and the set-up of British industry generally. The arguments put forward, based on the old theories, already have proved in practice to be no solution to our problems, and have not brought with them any marked change in the workers' conditions. In the industries where these theories have been put into practice the industrial arguments and strife between the workers and management have recalled some of the worst struggles of the past century.

The issue of profits in the past, always a trump card in trade-union argument for wage increases, today has a higher political than economic value. Production costs and industrial efficiency in the past never came into the picture when discussing a new wage demand in the branch room. Quite frankly, nobody in the unions could care less. If we argued at all it was for restricting production at whatever the cost.

The unions still cling to this "profits" argument, in the main because it serves as a class propaganda weapon to perpetuate the feeling of class injustice and inequality between the worker and his boss, thus serving a political purpose. But in actual fact the use of it today can serve only as a deterrent against that goodwill which is so essential if we are to break down the remaining class barriers standing between worker and employer for a joint effort towards higher and cheaper production.

### Communist Infiltration

THE third main reason for the unions' ineffectiveness in contributing to the country's present difficulties is that they are menaced and threatened with Communist infiltration. The Communists' rôle in our trade unions' attitude to our country is no secret, but unfortunately their actions and policies, not being fully understood, too often mislead the workers they represent in the unions.

The Communists are out to capture our trade unions for the purpose of bringing them under the influence of their dictates, to use them to wage relentless class war against Britain's industries, to recruit union members to the Communist ranks, and finally, acting under orders from their Soviet masters, to use the power of the unions to overthrow the State.

How far they have progressed in their plans and strategy can be measured in the fact that they control several unions, including the powerful Electrical Trades Union, 200,000 strong, and present a menacing challenge to unions in coal-mining, engineering, and ship-building, and constructional engineering. Among the professional workers they are strong and influential in Law Societies, among Teachers' Associations, scientific bodies and in the medical profession. Unofficially they wield influence out of all proportion to their union status in our docklands and transport depots. It is perfectly true of course that they have suffered severe setbacks from Soviet actions in East Germany, Poland and recently in Hungary. In all these instances the Communist attack has been on democratic forces and most brutal against the organized workers themselves. This situation has of course put the Com-

munists on the defensive, but there is certainly no case for any complacency or slackening of vigilance on the part of the nation, and the unions in particular.

The fact is that memories are short even in relation to what the Communists have done in Eastern Europe; while our unions still cling to the old trade-union class outlook, the Communists will not lack opportunity, and situations to exploit. Only recently when the Hungarian bloodshed was still in the air, at a meeting of the Engineering Unions Policy Committee, one "Reg" Birch, a well-known and uncompromising Communist, moved a motion calling upon 800,000 engineers to strike for one week, to enforce a new wage demand. This man, known by all the committee men around for what he is, presenting the strike resolution in his best class-war Communist manner, was defeated by a mere six votes. Out of the 50 delegates 22 voted for Mr. Reg Birch the Communist. The incident is quoted here, first, to bring home the terrible menace of complacency towards Communism in the present position, secondly, to reinforce the argument that it was by playing up to the old slogans of trade unionism that Mr. Birch came so dangerously near to gaining the adoption of a policy that could have brought only further disaster to Britain's economy. However strongly the workers may feel over Hungary, the fact remains they voted for Mr. Birch. The stock answer is of course that they did not vote for the Communist, or for what his comrades did in Hungary, but for his trade-union militancy and the hope of a wage increase. That is how the argument goes, and nobody knows it better than the Communist, who exploits it to gain his ends.

The little things like job grievances and lack of attention on the part of management have in the past played into the Communists' hands. So much of their strength has been built around their factory organization. Today the basis for this form of influence and infiltration is rapidly disappearing for reasons already given. But whatever the situation and however good the employers' intentions the Communist, more than any other trade unionist, will continue to revive the old trade-union slogans and dogma as the basis to propagate the industrial class war.

With this background, with its political trends, divergencies and disruptions, it is not difficult to understand why, in the name of Britain and for Britain, our unions cannot rise to the national emergency and give that vital lead which must be followed by its eight million workpeople if we are to overcome and surmount our recurrent economic difficulties.

The antiquated cry against the morality of profits made by industrial speculators contains at best a half truth, as those who raise it well know, and is becoming more and more a mere catchword of a propaganda with no real relation to the present economic situation. A small profit is an incentive to work and live for, no less than a dividend won on the football pools; and we all know 90 per cent of the workers indulge in pool betting for the sole purpose of gaining profit.

New spates of wage increases cannot at this stage solve anything. On the contrary they are bound to make things materially worse all round. New wage increases can only mean increases all round for the housewife and

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equally disastrous increases in the prices of the goods we must sell abroad to live. What is the good of sending salesmen abroad with a price list beyond the requirements of the customer? To go on in this manner is plainly and simply organizing our own redundancy, with its inevitable mass unemployment, again giving openings to the Communist plan. Let us have some boldness on the part of the unions for a change. It is no policy just to arrange and organize conferences for new wage demands. This is just appeasing the members instead of leading them. Is it mere slavish adherence to the traditional rôle of the unions, to fight for more wages regardless of consequences? Or is it the basis for justifying the necessity of the unions to the workers? Whatever it is it takes us nowhere, as every member of the rank and file knows only too well.

### A Seven-point Plan

SURELY by now the ordinary worker in his innermost heart is just as conscious of what is happening to his country as he is about any new wage claim or shorter working week. Surely he understands that the question now is what can be done to save us all. It is a question not of "Workers Unite", but of the unity of all classes. Let us try and think of something outside class and dogma. Never mind what the old pioneers said or what were their slogans a hundred years ago. They are not alive today, having to face the realities of the situation. To break out of the vicious circle now we need sacrifice, if that is the word, hardly any of our hard-won gains; and if we cannot get any extra out of it ourselves for the next couple of years—and we still live on a high standard—then at least we can stop the wrangling, the class bitterness and the scoring of points which are getting us nowhere at home and bringing nothing but dismay to our friends abroad and glee to our enemies. "Workers of the World Unite" is a fraud. Those who are enemies of Britain, and out to ruin it as are the Communists, are the enemies also of those of us who live and work in Britain, and therefore are out to ruin us also. It is not enough to disagree with the Communist way of life: it is more important to stand together to save our own.

The writer is a life-long trade unionist of the rank and file. It is in loyalty to the movement that the following proposals are offered to his fellow workers. They will lead to no Utopia; but they are capable of providing breathing space in which to plan again more securely.

1. Let complete agreement be reached between the unions of this country and the employers on a two-year stand-still policy. This agreement to maintain wage, profit and price levels within the limits ruling at the time of the agreement. This agreement to be supervised by a joint board, with an independent chairman representing the Government to ensure that it is carried out.
2. Let all restrictive trade practices proven to be hampering the continuity of production and its maximum efficiency be immediately abolished.
3. Let there be a two-year agreement to outlaw all forms of strikes. This agreement, whilst not in the form of government legislation, neverthe-

less to give either side the legal right to take action should there be grounds of flagrant provocation.

4. Let there be a two-year agreement bringing up the working week to a 46-hour minimum. The proceeds of the extra hours worked to be distributed on the following basis: 40 per cent bonus distribution to the workers involved, 30 per cent for reducing prices, and the remaining 30 per cent to be utilized to offset extra running costs and for capital development. To safeguard the interest of all concerned, to avoid mistrust, it would be necessary to set up joint works committees to ensure that the scheme is administered properly.

5. Let Parliament abolish Whit Monday as a public holiday. This unnecessary holiday must create a great loss to production.

6. Let there be a two-year joint agreement for changes in the holiday schemes. Instead of the existing two weeks with pay, in the interest of production let there be seven days holiday with ten days pay. This would mean a financial saving to industry, maintain a greater volume of production over the current period and of course give the workers the extra pay to enjoy seven days holiday—at present the fourteen days gives them the extra time away from work but no extra money to take a real holiday.

7. Finally, let the National Joint Board, with the government representative acting as its independent chairman, meet periodically for the purpose of assessment of progress, to issue joint statements, to reach factory level again for joint discussion, to stimulate factory production by defining targets, and to supply information relating to the changing of production and price levels set.

For this plan no legislation is necessary or desirable except to give protection to the legality of the agreements. Certainly neither compulsion nor exhortation can solve this problem of our production costs and prices. It can be solved only by the joint effort, goodwill, courage, determination and change of outlook on the part of the unions and the employers, to take the initiative and make the approach. It is what the nation needs, not what seems best for our sectional interest, with the fullest realization by us all that, if Britain goes down, we all go down with it.

It is necessary, however, that our unions should take stock and use some initiative, or face the consequences of the deadly menace of the Communists, who rely more than on anything else upon the failure of our unions, waiting to exploit any further worsening of the situation, sparing none of us in their quest for power and for Communism.

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# IRELAND

## CONFLICT, CONFUSION AND CRISIS

IRELAND enters 1957 in a sad state of conflict, confusion and crisis. The clatter of sten-guns along our Northern border, the confused babbling of our politicians faced with the results of their past folly and the long queues of unemployed outside our Labour Exchanges provide clear evidence of our tragic plight. During the debate on Mr. Costello's Republic of Ireland Act in December 1948 the late Professor J. J. Bigger, who represented Trinity College in the Senate and was himself of Ulster rebel stock, made a remarkable speech.\* The gun that had killed for the Republic might now, he said, be turned against Northern Ireland, and that way lay civil war. His prediction, which was received with ridicule by Mr. Costello and his supporters, has now been virtually fulfilled. After a year's respite the attacks made on Northern Ireland by the I.R.A. and kindred organizations, which began in June 1954, have now been resumed on a more extensive and formidable scale. Since the middle of last November customs posts, police barracks, drill halls, electric transformers, a courthouse and a radar station have been at various times the targets of attacks by armed bands from the Republic, which, while of no real military importance, have caused much damage to property and some loss of life. While it may be doubted whether even one-tenth of our people really approve of these immoral and insane attacks, which have been condemned by both Church and State, they are in fact the result of irresolute and incompetent government combined with our own lack of moral courage and clear thinking.

### The Reason Why

THE reason for this strange situation is complex but clear. The Rebellion of 1916 made the division of Ireland inevitable, the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and the Tripartite International Agreement of 1925† gave it binding and permanent effect. After 1925 only two policies as regards Partition were open to any Dublin Government. One, quite indefensible, was to disregard all legal and moral obligations and to attempt to conquer Northern Ireland by force. This was not only physically impossible, but, even if possible, would have destroyed all hope of achieving that spiritual unity between Irishmen without which political unity would be merely "a mockery, a delusion and a snare". The other policy, that of "the good neighbour", was dictated alike by Christian principles and political wisdom. Based on a desire to live and let live such a policy would have recognized the Government of Northern Ireland, worked with it whenever possible and agreed to differ with it when it could not co-operate. Neither policy was followed. On the contrary, ignoring the realities of the situation, our political leaders have for the last thirty

\* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 154, March 1949, p. 154.

† See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 62, March 1926, pp. 344 *et seq.*

years availed themselves of any and every opportunity to exacerbate relations between North and South and to put forward fantastic demands, which they should have known they were powerless to obtain. Their arguments were based on the fallacious premise that the geographical entity of Ireland involved and demanded political unity in spite of deep religious, racial and political differences. In addition our educational system has inculcated a doctrine of perverted nationalism and glorified violence. It is true that in recent years some of our politicians, realizing the result of their conduct, have sought to trim their sails and establish some kind of *modus vivendi* with Northern Ireland, but the damage had been done.

### The Republic and After

THE extremist element, nourished by this false teaching and ever ready to have recourse to the gun, found a perfect excuse for violent action in Mr. Costello's Republic Act. This measure, for which no electoral mandate had ever been given, was conceived in a moment of pique and devised to take the wind out of Mr. de Valera's sails. It finally destroyed all hope of ending Partition. During the debate on the subject Mr. Costello declared that his purpose in becoming Prime Minister was to put an end to internal personal bitterness, to take the gun out of Irish politics and to bring about unity and domestic concord. Far from taking the gun out of Irish politics the Act was, in reality, not only a surrender to that small but implacable minority who have stained Irish history with blood for nearly half a century, but a flagrant denial of the principles for which his own party was supposed to stand. Instead of promoting unity it merely aggravated the problem of Partition and gave the I.R.A. a plausible excuse for violent action against Northern Ireland.

To make matters worse Mr. Costello declared that he would never again take part in a Government which had to enforce order by extra-judicial process (i.e. special courts or military tribunals), thus exposing the weakness of his personal position and assuring the I.R.A. of a fair field for their illegal activities. From 1951 to 1954, during Mr. de Valera's administration, the extremists, being aware from past experience that he would tolerate no nonsense, prudently remained quiescent. But as soon as Mr. Costello returned to power in 1954 they began a series of attacks on Northern Ireland. After the first of these Mr. Costello declared in the Dail that the use of force by a minority was "immoral, unchristian and likely to endanger the vital interests of the nation". The only authority, he said, to decide for peace or war was the Dail. Force, he declared, was no remedy, for it would only create an implacable minority. With these unimpeachable sentiments Mr. de Valera concurred. No steps were, however, taken to deal with this obvious threat to responsible government, for, as his Labour colleagues in the Government made clear by their speeches and votes, they were not prepared to act against the extremists.

When in November 1955 another attack was made on Roslea police barracks\* Mr. Costello announced that if there were any more outrages the

\* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 182, March 1956, p. 168.



Government would take action. They have now at last, after the intervention of the British Ambassador, been forced to do so, but whether their belated activity will be either effective or resolute remains to be seen.

No attempt has been made to establish liaison with the Northern authorities for the purpose of concerting measures to prevent further forays. This uncertainty as to the Government's intention to take resolute action naturally affects the morale and attitude of the police and army. Prominent amongst those caught or killed during the recent raids on the North were several government and local-government officials.

The real tragedy of the situation is that many of those involved in these attacks are sincere, idealistic boys frustrated by the failure of the politicians and perverted by fanatical teachers. Owing to the supine attitude of the Government the number engaged in these illegal activities has grown considerably during the last two years. It is a clear case of conspiracy against public order and established authority, and the Government has full power to deal with it under the Offences Against the State Act passed by Mr. de Valera's Government in 1939 to deal with a similar situation. Under this Act the Government can set up Special Courts to try offences and suppress unlawful organizations. These organizations include any body that "raises or maintains without authority a military force", or that "advocates the attainment of any object, lawful or unlawful, by violent or criminal means". The I.R.A. and its imitators clearly fulfil both these requirements. According to Mr. Costello there are now three or four splinter groups involved which are vying with each other in violence.\* As Part V of the Act, which enables such Special Courts to be set up, was brought into operation in August 1939, there is nothing to prevent the Government from enforcing it. Whether they will do so or not remains to be seen. The extremists are naturally seeking to create a situation that will intimidate the Government.

The funerals of the two raiders killed during the attack on Brookeborough police barracks on January 1 were turned into a demonstration of support; and the usual resolutions of sympathy have been passed by several public bodies. John Redmond once said that the Irish people were more moved by sentiment than anything else, but emotion combined with exaggeration, misrepresentation and violence is a dangerous mixture. Some local councils have even gone so far as to pass resolutions asking that the army and the police should be authorized to support the extremists in their attacks.

This is the situation with which Mr. Costello, largely through his own ineptitude, is now confronted. The I.R.A., with Russian effrontery, maintain that their attacks, directed and launched from the Republic, are in fact a rebellion by the oppressed people of Northern Ireland! Only the Soviet press has so far swallowed this fable. In a broadcast address on January 6, Mr. Costello again affirmed the supremacy of Parliament and announced the Government's intention to deal with any attempts to usurp its authority. He appealed to public opinion for support. Since his broadcast several of the ringleaders of the extremists have been arrested. He has refused the request

\* The I.R.A., Saor Uladh (Save Ulster) and The Liberation of Ireland group.

made by two deputies to recall the Dail in order to discuss two motions, one asking the Government to raise the matter at the U.N., and the other that the extremists should not be interfered with. But a negative policy is not enough. If we really desire to establish friendly relations with our Northern fellow countrymen and to end the present disastrous situation we must recognize and co-operate with their Government and stop the pernicious anti-partition propaganda which is responsible for our present plight. In no other way can the demand for Irish unity be transformed from a barren political shibboleth into a fruitful spiritual reality.

### Ireland and the United Nations

THESE internal troubles have somewhat obscured recent important developments in our external policy. It has been clear for some time that Mr. Cosgrave, the Minister for External Affairs, has been trying to break away from the position of negative and impossible neutrality followed by his predecessors, and our entrance into U.N. has given him an opportunity to do so. Before he went to New York he delivered an interesting address, in which he outlined his policy and made it clear that Ireland would normally take her stand with the United States and those countries of Western Europe which were engaged in countering and opposing Communism. While, he said, they would do what they could to win support for their view as regards Partition, he admitted that in the final analysis the solution of this problem could only be found by restoring a sense of brotherhood and spiritual unity in Ireland itself. Admitting Ireland's dislike for colonial policies he was careful to add that we could not take up a position of basic or permanent opposition to European colonial powers which were our traditional friends, nor could we support anti-colonial movements warped by racial or religious fanaticism or fostered by Soviet Russia. Our delegation at U.N. would, he said, consider individual problems on their merits and in a realistic spirit.

Applying these sensible principles he made it clear during the debate at the General Assembly that while we sympathized with Egypt in her struggle against invasion we could not help feeling that this terrible crisis need never have arisen if the Egyptian Government had behaved itself properly and had not relied on Russian aid. The Governments of England and France had at least shown that they were amenable to public opinion. It was not enough, he said, to affirm that British and French troops should get out of Egypt. It was also essential to secure that Soviet Russia should not move in. The Suez Canal was not just an Egyptian interest, nor an imperial interest, but a world interest. Life, for example, was harder for the Irish people, who had no say in the events that led to the closing of the Canal but had to pay for it. As regards Hungary he left the Assembly in no doubt of our sympathy and support for its oppressed people. We have in fact given shelter to some of the refugees and raised a relatively large sum for their support. Thirty years ago Mr. Cosgrave's respected father addressed the League of Nations as President of the then newly established Irish Free State. He must be proud

that his son has opened a new chapter in Ireland's international relations with words of such moderation and good sense.

### Economic Difficulties

THE Suez crisis has unfortunately accentuated our economic difficulties.\* Petrol and oil rationing has been introduced and is bound to affect our commercial, agricultural and industrial activities. The reduction in government expenditure necessitated by the failure of two National Loans, and the special levy on imports, have seriously affected such industries as motor-car assembling and building. While the special levies seem to have reduced the adverse trade balance to manageable proportions,† this has been achieved solely through the reduction of imports and not by an increase in exports. This failure of exports to expand is the real cause of our present difficulties. With a few small exceptions our export trade is static, while in comparison with other Western European countries our exports are small. In 1955, for example, our exports were valued at £110 million, as compared with £270 million for Northern Ireland and £410 million for Denmark. Although a country cannot normally import much more than it exports we managed in 1955 to import £204 million or nearly double the value of goods exported. Moreover our non-foreign trade income of about £60 million is mainly fortuitous, and it would be imprudent to count on its permanence. Since 1947 we have had a balance-of-payments deficit every year and are minus £209 million on our current balance-of-payments account. This represents our whole war-time accumulation of sterling and much more besides. We now possess much less sterling than before the war at a much lower purchasing power. The essential weakness in our position is our low export capacity, which is due to low agricultural productivity. The average farm income in Northern Ireland is 85 per cent higher than in the Republic owing to more intelligent and industrious farming. The Irish economy has plenty of land, and a superabundance of labour, but little capital in the shape of plant, equipment and raw materials. Agriculture, its basis and the main source of exports, is rapidly losing its workers, while industry, the chief provider of employment, imports most of its machinery and materials, produces in the main goods for the domestic market and exports little. The imminent formation of a European free trade area in which Great Britain may participate will confront our maladjusted economy with a vital and almost insoluble problem. Domestic savings are insufficient to finance development, and State policy has been directed to discouraging foreign investment here. In so far as investment depends on personal savings two factors militate against its increase, a slowly expanding national economy and rising prices. Once the import levies have reduced the balance-of-payments deficit to reasonable proportions our politicians, who are already proclaiming that the crisis is over, will no doubt remove them. In a short time we shall then have to face the same problem again under worse conditions. Meanwhile we are

\* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 185, December 1956, pp. 66 *et seq.*

† Preliminary returns for 1956 show that the adverse balance has been reduced by £21 million—namely from £35 million to £14 million.

confronted with the fact that emigration has increased in each census period since we became a self-governing State—the present exodus being two and a half times as great as in the period 1926–36. A strong and really representative national government, assured of office for at least ten years, might be able to save the situation. Present constitutional and political limitations unfortunately make such a solution impossible.

### A General Election

THE Costello inter-party Government, as was to be expected, has been unable to stand the strain of dealing firmly with the campaign of anarchy and violence. On January 28 Mr. Sean Mac Bride, T.D., whose ludicrous party of three (Clann na Poblachta) forms part of the Government's "tribal levies", tabled a motion of no confidence in the Government for discussion when the Dail reassembled on February 13. Although Mr. de Valera aptly commented that, while Mr. Mac Bride's gyrations were amusing, the situation in which he had played a full part was not amusing, he himself proceeded to table a similar motion calling for a general election. While Mr. Mac Bride's motion claimed that the Government was no longer worthy of support because of its failure to devise a long-term economic policy, or to pursue a positive policy calculated to bring about the reunification of Ireland, its real object was disclosed in a statement which accused the Government of "acting as British policeman against a section of the Irish people", in other words trying to put an end to terrorism. In short Mr. Mac Bride is seeking extremist support while posing as a moderate-minded statesman. Such "double talk" will hardly deceive anyone. Faced with this unholy alliance, which destroyed his slender majority in the Dail, Mr. Costello exercised his prerogative as Prime Minister by asking the President to dissolve the Dail; and a general election will therefore take place on March 5. Mr. Costello's own party, Fine Gael, is devoid of both policy and principles, the Labour leaders are discredited, and the smaller splinter groups are unrepresentative and incoherent. The extremist element, represented by the so-called Sinn Fein Party, threatens to run some fifty candidates, but it is doubtful whether, even under P.R., they will return five. It therefore seems likely that Mr. de Valera's party, Fianna Fail, which is the most coherent and best organized, will be again returned to power with a working majority. Any other result might well prove a national disaster.

Ireland,

February 1957.

# AUSTRALIA

## THE SUEZ CANAL CRISIS

THE invasion of Egypt by British and French forces occasioned grave questioning. The Prime Minister's report to Parliament on September 25, in which he had etched in the background of the London Conference and told of his own interviews with President Nasser when, as leader of a special mission to Cairo, he had striven to reach accord with that dictator, had laid bare the essentials of the matters in issue. "Colonel Nasser's act of repudiation and confiscation", was, he observed, "the first shot in a campaign calculated, unless promptly and successfully resisted, to make the peoples and economies of Great Britain and Western Europe dependent, literally from week to week, on one man's whim." Apart, therefore, from the unflattering estimate of the Egyptians, general amongst Australians who had served in the Middle East in two world wars, there was a widespread conviction that in Nasser another Hitler was arising, who by his arbitrary actions and unscrupulous propaganda was rapidly becoming a menace to the peace of the world. It was no less widely recognized that, in Arab hatred of Israel, there existed a weapon ready to Nasser's hand when he thought the time opportune to use it. It was further suspected that, in gauging such time, he would be guided by advice from the masters of the Soviet Union, whose interest in the rich oil-fields of the Middle East waxes with the passage of time.

When, on November 1, Great Britain and France actively intervened, the propriety of their action was anxiously canvassed. "Upon this point", said the Prime Minister in his official statement\* to the House of Representatives and the nation, "the Government of Australia believes that the action was proper." As, save for a statement on November 8 by the Acting Minister for External Affairs on the situation in Hungary, no other member of the House, except the Leader of the Opposition, addressed himself to the crisis, the wholeheartedness with which those sitting behind Mr. Menzies shared this belief cannot be assessed. It was certainly qualified by considerable misgiving in the country at large. In many cases traditional loyalties to the United Kingdom and angered contempt for Egypt induced immediate support for the British Government's action. But from the outset there was a distinct note of interrogation, which gathered volume as the days passed. Was the use of force inevitable? Was it not likely to cause more damage to British interests than it could prevent? Would it not alienate Asian peoples? Australia wished to be in good relations with whom? Was it a fact that Mr. Casey, the Minister for External Affairs, who had made the promotion of such relations the mainspring of his policy in the near North, was tepid in his support of his leader's forthright endorsement? Could Australia, anxious to be in step with the United Kingdom, afford to be out of step with the United States? How would the repercussions of such intervention affect the solidarity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? Might we not be witnessing but the

\* See also p. 117.

beginning of a catastrophe that would engulf mankind? Was not the Commonwealth bound, in any event, to ascertain and comply with the will of the United Nations in such matters?

To the last question, Dr. Evatt, speaking as the Leader of the Opposition in the national Parliament, gave an emphatic answer:

In our opinion the action taken by Great Britain and France was wrong from the point of view of the duties cast upon members of the United Nations. Military force can be used only with the authorization of the United Nations or in self-defence in the case of armed attack against one's nation. In no other case is it permitted. . . . Let it be perfectly well understood in this House [he concluded] that the people of Australia will take all proper and constitutional steps to oppose the completion of the action that has been initiated by Britain and France.

Within six weeks, the extent to which Dr. Evatt had overreached himself in venturing to speak "for the people of Australia" was made manifest. The first opportunity given them of indicating their reaction to what he described as "an act of aggression" was at the polls in the Wentworth by-election on December 8. The candidate he actively supported scored about 20 per cent of the votes cast. Wentworth is a "blue-ribbon" non-Labour constituency in New South Wales; nevertheless a comparison of relevant figures establishes that Dr. Evatt's stand on "The Suez Crisis" was of no advantage to the candidate for whom he and others like-minded so strenuously campaigned.

This pointed refusal of the electors of Wentworth to endorse Dr. Evatt's censures was due in part to his pronounced tendency to equate Anglo-French action in Egypt with what the Prime Minister described as "the murderous activities of the Soviet Union in Hungary". Throughout Australia sympathy with and support for the people of Hungary in their attempt to throw off Russian domination has been widespread, and the decision of the Government to give asylum and succour to Hungarians seeking them has been unequivocally approved. To the average Australian the bracketing of what so many still regard as their mother country with the red-handed and alien oppressor in Budapest was a monstrous affront and strengthened many of them in the opinion that the leader of Labour is ever prone to be unduly gentle when touching the Kremlin.

In his strictures upon the United Kingdom Government for its failure to consult Australia and other British Commonwealth countries before joining with France in an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel on October 31, Dr. Evatt was upon much firmer ground. "In our opinion," said Mr. Menzies, since "the circumstances were those of great emergency Great Britain was correct in proceeding upon her own judgment and accepting her own responsibility." "Would anybody", asked Dr. Evatt, "accept that?" His was a rhetorical question, but no one who approves of developments, in this regard, in inter-Commonwealth relations since 1910 will fail to answer it with an emphatic "no". Again and again, Australian prime ministers, the late John Curtin and Mr. Menzies himself among them, have pressed for improvements in the system of consultation between member countries of the Commonwealth.

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"The Suez Crisis" has proved the urgency of the problem. If it is not satisfactorily solved, it may well be, as Dr. Evatt has foreshadowed, that "the British Commonwealth will not be a commonwealth at all". The self-respect and the self-interest of such member countries alike demand such pre-consultation. "We have not been asked to make any commitments ourselves", said Mr. Menzies. To which the reply of an Australian might well be: but should we not, in the result, have been committed, had the Anglo-French action initiated global warfare?

In some quarters the failure of the two Western Powers to take the United States into their counsels before letting slip the dogs of war has also been adversely criticized. As against this, however, there has been vigorous criticism of the reaction thereto of Washington and that by folk formerly very well disposed to the United States. There has been meaningful reference in influential journals and in the market-place to "the oil-mighty dollar", and doubt of the keenness of American perception when the manoeuvres of Soviet agents in Egypt, Syria and Jordan are under review. Such doubts and surmises may be baseless, but they find considerable, if regretful, acceptance. Regretful because Australians have a vivid recollection of the American shield thrown over their homeland during the Second World War and no less acutely realize the closeness of the association between their fortunes in the Pacific Basin and those of the United States.

The lead given by the representative of the United States to opinion in the forum of the United Nations has also been the subject of critical comment. From this distance it seemed as if an attempt were being made to humiliate the United Kingdom, and guesses were made as to the attitude the United States would adopt to any endangering of the use of the Panama Canal analogous to that threatening the other waterway in which the European States, and particularly Great Britain, are so vitally concerned. Observers could not but contrast the swiftness with which the United Nations mobilized both opinion and police action against Britain and France with its impotence against the Soviet Union in her "butchery" of Hungary. It was felt by some of them that, having set out on their course, Britain and France should not have stopped short of Suez, acting *ab initio* with such promptitude and decision as to prevent the blocking of the Canal and the seizure of the huge stocks of military equipment still there despite the earlier withdrawal of British forces from their Canal bases.

In the result, the prospect of a settlement of Middle East problems satisfactory to users of the Canal appears obscure if not overcast. Military commentators refer without enthusiasm to the police force conjured up by the United Nations: "a corps composed of petty detachments gathered *ad hoc* from a miscellany of nations and without co-ordinated supply and administrative services". "The United Nations was militarily effective in Korea", they remark, "because its army was based upon American forces and services."

Meanwhile the long-term effects on Britain herself, and indirectly on Australia, of the blocking of the Canal have been regarded in Australia with melancholy foreboding. Diminution of oil supplies and higher costs are

seen as threats to the British standard of living. Financial observers have pointed out that the expenses of the British intervention and its far-reaching consequences will more than destroy most of the good effects of the Government's anti-inflationary policy and undermine the work of years in building up export trade. Any decline of British prosperity will affect every part of the Commonwealth, especially Australia and New Zealand, owing to their close relationship with Britain as both importers and exporters.

### The State of the Wool Market

AUSTRALIANS at present have reason to be satisfied with the position of wool—their principal export commodity and the key-stone of the arch that supports the economy.

The causes of the strength of wool so far as Australia is concerned may be briefly considered under three headings: (a) Supply. (b) Demand. (c) Price and realization.

The estimate of the Australian clip for the 1956-57 season is approximately 4½ million bales, of which 75 per cent is merino and the rest cross-bred wool, and which will be grown on about 140 million sheep, the largest number ever recorded in the history of the industry in Australia. This represents an increase in wool production over the last ten years of nearly 50 per cent. The reasons for this dramatic growth of the clip are:

- (1) An extraordinary succession of good seasons throughout most of the country.
- (2) The eradication to a large extent of the rabbit population through the introduction of the virus of myxomatosis.
- (3) The application of the fruits of scientific research to the industry, and better husbandry in the care and development of flocks.
- (4) Profitable to very profitable returns to growers during the last decade.

It is difficult to evaluate the exact influence of these factors on the final result; but it may be worth noting that two of them represent the efforts of man to help himself, which encourages the view that beneficial effects will continue to flow from them. It should be observed, however, that myxomatosis may prove to have a declining economic use. There are survivors, and it is proportionately more difficult and costly to eradicate the few by this method. The views of scientists as publicly expressed suggest that caution should be exercised as regards the future benefit of this particular aid to production. There is little doubt that the industry is much more efficient than it was in pre-war years. High prices over a long period have made it possible for graziers to improve their methods, and better education has enabled intelligent application to be made of scientific aids to wool growing. There is need still for greater concentration on this aspect of the wool-production problem, but the improvement already noticeable is encouraging.

No one can forecast the seasons. It may well be that a drought is not far away, if the history of the cycle of seasons is any guide. It is, however, unlikely that droughts in the future will have the devastating effects on wool production and the sheep population that they used to have. The industry is

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Some climatologists have noted what they believe to be a permanent increase in the annual rainfall of south-eastern Australia, which could, if it is confirmed, have an important and favourable influence on wool production. Australia's reply to the challenge of man-made fibres on the production side is impressive, and she is making increasing supplies of wool available to the world's textile trade.

The demand for wool as shown by competition and purchasing at Australian auctions must be regarded as highly satisfactory. The United Kingdom is the largest buyer. France, Italy, Belgium and Eastern Europe are all large purchasers of the staple. The Japanese mills have a particular liking for Australian wool, and a large proportion of their allocation of wool imports goes to Australia. The purchasing and competition of Japan have had, and are having, a material effect on values. This influence seems likely to be maintained and even increased, particularly if the Federal Government allows more Japanese imports into Australia. The United States is a useful supporter of the market, but during the last three seasons her purchases have declined considerably from the levels they reached in the 1946-52 period. This trend has, of course, reduced the dollar earnings of wool and has had adverse effects on the trade position *vis-à-vis* dollar countries, and on the Commonwealth dollar pool. Australian woollen mills take about 12 per cent of the clip. Wool is also purchased by many countries in small quantities, but the aggregate of their purchases is considerable and the market operations involved represent effective competition at the auctions. The world demand for wool at present is undeniable. Its uses and destinations appear to be widening as its production increases. Supply and demand seem to be nicely balanced.

The wool cheque for the 1955-56 season was £A334 million. If the present level of prices so far recorded for the current season is maintained, the return for the clip could be £A90 million greater than that of last season. There is, of course, no assurance that prices will hold at existing levels, but it appears reasonable to assume that some increased income from wool will be earned during this financial year. Wool from July 1 to the end of October has, on a greasy basis, averaged A74d. per lb., as against A57d. per lb. for the same period last year. Though the recovery of prices is reassuring from the point of view of the immediate local situation, some authorities would not wish values to go much higher because of the stimulus that high wool prices give to the use of synthetic fibres. Professor Sir Samuel Wadham, the doyen of Australian agricultural scientists, has recently suggested that the danger to wool from this quarter would become real when wool values in Australian currency rose above an average of A120d. clean scoured on the floor. The present level of prices reduced to this basis is rather higher than the suggested danger level.

The international situation, particularly the crisis in the Middle East, may have had some bearing on recent price movements. The Egyptian trouble seems to have increased the tempo of Eastern European buying, but English

and American purchasing has been restrained throughout the worst phases of the crisis.

If the international situation is eased there is certainly a possibility that wool values will not go above their present level. They may slightly decline. General conditions in demand, however, suggest that for the current season they will prove to be sufficient to sustain the local economy on its present rather high cost basis.

### The Olympic Games in Melbourne, 1956

**C**ELEBRATION of the XVIth Olympic Games in Melbourne adds quite a thrilling chapter to Australian history. The Olympic movement had travelled far in its first sixty years, but never before to the Antipodes; and in his address at the Solemn Opening of the Congress of the International Olympic Committee in the Melbourne Town Hall (November 19) the Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, pointed out the national importance of such an event.

Its international importance is no less great. Taking place at a critical moment in history, with fate's axis suspended dangerously between Suez and Budapest, the Olympic Games remind us that despite its perilous differences all humanity has many fundamental things in common, including a healthy love of competition for its own sake, competition without rancour. True, several nations withdrew at the last moment, but the impressiveness of the total number (67 including Australia) was not seriously impaired by this. Moreover, though all the athletes were housed in the same area (in the admirably constructed Olympic Village at Heidelberg, an outer suburb of Melbourne), political differences were discreetly forgotten.

Full credit must be given to the many devoted people who contributed to the success of perhaps the greatest piece of civic organization hitherto undertaken in Australia. The face of Melbourne was, in fact, profoundly altered in the brief six years at the organizers' disposal. The Melbourne Cricket Ground, for example, was enlarged and modernized in a way that makes it a magnificent stadium; the Olympic Pool is an architectural marvel and an artistic gem; other stadia were created to complete the unique area known as Olympic Park. The network of organization spread as far inland as Ballarat, a good 100 miles away, where the lake was transformed into a *venue* for the boat races.

On the whole, Melbourne has a sober temperament. But the Games gave it a "new look" and a faster pulse. With the whole city beflagged and decorated; with impressive illuminations; with visitors, many of them royal, arriving from all countries; with a constant influx of people from other Australian States; with a miscellany of races, colours and languages everywhere in evidence, Melbourne suddenly became a world centre, a glittering Babel.

To complete the pageantry and the emotional value of the occasion, the opening of the Games on November 22 by His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh, for whom Australians have a great affection, seemed to have the

approval of the very elements. For the unpredictable Melbourne climate, which had long been blanketing the city with unseasonable rain, suddenly brightened up and produced a perfect day.

The importance of these events is undoubted. Not only do they link Australia more closely to the world, but they splendidly demonstrate the efficiency of a democratic society whose constructive enthusiasm is spontaneous and unregimented. The original Invitation Committee, the Organizing Committee, the various sub-committees, the City Council, the Government of Victoria and the Commonwealth Government; the voluntary and most generous hosts who accommodated visitors; the police; the taxi-drivers; the shop-assistants; the man in the street; all were on their mettle, and all passed the test both figuratively and literally with flying colours.

Australia,

February 1957.

# PAKISTAN

## REBUFFS FROM EGYPT

EVER since the emergence of Pakistan as an independent and sovereign country, her detractors have taken particular pleasure in ridiculing her sincere belief that the sentiments of Islamic brotherhood, if properly channelled, can be a potential force. Perhaps the Egyptian episode has set them thinking in a different direction. Here was a country that has consistently harboured virulent hostility for Pakistan and time and again sorely tried her patience. A whole barrage of calumny and abuse was unleashed against Pakistan when she joined the Baghdad Pact. Perhaps the junta in Egypt believed that the word "sovereignty" had one meaning for Cairo and quite another for Karachi.

As if these gratuitous affronts were not enough, the Egyptian President took upon himself to give his verdict on an issue that is still before the United Nations. In a press interview he said that "Suez is as dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India". To anyone claiming even the slightest interest in Pakistan it will at once be apparent how profoundly such blatant assertions must have shocked the people of Pakistan, all the more so when they come from quarters where, as fellow Muslims, they should expect some sympathy at least. Kashmir is a matter of life and death for the people of this country, and they can neither ignore nor forgive nor forget any opposition, no matter whence it comes, in this regard. And yet these were the very same Pakistanis who, when they thought that Egypt needed their help, volunteered to give their all.

A mass upheaval is a thing to be seen to be believed, but perhaps a few captions of the numerous editorials in the national press of Pakistan may give some idea of how vocally the people reacted to Egypt's cause and how they were finally disillusioned. It is a long way from such outbursts as "A crisis for mankind", "Hitler reborn", "Keep the robbers out", "The law of the jungle", "Eden against the world", "Wages of aggression", "Murder in Egypt" and "Bleeding Egypt" to the final cry of despair, "So this is Nasser." What was it, one may ask again, if not the powerful sentiments of Islamic brotherhood, that made the people of Pakistan so eager to come to Egypt's succour? The reply may be a counter-question. Why, in spite of all this talk of Islamic brotherhood, has the enthusiasm for Egypt turned into the frustration of a lover spurned? The answer is clear and categorical. Like all human attributes, even the strong sentiments of Islamic brotherhood have their limit. This is something natural, but it is here that the propagandist gleefully comes in and tries to impress that such sentiments are no more than mere anachronisms in the modern world of today. Perhaps it may be pardonable to say that one has to be an ostrich to accept such a view. The sentiments of Islamic brotherhood have their limitations, but they could only be ignored



at one's own peril. Given proper direction they can become a force to be reckoned with in world affairs.

The impact of events in Egypt and Hungary have accentuated the note of realism in Pakistan's foreign policy. While the former has driven home the futility of being guided solely by considerations of being fellow Muslims when the other side is not so inclined, the latter has emphasized the need to be wary of the new imperialism, albeit in a different garb.

Hitherto the overriding consideration in Pakistan's foreign policy has been to cultivate the friendliest relations with all Muslim countries. That still remains an important aspect of the country's approach to international affairs. It was reaffirmed by the Prime Minister, Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy, in his forthright speech on foreign policy in Dacca on December 9 last year. He said: "There is that Muslim sentiment in all our hearts which goes out whenever we find that any brother Muslim anywhere else is being subjected to some kind of pressure or attack. It is something which is inborn in us." But if a Muslim country like Egypt decides to take a different stand and spurn the hand of friendship proffered by Pakistan could the Prime Minister come to any other conclusion except "that certain things which unfortunately Egypt has done have rather shaken our faith and made us pause a little and become a little more wise in the precipitancy of our actions".

A brief account\* of Pakistan's rôle in the Suez crisis would certainly not be out of place here. Considering that Pakistan is a member of the Commonwealth and her economy is vitally linked with the free flow of traffic through the Suez Canal, there could be few examples of any country's helping another, and that too not a friendly one, to the extent to which Pakistan offered aid to Egypt.

It was at Pakistan's insistence at the 24-power conference that its sponsors had to alter their resolution in order not to conflict with the most fantastic definitions of sovereignty by Egypt. Pakistan stayed out of the 18-power conference when she thought there was a possibility that Egyptian sovereignty might be compromised. When the hostilities started Mr. Suhrawardy was in China. Immediately on his return he denounced Israel as the aggressor. President Nasser's trusted friend, Mr. Nehru, had not yet done so. Thereafter when the question of sending a United Nations force to Egypt came up, Pakistan lost no time in offering her troops. Arrangements were made to send a Red Crescent team to Egypt and to despatch as much money, food, clothes and medicines as possible. And all this was done with the full knowledge that Pakistan was standing up against one of its allies, namely, the United Kingdom. But when the Prime Minister asked for a meeting with President Nasser, he was cold-shouldered, even rebuffed.

President Nasser has never forgiven Pakistan for joining the Baghdad Pact. The only plausible explanation of his opposition to the Pact is that he considers it the biggest stumbling block to his ambition to bring other Arab States in the Middle East under Egyptian hegemony. Undoubtedly in Muslim eyes the Pact has its flaws, but it has nowhere conflicted with Egypt's interests. On the contrary it has been instrumental in effectively espousing

\* See also p. 118.

Egypt's cause. Both in Teheran and in Baghdad the four Muslim members of the Pact, disregarding and not inviting Britain, the senior partner in the Pact, condemned her intervention in Egypt and demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egyptian territory. They persuaded Turkey to break off diplomatic relations with Israel.

But if Mr. Nasser must continue to regard the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact as unfriendly and India, which has not even rescinded her *de jure* recognition of Israel, as her friend, there is little that can be done to convince him that there are none so blind as will not see. His intransigence has only helped Pakistan, as others, to be more realistic in their approach to Egypt and to be guided more by facts and less by theories and sentiments. It was in this strain that President Iskander Mirza of Pakistan said on January 11: "As regards Egypt, despite all our endeavours we were not successful in convincing them of our friendship and it looks as if it is quite useless trying to convince one who will not be convinced."

### Dynamic Foreign Policy

FOR a better appreciation of the new dynamism in Pakistan's approach to foreign affairs, it will be necessary to quote extensively from Premier Suhrawardy's policy speech, which he made at Dacca on December 9. It is an incredibly bold and blunt exposition of Pakistan's stand on international issues. Mr. Suhrawardy minces no words. He calls a spade a spade. From the strictly national point of view, Mr. Suhrawardy's speech is remarkable above all in that he has set a great example for the rest of the country's leadership never to drag in national issues in party politics.

Describing neutrality as a "species of blackmail", Mr. Suhrawardy linked opposition to military pacts

to the mentality which we have developed, namely, that if we say anything in favour of America or the U.K. we are called "stooges of imperialism" and if we say anything in favour of Russia we are called "independent". Now in order that you should be independent you must attack those two countries—U.K. and U.S.A.—and you must praise Russia, even though it may have perpetrated a tragedy which is unparalleled in history, namely the tragedy of Hungary. Nevertheless you shall not condemn it. If you condemn it it shows that you are a stooge of imperialism. By imperialism again is meant the imperialism which is passing, the imperialism of the older countries: but what about the imperialism of the newer countries?

The Premier was not making these observations in an offhand way. He knew the risks in discharging "our duty to point out the mistakes of Communist countries, particularly when we are almost being drawn within their orbit". His hope was that Pakistan will not earn the hostility of Russia. "We are far too small to do so and I hope we shall not earn it in any way." But he had to warn his people "beware of the fate of Hungary" and to remind them that the Warsaw Pact was nothing else than a military alliance.

It was with the same realism, the same frankness and candour that he spoke of Pakistan's relations with India. He held out the assurance that Pakistan in

all sincerity wanted good neighbourly relations with her. He dismissed any suggestion that Pakistan had any aggressive intentions against India :

India is a great country with tremendous resources and it can—should it take and adopt the path of aggression—overrun us if we do not make ourselves strong. It is not possible, feasible and intelligent to annoy that great country or to consider it as your enemy. Therefore we want to have good relations with her.

He expressed his amazement at the statement made by "India's great Prime Minister" on Pakistan's aggressive designs against India.

I am afraid that he must think us to be either demented or on the road to insanity. The position is that we do want to be friends, but do allow us an opportunity to be so.

Even after conceding that Pandit Nehru, to all appearances, has accepted the fact of Pakistan, no one in this country can forget his grab of Kashmir, which the Premier said "was our own territory". Nor can anyone forget that Mr. Nehru has shown little hesitation in moving his troops to Pakistan's borders, poised for attack, whenever he has essayed to coerce Pakistan in giving up her stand on Kashmir. The Premier pointed out the painful fact that "in March 1950 and July 1951, when Indian troops were massed along our borders, against us, we were hardly capable of any defence". And if after all this Pakistan seeks for herself a greater degree of safety and strength by forging new links with like-minded countries, Mr. Nehru is annoyed. He is displeased. He accuses Pakistan as a reactionary religious State and forgets that in his secular India as many as 360 communal riots have taken place in the last six years or so, as against only one in Pakistan. And of course he accuses Pakistan of harbouring aggressive designs against India.

It would be a long and dismal story if one were to go into the details of India's double-dealing with Pakistan, of which Kashmir is the most glaring example. Even as this article is being written the Security Council has given its verdict against the Nehru Government's move to integrate Kashmir with India. But would Mr. Nehru give up his intransigence on this issue? Would he act on what he has been preaching to others, for instance on the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt? One may hope so, although experience has hitherto belied such a hope. Indian obduracy on this issue constitutes a grave threat to world peace and civilization. In the words of the late Professor Harold Laski: "The betrayal of a civilization is always a long process. And the surest way to its betrayal is to allow the abyss to widen between the values men praise and the values they permit to operate."

Pakistan,  
February 1957.

# CANADA

## A NEW LEADER OF OPPOSITION

THE approach of a general election always generates liveliness in Canadian politics, and although the statutory term of the present Federal Parliament does not expire until 1958, the omission of the Speaker of the House of Commons to issue writs for by-elections for seats that have been vacant for several months is interpreted as a clear indication that the Government will appeal to the voters for a fresh mandate before midsummer. Prime Minister St. Laurent, now 75, will again lead the Liberal Party in the election, and a revival of a vigor in his leadership in Parliament that was absent in the session of 1955 has heartened his followers. He will have as his chief opponent a new leader of the Progressive-Conservative Party, Mr. John G. Diefenbaker, Q.C., in place of Mr. George Drew, who has been forced to retire from politics through ill health. In the coming election the real battle will be between the two senior parties, the Liberals and the Progressive-Conservatives; for Canada's steady strides to greater prosperity in recent years have created a political climate adverse to the Socialist program of the C.C.F., and the Social Credit Party has no serious foothold outside the two far western Provinces, Alberta and British Columbia.

At a national convention of the Progressive-Conservative Party, held in Ottawa early in December and attended by some 1,400 delegates, the contest for its leadership was between three candidates, Mr. Diefenbaker of Saskatchewan, Mr. Fleming of Ontario and Mr. Fulton of British Columbia. On the first ballot the first-named was elected with a decisive majority over the combined vote of his two opponents. His great advantage over his rivals was that by his assiduous cultivation of the interest of the public by speeches and broadcasts ever since he entered Parliament in 1940, he was much more of a national figure than they; and he had also acquired a great reputation as a successful vote-getter, based on his feats in carrying in three successive elections the only seat won by his party in Saskatchewan, which for many years has been very unfriendly political terrain. He also had the influential backing of Premier Frost of Ontario and Premier Fleming of New Brunswick and the support of at least two-thirds of the Progressive-Conservative members of the House of Commons.

Mr. Diefenbaker, who is 61 years of age, belongs to the left wing of his party and is credited with enjoying the goodwill of the labor elements through his championship of their causes both in Parliament and in the courts; but these departures from normal conservative moorings make a substantial number of industrial and financial leaders, who belong to his party and have been generous contributors to its campaign funds, unenthusiastic about his election. Moreover at the convention, by choosing as his nominator and second two English-speaking supporters, instead of following the tradition that a French-Canadian should be given one of these rôles, he antagonized the delegates from Quebec, with the result that most of them voted for

Mr. Fleming. Accordingly, his chances of gaining seats in Quebec are not rated high, but the open protest of the French-Canadians against this supposed slight may bring him votes in the English-speaking Provinces.

Mr. Diefenbaker is too much given to declamation to be a first-rate parliamentarian, but he is a formidable campaigner with the temperament of a crusader and a command of an effective line of emotional oratory, which none of the Liberal leaders can match. Moreover the triumphal progresses of Dr. Billy Graham, the American evangelist, and the success of the Social Credit Party's leaders in Alberta and British Columbia in giving a religious flavor to their appeal for political support, suggest that there might be a surprising response from many Canadian voters to the sort of revivalist crusade that Mr. Diefenbaker could conduct; and it is being recalled that the leader of his party to its last victory in 1930, the late Lord Bennett, was also a crusader equipped with some of the arts of the religious revivalist.

The new platform for the Progressive-Conservative Party, which a representative drafting committee evolved, was endorsed without serious criticism or amendment by the delegates, but it was justifiably described by the *Toronto Globe and Mail* as a "ponderous please-everybody platform" and it could easily have been adopted without much alteration by a Liberal convention. There was perhaps greater emphasis than the Liberals would have placed upon the need for Canada's close co-operation with Britain and other partners in the Commonwealth, and greater support for a vigorous immigration policy; and there was a definite commitment to support a national plan of health insurance. But the great expansion of Canada's extractive industries, based upon natural resources like mines, forests and oil, which have no interest in tariffs, and their increased political weight, made it inadvisable for the Progressive-Conservative Party to resume its rôle as the advocate of higher protection; so the convention contented itself with a pronouncement in favor of measures that would ensure that a substantial proportion of the raw materials now exported from Canada to feed foreign plants should be processed at home.

Some cryptic observations of Mr. Diefenbaker, made at a press conference immediately after his election, to the effect that he would not run counter to any other movement, but would try to bring into his party's fold elements that "had been diluting their opposition to the present Government by voting for third parties" were interpreted as evidence of a willingness to form a working alliance with the Social Crediters, whose policies have a distinctly conservative bias. But two prominent leaders of the Social Credit Party proceeded to proclaim their deep aversion from any deal with discredited old parties, and Mr. Diefenbaker has explained that his design was to convince voters who wanted to eject the Liberals from office that they were helping them to retain it, when they voted for splinter parties.

#### Canada in the Middle East

THE decision of the Canadian Government to contribute a contingent of armed forces to the international force that was being organized by the U.N. to uphold its authority in Egypt required the approval of the Federal

Parliament; and when a special session opened late in November the debate on the crisis in the Middle East and the Government's proposals was kept on a very creditable level. It was soon realized that the partisan flavor and harsh recriminations of some of the opening speeches were inappropriate to the gravity of the situation, and accordingly they were discarded in favor of sober and intelligent appraisements of its realities, with the result that a gradual modification of conflicting views procured for the Government the unanimous endorsement of the votes. This formed the sole business of the session.

The Prime Minister and Mr. Pearson undertook the main burden of defending the Government's policy. The initial speech of the former was not one of his happiest efforts. The robust tone of his assertions that Canada would take her own line about international problems, regardless of who was offended, pleased his supporters, but he dismayed some of them and irritated the Opposition by proclaiming his scandalized displeasure with the attitude of certain Great Powers and by some cheap sneers at "their so-called vital interests" and "the supermen of Europe", and appearing to link Britain and France with Russia in the category of imperialist aggressors.

Mr. Pearson in a much fairer speech built up a very damaging case against the Eden Ministry for its disregard of warnings from Ottawa that it should lose no time in getting the problem of the Suez Canal dealt with by U.N., and should make no move that would violate its obligations under the covenant of that body; and he bewailed its omission to consult either the other partners in the Commonwealth or the United States before its resort to armed force, which had antagonized the Eisenhower administration and had by his account brought the British Commonwealth to the verge of disruption.\* His narrative of the steps that he and Mr. Hammarskjöld, the Secretary of U.N., had taken to retrieve the situation by asserting the authority of U.N. and organizing an international force for policing the canal was both exhaustive and modest; and he claimed that these moves had earned the gratitude of the British Government for easing its embarrassments. Later in the debate Mr. Pearson said that his differences with the representatives of Britain had caused him "agonizing regret" and that over the years the directors of Canada's foreign policy had ample reason to be grateful for the superior wisdom and experience of the British in their consideration of international problems at conferences and had usually been able to march in step with them.

In the eyes of old-fashioned Canadian Tories like Mr. Rowe, the acting leader of the Progressive-Conservative Party, and Mr. Green of British Columbia, a British Conservative Government could do no wrong; and so they both delivered bitter attacks upon the Government for its condemnation of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, and accused it of acting as the docile "political choreboy" of the United States and aiding and abetting Nasser to turn a military defeat into a diplomatic victory. Apparently Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Fulton, each a prospective candidate for the leadership of the Progressive-Conservative Party, felt that the chauvinistic line adopted by their

\* See also p. 117.



older colleagues would not win the approval of the public and accordingly, while they did not spare the policy of the Government, their criticism was couched in moderate language and they refrained both from any commendation of Anglo-French policy and from any criticism of the United States.

### A Survey of Foreign Policy

WHEN Parliament began a new session on January 8, the Speech from the Throne outlined a very modest program of legislation and contained so little material for controversy that it may easily be disposed of before the Easter recess. Its most important item was a bill for the establishment of a Canada Council for the Arts, Humanities and Sciences, endowed with a fund of 100 million dollars; the income from half of this fund will be devoted to the encouragement of cultural activities and the other half will be spent on helping the building programs of Canadian universities, which are also to have their present annual subsidies from the Federal Treasury doubled. The authority of Parliament is also sought for the continuance of the Canadian Wheat Board, for the revision of the law controlling narcotic drugs and for the payments of grants in lieu of taxes on Federal property to municipal authorities. There is the usual list of minor amending measures.

The debate on the Address, whose length is now happily curtailed by a time limit, followed its normal course, with members of all parties expatiating upon the needs and grievances of their constituencies rather than discussing problems of national interest. The imminence of an election was probably responsible for numerous pleas for an increase in the present scales of old-age pensions and family allowances, on the ground that the rise in the cost of living had made them inadequate and that the substantial expansion of the Federal revenues, now visible, made the increase possible.

The most notable feature of the debate was an important exposition of the basic principles of Canada's foreign policy by Mr. Pearson, the Secretary for External Affairs. He declared that it must always be governed by four principal factors, Canada's membership in the Commonwealth of Nations, her associations with U.N. and N.A.T.O. and her existence as a neighbor of the United States. Affirming that the support of Canada was almost certain to be available for actions by other partners in the Commonwealth that tended to foster and strengthen their common ties, but would be withheld from policies that had a contrary effect, he reiterated his contention that the Commonwealth had been deeply split by the crisis over the Suez Canal; and when his statement was challenged by a member of the Opposition, he said it was based on information received from "the highest authorities in the government of India". Then, after recalling his relief when the danger to the Commonwealth was removed by the Anglo-French decision to bow to the authority of U.N., he proceeded:

So the Commonwealth Association remains strong and close. The friendly, informal and frank exchange of views is a sincere effort to reach agreement on all matters of common concern and the Commonwealth continues to play its invaluable and constructive rôle in today's troubled world, a rôle for which the whole world has reason to be grateful.

His prescription for giving enduring value to the Commonwealth was that all its members should strive for the widest possible areas of agreement, remain united in their support of parliamentary democracy and the supremacy of the individual over the State and accept a certain basis of morality as a guide to political action. Then, commenting on the impending admission of Ghana to the Commonwealth, he paid to Britain a tribute infinitely warmer than any that has fallen from Liberal lips at Ottawa for many a long day, when he said:

Thus the process of what I might call creative withdrawal continues to be the special credit and indeed to the glory of the heart and centre of the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom. As has been said "the smaller the Empire, the greater the Commonwealth". New nations arise from former colonial territories to take their place among the free democracies of the world. As an older member of the Commonwealth Canada is proud, I am sure, to assist in welcoming these young countries as they attain independence to our growing family and to assure them of our friendship and support.

Turning next to the influence of U.N. upon Canada's policy, he admitted that adhesion to it placed some limitation upon her independence in foreign affairs, but he held that while this organization could fill an indispensable rôle, it offered no substitute for the national policies of its members and that it was wrong, and even dangerous, to suggest that it could replace "the necessity of hammering out wise and constructive policies among one's friends merely by a resort to high-sounding moral platitudes at the Assembly".

His observations about Canada's relations with N.A.T.O. were brief and mainly concerned with the results of the recent meeting of its Council in Paris, where there had been evidence of a general desire of its members to strengthen the non-military side of the alliance. In his view the paramount need of N.A.T.O., apart from the maintenance of defensive military strength, was for the developement of the common policies essential to its unity. Finally he dealt with the influence of the United States and, after declaring that Canada's acknowledgement of the United States as the inevitable and indispensable leader of the free world did not mean automatic agreement with all its policies, he went on to say:

On the other hand it seems to me to be difficult to imagine a really critical situation in international affairs, one which involved final questions of war and peace, on which we should be likely to diverge very widely from the attitude of our neighbours. If we had to, for Canadian purposes, we should certainly be in a most uneasy position. For us in Canada, therefore, to formulate and try to follow foreign policies, which do not take into account the closeness of the ties which link us—and must do so—with the United States, would surely be nothing but unrealistic and unprofitable jingoism. The time when we can comfortably enjoy this particular form of national indulgence seems to have disappeared.

But in closing he was at pains to emphasize that, in her relations with the countries and organizations that influenced her foreign policy, Canada had retained and would retain full liberty "to propose, to persuade, to advise and to object" whenever a Canadian interest required such action.

But Mr. J. M. Macdonnell, speaking for the Progressive-Conservative Party, while he welcomed the "fair words" of Mr. Pearson, was not satisfied that he and his colleagues were seriously concerned about promoting close co-operation among the partners in the Commonwealth, and wished that he could discern more evidence of their practical zeal for it.

### The Gordon Report

THE Government has published a preliminary report of a Royal Commission headed by Mr. Walter Gordon, a prominent chartered accountant in Toronto, which it had appointed to appraise the economic prospects of Canada and in the light of its prognosis make recommendations for the guidance of Governments in their financial, fiscal and social policies. The report reaches very optimistic conclusions about Canada's economic future, but some of its numerous recommendations are meeting with sharp criticism and provide material for political controversy. It predicts that in the next twenty-five years the population of Canada, now about 15½ millions, will increase to 26½ millions: that the value of gross national production, estimated at 20½ billion\* dollars in 1956, will rise to 76 billion dollars; that the income that the average Canadian is now able to retain for personal use will be enlarged by two-thirds; that the average hours of labor for workers in industry, now 41.2 hours per week, will drop to 34.2 and for workers in agriculture, now 55.3, to 43.73; that the contribution of agriculture to the total national production will fall from 15 per cent to 6 per cent, while the share contributed by natural resources, particularly mines, oil and hydro-electric energy, will rise from 10 to 15 per cent and the share of secondary manufacturing from 20 to 25 per cent; and that as a consequence there will be a further urbanization of Canada's population through the increase of the proportion of it living in urban communities, now 62½ per cent, to 80 per cent.

The report also forecasts that the production of the mining, smelting and metal refining industries will increase at a faster pace than the gross national production and that by 1980 both the demand for Canadian newsprint and the total production of the forests will be doubled, that petroleum and natural gas will supply between two-thirds and three-fourths of Canada's requirements in energy, that the output of coal will shrink and that the abundant supplies of hydro-electric energy will restrict the development of nuclear energy to a modest scale.

The report is less optimistic about the future of Canadian agriculture. Its estimate that the combined domestic and export demand for wheat will be between 400 and 475 million bushels leads it to predict that Canadian farmers will not increase the acreage devoted to grain, but will raise more cattle and pigs. It recommends that the Canadian Wheat Board should be retained as the sole agency for marketing western wheat, barley and oats, that it should establish annual marketing quotas in order to control surpluses of wheat, and that it should pay cash to grain-growers for wheat stored on farms within the limits of their marketing quotas. It favors continuance of the present system

\* In the American sense of 1,000 millions.

of price supports for farm products, but holds that its administration should be transferred from the Federal Department of Agriculture to a separate body and suggests that in the next decade large projects of irrigation should be discouraged, lest they create unwieldy surpluses of farm products. An increase in the domestic demand for fish is predicted, but owing to improved methods of fishing a smaller number of fishermen will be able to supply it.

The Commission's examination of Canadian trade policy and its fruits has led it to the conclusion that the present general structure of the tariff is satisfactory, but that for the attainment of greater simplicity and flexibility in them the workings of its schedules should be subjected to periodical re-examination. It expects some ultimate reductions in the present barriers in international trade, but not in the near future, and predicts that in the years ahead the percentage of Canada's exports that the United States will absorb and the percentage of her imports that that country will supply will both increase. It also recommends the establishment of a Federal authority for energy, empowered to regulate exports of oil, gas and hydro-electric energy, and suggests that exports of hydro-electric power should be encouraged under certain circumstances and that a system of export controls over minerals and metals might be profitably established through Federal licences.

The report recognizes that the Atlantic Provinces have been lagging behind the rest of Canada in the expansion of their economic activities and favors the idea of a broad plan of economic aid for the stimulation of their prosperity and a special enquiry into their need for improved facilities for transportation. But its suggestion that residents of this region who are hard pressed to make a decent livelihood in it should move to more prosperous Provinces has naturally had a hostile reception there.

### A Provincial Change of Government

AT a provincial election held in October in Nova Scotia, the Progressive-Conservative Party, which had been in Opposition since 1933, regained office under the leadership of Mr. Robert Stanfield by electing 25 members of a legislature of 42 seats; the Liberals held 17 seats and the C.C.F. one. The Liberal Party had owed its long ascendancy in the Province to the political abilities and personal popularity of the late Mr. Angus L. Macdonald, who was Premier for about twenty years; but when he was succeeded by another Roman Catholic, now Senator Connolly, a revolt of Protestant elements in the party ejected him from the Premiership in favor of Mr. Henry Hicks, and the defection of embittered Roman Catholic Liberals was partly responsible for the latter's defeat. The Liberal Party now controls only three provincial governments, those of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and Manitoba, which contain between them about one-fifteenth of Canada's total population.

Canada,

February 1957.

# SOUTH AFRICA

## THE TREASON TRIAL

AT dawn on December 6 the South African Police, in the biggest police operation in South African history, raided homes and offices all over the country and arrested more than 140 men and women on warrants alleging high treason. The operation had been thoroughly planned, most of the arrests took place almost simultaneously, and within a few hours the accused were placed on board military aircraft and flown to Johannesburg from Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth. There they were confined in the central prison, and after a fortnight, during which time bail was refused, they appeared before a magistrate in a huge court set up in the Johannesburg Drill Hall. The proceedings took the form of a preparatory examination on charges of high treason and contraventions of the Suppression of Communism Act.

The trial is a sequel to large-scale police raids which, in equally dramatic circumstances, took place in September 1955. On that occasion hundreds of premises were searched and vast quantities of documents impounded. Some six months later Mr. Swart, the Minister of Justice, was vigorously questioned in Parliament about these raids. His reply was that evidence of crimes against the security of the State had been found and that "about 200 people will probably appear on charges of treason, of contravening the Suppression of Communism Act and other offences. . . . The charges would be based on documentary evidence seized during the raids."

When the preparatory examination began 156 persons appeared, and the intention is presumably to charge them on a single indictment. Among them are six Europeans, including a member of Parliament representing the Natives, a former representative of the Natives in the Cape Provincial Council, a Methodist clergyman and the director of a left-wing newspaper. There are also Coloured people and Indians, but most of the remainder are Natives. Among the Natives are Professor Mathews, the Acting Principal of the Fort Hare University College, and Albert John Luthuli, the president of the African National Congress. About 48 organizations are involved, among them the African National Congresses, the various Indian Congresses, the Congress of Trade Unions, the South African Society for Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union, the Civil Rights League and the Springbok Legion.

On the first days of the hearing there was excitement in Johannesburg and some disturbances outside the court, which led to baton charges and firing by the police. After a few days, however, the atmosphere was calmer and the examination is now proceeding quietly and without attracting much attention either from spectators or from the newspapers. At the time of writing the evidence has consisted entirely of putting on record thousands and thousands of documents.

The authorities are agreed that, particularly since the passing of the Statute

of Westminster, little assistance can be derived from the law of England in any department of the South African law of treason. There is in fact in existence a formidable body of South African case law on the subject, arising out of treason trials which were held during the South African War, the rebellion of 1914, the First World War and the Second World War.

High treason is formally defined as being committed by those "who with hostile intention disturb, impair or endanger the independence or safety of the State or attempt actively to do so". It is significant that nearly all the instances of treason charges in South Africa have been associated with active hostilities against a declared enemy. It has been held that any conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit what would, if consummated, amount to an act of high treason is in itself an act of high treason. In whatever degree a person may be wrongfully concerned in an act of high treason he will be regarded as a principal. Hostile intention is an essential feature of the crime. One of the authorities states: "Notwithstanding that his motive may be anger at maladministration or the like, and that there may be an absence of actual intention to overthrow the State, if a person makes upon the State an attack so fraught with danger that it cannot be conceived without exposing the State to the risk of destruction, an intention to bring about the intrinsically probable consequences of the act is inferred and high treason is committed."

Most of the instances of conduct held to be treason in South Africa concern trafficking with or assisting an enemy in a time of hostilities, although there was a successful prosecution during the last war when the accused was held to have "conspired to overthrow the government and to establish a national socialist state under the auspices of the enemy".

The Suppression of Communism Act defines Communism in wide terms and makes crimes (carrying very severe penalties) of attempts to assist or encourage the achievement of the objects of Communism.

Statutory provision is made for an application by the Attorney General to the Minister of Justice for a special criminal court to try a charge of treason if he is of opinion that trial by jury might defeat the ends of justice. If the Minister agrees the Governor General may constitute a special criminal court, to consist of at least two and not more than three judges of the Supreme Court, who shall have jurisdiction to try the accused without a jury in any place in the Union. The death penalty may be imposed, but a lesser penalty is possible.

The technical problems of conducting a mass trial of 156 persons on complicated charges are very considerable and the proceedings are likely to be long drawn-out. The first stage is the preparatory examination, which is expected to take months, and at the end of the examination the charges are framed and the accused are required to plead. Anything up to six months later the trial proper will begin, and this also will obviously be a long affair. Thereafter there can be an appeal to the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein. In the meanwhile, of course, there can be other delays occasioned by applications for separate trials and other legal complications.

South Africa,

February 1957.



# NEW ZEALAND

## ECHOES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST

NOVEMBER 1956 was for New Zealand a period of anxiety and consternation, when the community attempted to assess startling developments in the Commonwealth's strategic and moral position. By December public discussion had settled down with a comforting formula ("a major war has been stopped in its tracks") and the equally comforting assumption that something ardently desired (the re-establishment of understanding between Britain and the United States) would surely come about. Public discussion accordingly swung back towards more moral preoccupations. It need hardly be emphasized that opinion on Russian actions in Hungary was virtually unanimous, and that behind the scenes the events of November still gave cause for anxious, if little publicized, thinking.

New Zealand's views on Anglo-French action in the Middle East were accurately shown in the nature and the timing of statements by the leaders of the two parliamentary parties. On November 1 the Cabinet met, and there were talks between the Prime Minister, Mr. S. G. Holland, and the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. W. Nash. In the evening Mr. Holland defined New Zealand's position.\* "While several features of the present position are disturbing," he said, "I have full confidence in Britain's intentions in moving forces into the Suez Canal Zone. The British Government has given an undertaking that its operations are designed solely to protect the Suez Canal and to halt fighting between Egyptian and Israeli forces, and that this emergency police action is intended to be of limited duration." He expressed the hope that in due course there would be wider understanding of the considerations that Sir Anthony Eden had explained as motivating Britain, and added, "it is nevertheless a matter of grave concern that a situation should have arisen in which there are serious differences of viewpoint between the United Kingdom and one of her principal allies, the United States". He told the press, also, that New Zealand had not been consulted before the ultimatum was addressed to Egypt and Israel, and that no question had yet arisen of any military assistance to be provided from New Zealand. A few days later he rejected a request from Mr. Nash that Parliament should be summoned at once, but promised that this should be done if the situation worsened, or if New Zealand were called upon to "play some direct rôle in accord with our United Nations obligations". He warmly welcomed the Canadian suggestion of an international police force to preserve peace in the Middle East, and promised New Zealand's co-operation in providing it. In his view the incident proved the need for the United Nations to have the machinery to enforce its decisions.

On this point there was agreement between Government and Opposition. Mr. Nash's statement of Labour policy was issued after a caucus meeting on November 7.

\* See also p. 117.

The party recognizes the inability hitherto of the United Nations to maintain the terms of the armistice in the Middle East and compel compliance with its decisions. We appreciate to the full the magnificent contribution that Britain has previously made to world peace and to the extension of democratic government. We regret, however, the action of the United Kingdom, in co-operation with France, without consulting the other members of the Commonwealth and without reference to the United Nations, in taking aggressive action against Egypt. Equally do we regret the action of Israel, Egypt and Jordan (*sic*) in launching attacks on one another. We condemn any country that violates the territory or independence of others. . . . We urge the United Nations to consider the establishment of a permanent force to be in readiness to enforce decisions made by the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Anglo-French action in Egypt caused grave apprehension to many New Zealanders. On November 1 the *Evening Star* remarked that it would "go down in history either as a stupendous blunder or a brilliant coup. There is nothing of the half measure about it"; and the journal went on to give a realistic analysis of the dangers as well as the hopes involved. It should perhaps be added that the elements of reserve in the Prime Minister's initial statement, which was to be echoed a month later in his comment on the Anglo-French decision for immediate withdrawal—"New Zealand had never wavered in its support of Britain because it had never wavered in its belief in the sincerity of Britain's motives"—received some notice both locally and overseas as indicating something less than full approval of British policy. In the eyes of most New Zealanders, and of the outside world, the effect of this caution was no doubt obliterated by New Zealand's vote with Britain, France and Israel in the United Nations General Assembly. Nevertheless two or three newspapers still expressed uneasiness, and the *Auckland Star* on November 5 explicitly regretted that New Zealand had not, like Canada and South Africa, abstained from voting. It added that

New Zealand is a Pacific country—off the coast of Asia it might almost be said. Its future is irrevocably bound up with that of Asia, and for its long-term security it must largely depend on the existence of a strong United Nations capable of effective action. . . . While New Zealanders retain the strongest ties of kinship with Britain and find themselves largely in sympathy with her in her present hazardous rôle it must be realized that Britain's interests are not necessarily and wholly identical with our own.

New Zealand's prompt and positive offer to supply men for the international police force to serve in the Middle East had complete public approval. None challenged the Prime Minister's expression of confidence in British motives, and all agreed that the breach with the United States was a calamity that must be remedied. The situation was here, of course, peculiarly embarrassing. New Zealand, with Australia, has for years had an unavoidable duality in her policy-making: her intimate association with Britain, and her geographical position in an overwhelmingly American sphere of influence. It has been her constant hope that no divergence between British and American policy would force her to choose between her two great friends. On the issue of China, she stood on the whole with America, and

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at the end of November her Commissioner in South-East Asia visited Formosa, where he had "very frank discussions" with Chinese Nationalist leaders on questions of mutual interest concerning the security of the Pacific. In respect of Suez, however, she stood with Britain, subject only to some expressions of misgivings.

New Zealand was among the first countries to offer troops for the international police force; but in December it was still doubtful whether they would be accepted. Steps were taken to enlist volunteers, but the Prime Minister explained with apparent irritation that the decision whether they would be accepted seemed to belong not to the United Nations but to Colonel Nasser. Incidentally it has been emphasized that there is no question of revising the recent decision by which New Zealand's major defence commitment was transferred from the Middle East to Malaya. On the contrary, it has become clear that should a major crisis develop for Britain in the Middle East, New Zealand's responsibilities in South-East Asia would be automatically increased; and no one has mentioned that policy-making in this area is primarily an American affair.

### Two Conferences

IN November and December there met in Wellington the eighth conference held by the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee. The Colombo Plan, said the Minister of External Affairs, "has been able to make a truly effective contribution towards a fuller and more secure life for the peoples of Asia. It is, I believe, a concept which has won the unstinting support of all New Zealanders. We in this country have been proud to be associated with the plan and to co-operate in giving what help we can to our neighbours in Asia."

The conference began with a meeting of officials from twenty-one countries from November 19 onwards, followed by meetings of Ministers in early December. It was a working conference—"the largest and most important of the kind held in this country"—charged to review economic conditions in areas covered by the plan, to assess achievements and problems, share experiences and finally prepare an annual report for publication. It met mainly in closed sessions for serious work, and there was oddly little publicity, especially in the early stages. Such statements as were published gave little indication of the extent to which experts thought that the needs of South-East Asia were in fact being met, nor was there much indication whether the contributions being made by the more fortunate countries to help their less fortunate neighbours were adequate in equity, or in political wisdom. The strong impression remained, however, that the conference brought together leading officials and politicians in a friendly atmosphere where constructive work could be done.

So far as New Zealand is concerned, her experiences as "host" on such a major occasion did something to underline her growing consciousness of the importance of Asia and of the desperate need among under-developed countries for economic aid. New Zealand, it is claimed, has made a worthy contribution: some £3 million actually spent on capital assistance by August

1956; 315 Colombo Plan students given training courses; and 58 New Zealand experts provided for service in under-developed countries. The figures are small in relation to the tasks in hand. Standards of living are desperately low, and each year 10 million more people have to be fed, clothed and housed; there will be many who wonder uneasily whether enough is being done. It was encouraging, though not perhaps conclusive, when visiting experts—not from Asia—remarked that Australia and New Zealand were making a substantial contribution to the plan when the state of their own resources was taken into account, together with the fact that they too were in need of capital for their own development.

Even less spectacular than the Colombo Plan Conference was the meeting in November of the International Grasslands Conference at Palmerston North. This is the seventh such congress, and the first to meet in the Southern hemisphere. Some 300 scientists, two-thirds of them from overseas, met to exchange information about a problem of liberally vital importance—that of increasing land productivity at a time when world population threatens to press hard on its food supply. New Zealand opinion is proudly confident that her record in pasture improvement is outstanding; but she also increasingly recognizes the need for still greater achievement in the future. In the past ten years, it is claimed, production of butterfat has increased by 25 per cent, wool by 20 per cent and meat by 9 per cent; but this scale does not give full confidence that the problems of the next ten years can be met equally well. New Zealand scientists were learners as well as teachers in this conference concerning the Dominion's most valuable crop, and for the layman the moral clearly emerged that the maintenance—let alone the improvement—of New Zealand's standards depends on the continuance of high-level research.

Incidentally, there was also held in November, just outside Palmerston North, a unique demonstration of the new major agricultural technique of aerial topdressing. This was claimed to be "the world's first agricultural air show", and a forcible reminder of a development that has added new resources and flexibility to New Zealand production. During the year 1955-56 roughly one-third of the fertilizer used in the country was distributed from the air, treating nearly four million acres.

### Continued Inflation

**D**URING the quarter under review there has been little significant change in political and economic trends. Local-body elections were held on November 17. As usual, the campaign was to some extent on party lines, but the results give no useful indication of trends in national politics. In broad terms, the same mild inflationary trends are still present. According to figures accepted by the Arbitration Court, the cost of living rose by 5.1 per cent during the first nine months of 1956, being over twice the increase for the whole year in 1955. Official statements claim that government measures of control—particularly the "credit squeeze"—are being reasonably effective, but must be continued. Critics point out that, while the Government curtails bank lending to private borrowers, it maintains its own activi-

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ties at a high level; and that though there had been a decline in private imports, especially in the last three months, this had been partly offset by an increase in government imports. For the year ending October last, however, New Zealand's oversea exchange transactions showed a credit of £4,600,000: the first time that a surplus has been shown for two years.

In September last the Arbitration Court was faced with an application from the Federation of Labour for an 11 per cent increase in the wages paid under its awards. As is customary, this application was the occasion for a lengthy and detailed analysis of the Dominion's economic position. The Court consists of a judge with employers' and employees' assessors. In October by a majority judgment (the employers' assessor dissenting) it pronounced itself "completely satisfied that a moderate increase in minimum rates of remuneration is well within the national capacity to pay without undue strain or the aggravation of inflationary pressures, and is necessary to restore economic justice to workers employed on minimum rates or close thereto". It accordingly made an order increasing minimum rates by 5 per cent with a maximum weekly gain of 15s. 7d. for men and 11s. 9d. for women. The Court took the unusual course of emphasizing that there was no legal compulsion to increase wages for employers already paying above the new minimum. In the recent past the labour situation has been such that increases granted by the Court have normally been paid to all wage-earners, whether or not they were already receiving more than award wages. On this occasion, greater restraint has been shown.

### Religion and Education

FOR the rest, New Zealand has been stirred to a mild extent by the Olympic Games, by the progress of "Operation Deep Freeze" in Antarctica and to a greater extent by a vigorous attempt by the Roman Catholic community to obtain a contribution from the Government towards the financing of its educational system. The Roman Catholic petition was referred to a parliamentary committee. An exhaustive enquiry was held, and conflicting evidence presented, often with some warmth, by interested bodies, ecclesiastical and lay. The parliamentary committee made no recommendation, and the House accordingly took no action. So the matter rests meantime, for the same basic reasons which for generations have led the majority of New Zealanders to prefer a State system that is basically secular, with provision under the so-called Nelson system for some religious instruction outside formal school hours according to the wishes of individuals. It may be noted that no other major denomination at present shares the Roman Catholic viewpoint. The problem of State aid to private schools is, of course, real and long-standing; and more will be heard of it.

In December we had a welcome though very brief visit from the Duke of Edinburgh. It was for him a hard working time, concentrating at his own wish on N.Z.'s primary industries, particularly those concerned with the production and transport of food for Britain.

New Zealand,

February 1957

# EAST AFRICA

## ELECTIONS AND ELECTORATES

ELECTIONS, actual and prospective, have provided the main political theme in East Africa in the last six months, although it would be wrong to infer from this that the political temperature has been high. In Kenya Europeans and Asians have gone to the polls, and the registration of African voters for the elections in March has been started. In Tanganyika recommendations on elections from a committee of Legislative Council have been forwarded to the Colonial Secretary. In Uganda the Buganda Lukiko has rejected recommendations for direct elections to Legislative Council based on a qualitative franchise.

### Kenya

THE Kenya European election had the interest of being fought on a real theme. At least while it was in progress it seemed discernibly about whether there should or should not be multi-racial government. At one end were the supporters of Capricorn Africa, at the other the Federal Independence Party, which advocated a form of *apartheid* through "provincial autonomy". In the middle were the elected European Ministers and their supporters facing the "Independent Group", who advocated that offices should be distributed on "merit and ability" and not on race. In the upshot no supporter of Capricorn views or of the Federal Independence Party got in, and a supporter of the "Independent Group" gained a seat by unhorsing Mr. L. R. M. Welwood, one of the ablest men in Kenya's public life. Mr. Welwood was the most Right-wing of the three elected Ministers and had not been expected to lose. Another able man, Mr. W. B. Havelock, the Minister of Local Government, scraped home in his Kiambu constituency against a F.I.P. sympathizer.

The elections were interpreted as showing a swing to the Right in European politics, although it was perhaps as much an illustration of the slightly hothouse atmosphere in which European politics are conducted at election times with such small numbers in each constituency. At any rate, immediately after the elections the European elected members agreed to form a united front by sinking differences between them. The moribund United Country Party, which Mr. Michael Blundell had formed, was formally dissolved. This party was intended to support multi-racialism, but membership had been confined to Europeans for the present. At the same time the leader of the "Independent Group", Group Captain L. R. Briggs, while issuing a statement reaffirming his views that offices in the Government should not be allocated by race, agreed to join the Government in place of Mr. Welwood. The Asian elections were chiefly important for what appears to have been a resolution on the part of the electors, in such changes as they made, to return a strong team, although there is some contention about who shall lead it.

Since the elections, proposals have been announced for constitutional



changes. Under the Lyttelton Plan, setting up the existing multi-racial Government, it was agreed that there should be a constitutional standstill until 1960. The changes have therefore been made by agreement between all racial groups and within the framework of the plan, and have been accepted on this basis. Two more African seats have been created, which it is agreed were urgently needed, and to match these there are two that will be filled on the recommendation of the Board of Agriculture and the Board of Commerce and Industry respectively. These will be held by Europeans. One more African Minister is to be appointed, who will similarly be matched by another European Minister. Parity between the unofficial representatives of Europeans and of all other races combined is thus preserved. An additional Arab seat is also to be created and the Arab member of the Government given the right to attend all meetings of the Council of Ministers. The effect of the ministerial changes is to give to Kenya what must be for the size of the country one of the largest Ministries in the world.

The official announcement also explained that discussions were going forward about ways, within the framework of the Lyttelton Plan, of correcting the disbalance between the government and non-government benches and of providing an opportunity for Ministers to represent a wider section of the community than a single constituency, as at present.

Meanwhile interest switches to the forthcoming African elections, the first under the Coutts proposals for direct elections with a qualitative franchise and a multiple vote. Only 126,508 voters have registered of an estimated 400,000 who were eligible. There is argument whether this shows political apathy, fear that disclosure of incomes will lead to demands for taxes, or positive dislike of the system.

The most pressing African political demand remains one for an increase in the African share of the seats in Legislative Council. Seven of the eight African unofficial members have issued a joint election manifesto, numbering among its objects support for the retention on public bodies, including Legislative Council, of Africans of long and mature experience. It emphasizes loyalty to Kenya and to the Crown.

This document may be taken as representing the most moderate African opinion. Its principal political demands are that there should be an African majority on the non-official side of the legislature, that control by the British Government should be kept for the present, that communal rolls should be maintained until Africans attain full adult franchise and that Africans of quality and of the requisite qualifications should be appointed to higher posts in the public service.

### A Royal Visitor

THE police have now taken over responsibility from the army for law and order in Kenya. The visit of Princess Margaret, as part of the successful and strenuous East African tour which took her also to Tanganyika, served to illustrate how the colony has passed from the phase of Emergency to that of reconstruction. It was underlined, as things turned out, by the capture of the Mau Mau leader, Dedan Kimathi, during the Princess's visit.

There is fresh confidence in Kenya. It is based partly on the progress in land consolidation being made in the Kikuyu reserve and elsewhere. What has yet to be seen is whether such consolidation will not produce a sharp division between "haves" and "have-nots", and so create new and possibly dangerous social tensions. Nairobi, because of the services it offers and the markets that can be served from it, is attracting more and more secondary industry. There is an optimistic feeling that if the country can be shown to be a going concern, in which the African can be seen to be getting positive economic benefits, pressures for a change of policy, whether internal or external, will not be too great and the country will be able to develop peacefully. The unresolved question is whether Kenya will not sooner or later be faced with a decision on whether, as in Uganda, the African majority should not have majority representation, and how it will be settled.

### Uganda

IN Uganda the electoral story has recently been complicated rather than exciting. Last year the Government announced that it had as its objective the holding of direct elections on a common roll throughout the country in 1961, with representation of the minorities either by reserved seats on the common roll or by some other means. Meanwhile in 1957, as provided for under the new Buganda Agreement, there were to be direct elections in Buganda. In the rest of the country, the Government suggested, election of the African representatives by District Councils might well continue. The next public development was the start of talks between representatives of the Protectorate and Buganda Governments. Agreement was reached on a franchise which was broader than in Kenya but not universal. Its most important feature was to give a vote to every tenant on *mailo* and Crown land. It was estimated that perhaps 70 to 80 per cent of the men and 15 per cent of the women would get the vote. These recommendations were supported by all the representatives of Buganda (including Mr. I. K. Musazi, President of the Uganda National Congress), except for a young lawyer, Mr. S. J. L. Zake, who was a prominent member of a group that had at that point resigned from the Congress executive in protest against Mr. Musazi's leadership. Mr. Zake was able to address the Lukiko in his capacity as legal adviser to the Buganda Government, and persuaded them to reject the proposals in favour of universal suffrage.

Some observers had expected that elements in the Lukiko might consider the qualifications too low. The two arguments that appear to have had most effect were that the Lukiko was being offered something less than the best, and that the qualifications were designed to make the number of African voters near that of Europeans and Indians when the common roll was introduced. It is clear from the population figures that this cannot be so.

The case for a limited suffrage is that, while universal suffrage may be accepted as the ultimate goal, there is nothing to be said for thrusting the vote on illiterate and uneducated people as an end in itself, and that Uganda needs time to absorb these changes and expand, as the new education pro-

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gramme is doing, the size of its educated class, on which the responsibility for articulating political discussion must rest. The Colonial Office would clearly like to see a qualitative franchise in all the East African territories at present. There are, however, sound reasons why Uganda should accept such a franchise at present, if it is broad, for its own sake.

The next step will be to have a fresh constitutional review by representatives of the Buganda and Protectorate Governments this year (to carry out the letter of the Buganda Agreement, which says that the review should take place in 1957). The Government has made it clear that there can be no change in the agreed franchise proposals and that, if the Lukiko rejects them again, elections to Legislative Council in Buganda will take place through an electoral college as at present.

Meanwhile, African Representative Members from other parts of Uganda expressed opposition to the privileged place given to Buganda and argued that direct elections should be introduced uniformly in the country. One point made was that if this was not done it would be more difficult for political parties to develop which fairly represented the country as a whole. The outcome partly depends on whether agreement can be reached over the Buganda franchise. On the other side, it can be argued that the proper moment for introducing elections is when the common roll is brought in. The administrative complications of introducing direct elections this year have also been underrated. The real gulf in principle seems to be between elections by District Councils, which are not chosen for the purpose of electing members of Legislative Councils, and by electoral colleges, which are, and therefore meet the basic requirements of party politics. The Government might have been wise to have laid more stress on this at the start.

### Central Assembly

ONE other important constitutional development has been an enlargement of the Central Legislative Assembly, which is part of the East Africa High Commission. This body, which runs certain common services such as the railway, post office and research organizations, has always been regarded with great suspicion among Africans in Uganda, as being the thin end of the wedge for federation. Equally, in some commercial circles in East Africa it has been fashionable to say that Uganda in some unexplained way was stopping it from working properly. The High Commission has suffered both from ill-informed criticism and from proposals to give it more to do without any attempt to prove in practical terms what the benefits would be. The essential key to the High Commission's future is that it should be discussed on its merits as a way of running in common certain services which the East African territories would find it more expensive and inefficient to run separately. The Central Legislative Assembly's main job is to scrutinize the Estimates for the High Commission services although, as its ill-chosen name indicates, it was also intended to be a means of getting joint legislation on a particular subject with the consent of territorial legislatures.

The enlargement of the Central Legislative Assembly is a logical sequel to

the expansion in the territorial Legislative Councils and should make it easier to represent all currents of opinion within them on the C.L.A. The second notable feature of the change is that each territory has been able to decide for itself how the extra seats shall be distributed and is thus able to follow its own political formula on the unofficial side. Uganda's delegation is thus likely to have an African majority, Kenya's a European majority and Tanganyika's parity between the races.

In the background to all talk of constitutional changes is the question of financing the economic development that can alone provide the revenue to sustain the modern services that are so incessantly demanded. This is often thought of as a problem of inspiring confidence in the private investor. If it is unreasonable to treat political and economic progress as alternatives, it certainly is true that nationalist politicians should be asked to take more account of economics in their politics. But in East Africa at the moment it must seem that the main problem is not securing private investment as such but for the Governments to get the capital that they require to provide the basic services without which the private investor will not come. The East African Governments and the High Commission have drawn up capital development plans requiring £250,000,000 over the next decade, but the Administrator of the High Commission, Sir Bruce Hutt, has said that the prospects of getting this money are "bleak".

Tanganyika is undoubtedly the worst hit. Kenya has received substantial help from the United Kingdom because of the Emergency. Uganda can probably finance most of its government capital development from its own resources in the next five years, although not the requirements of the Uganda Electricity Board. If this is taken to the limit, however, it does have the serious consequence that there may be less room for manoeuvre after the first direct elections in 1961. Tanganyika, as a country with great distances separating its most fertile areas, particularly needs to spend money on communications and water supplies, and has also to try to meet the pressing demand of articulate Africans for more education, which can also be regarded with justice as in the long run fundamental to economic development. This year Tanganyika has suffered a fall in revenue compared with last, and the Government is at present spending 28 per cent of its revenue on social services compared with 22 per cent on economic services.

### A Notable Governorship

THE beginning of the year saw the departure from Uganda of Sir Andrew Cohen, ending what has been undoubtedly one of the most outstanding, if also most controversial, governorships in the history of the Protectorate. He is succeeded by Sir Frederick Crawford, previously Deputy Governor of Kenya, who has a difficult transition to make since African opinion is unfortunately but explicable suspicious of him.

The distinguishing mark of Sir Andrew's governorship was his genuine determination to try to build up the institutions that Uganda requires to be a modern self-governing State. He accepted the change as inevitable and

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sought, by preparing for it, to direct it. In an interesting farewell speech addressed to the Europeans of Uganda, at the annual Caledonian dinner in Kampala, he expressed the view that if mistakes had been made in West Africa it was because things had gone too slowly in the earlier years, when there was time and opportunity for gradual reform. The ministerial system came in for the first time simultaneously with an elected Ministry and the reform of local government after that.

The theme of his speech was that Africans wanted European technical help and that, if Europeans in the country adopted the right attitude, they still had a great part to play in it for years to come.

Sir Andrew's policy inevitably laid him open to the criticism that he was speeding the pace of change unnecessarily. His defenders would say that the most conspicuous changes, notably the introduction of the ministerial system and of a half-African membership in Legislative Council, were the consequences of changes made in local government previously. The Central Government had to be more Africanized, to try to mitigate the effects of the successful building up of basically tribal local governments. What could perhaps be said of Sir Andrew is that his belief in making statements of policy in every field led him sometimes to force situations, and that he did not sufficiently consider the administrative consequences of some steps that he took.

The common criticism that he was neglectful of economic development is certainly not true. He took the most realistic interest in it. What is true is that his governorship saw a very rapid build-up of government expenditure, particularly on education. This was in itself justifiable although like all expansive programmes it bred some extravagances.

He was also criticized for being a "desk" Governor. This, again, is based on a misconception. When he came to Uganda he had not the usual and valuable background of service in the field. But, once there, he toured the country far more frequently than most of his predecessors. In this way he built up valuable contacts in the districts. He also took trouble to get to know the relatively small number of Africans with higher education, who have an influence out of all proportion to their numbers, and to meet and to take a personal interest in the careers of students returning from abroad.

The most discussed feature of Sir Andrew Cohen's time has been the dramatic expulsion and then return of the Kabaka of Buganda. What may be noted now is that at the end of his term Sir Andrew's personal position was strong and that from a difficult position he made a remarkable recovery.

His successor has a difficult task. Assuming that Sir Andrew Cohen's policies have been sound—and the general direction is now certainly irreversible—Sir Frederick Crawford has to maintain the momentum of change when the accumulated surpluses from the Price Assistance Funds have largely been committed and when the revenue position is more difficult. He has to maintain African confidence that he is moving to self-government and outside confidence that, given this general aim, the people are being led to face realistically the great problems involved in building a State capable of holding its own in the modern world.

# UNITED KINGDOM

## A NEW PRIME MINISTER

IT would be an understatement to describe the last three months in Britain as "eventful". They have seen the country condemned by a large section of world opinion, the Government of Sir Anthony Eden assailed by the Opposition with a degree of violence unprecedented even at the height of the Appeasement controversy, the Prime Minister obliged to abandon his post for a period of recuperation in Jamaica at the height of an international crisis, the resignation of the Prime Minister shortly after his return and shortly after a public proclamation of his return to complete health, and the choice, to succeed him, of a statesman whom the greater part of the press and of the lay public expected to be beaten at the post by a formidable rival in the Government. There has also been a fundamental change in the complexion of the Government following the new Prime Minister's appointment, and there have been indications of momentous departures in defence and commercial policy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the present mood of the country, which appears to be shared by many M.P.s, is one of extreme bewilderment, showing itself, according to temperament or prejudice, in either optimism or gloom. The commonest comment on all these events has throughout been "Well, at any rate something is happening", and its truth has never been in doubt.

### The Government's Apologia

THE facts of the Suez crisis, as the stormy progress of British politics has shown, are capable of many different interpretations. To describe the controversy adequately, it is necessary at the outset to distinguish clearly what the aims of the British Government in launching this remarkable enterprise were, for, from the very necessities of the situation as well as from the lamentable incompetence of the Government's information services, they were never clearly and fully described to the public.

What may be called the "daydream" conception of the Suez campaign may be thus understood: Britain and France were still smarting under the nationalization of the Suez Canal; they saw Egypt becoming a bridge-head for Russian influence in the Middle East, and vital oil supplies and lines of communication in jeopardy; U.N. had proved utterly ineffective against these tendencies; if (it was not likely) an Arab alliance led by Egypt and armed by Russia overcame Israel, the Middle East would be lost; if a conflict in the manner of that in Korea dragged on, Russia would be tempted to intervene with equally disastrous consequences; if Israel were allowed to beat Egypt without intervention from outside, the whole of the Arab world would be driven to still greater dependence upon Russia. The only solution was a dramatic reassertion of British and French influence in the Middle East; Britain and France would go in to restore order; they would reoccupy the Suez region, no doubt alienating Arab opinion in the process, but they would then also order the Israelis to withdraw, and the Israelis would comply;



Colonel Nasser would collapse in utter humiliation, a friendly successor would make satisfactory arrangements with the Western Powers for the safety of the Suez Canal, the Arab world would again see in Britain that combination of strength and impartial justice which it is believed to admire; their task done, the humane heroes of Suez would return in triumph; even Americans would be constrained to admire us, and we would all line up in Trafalgar Square and sing "Land of Hope and Glory".

This, undoubtedly, was the Prime Minister's idea. The broad moral case for an action designed to put an end to the squalid career of Nasser was overwhelming, but the *casus belli*, the need to safeguard the Canal against immediate danger, was reduced in force by the fact that the first effect of the operation was to induce the Egyptians to block the Canal for months by sinking ships in it. The solid case for the operation, the fear of Russia, was never mentioned by the Government until late in the discussion. Even the plan of compelling the Israelis to leave Egyptian territory when Suez was safe was announced only belatedly. Worst of all, it seemed that the Government had not foreseen the strength of foreign reaction. When it was forced to accept the cease-fire, it hovered for a long time between the policy of remaining in Port Said for nuisance value until part of its real objective, the ultimate safety of the Canal, was achieved, and writing the whole thing off. When it became clear that the adventure had failed, the Government alternated between an attitude of injured innocence designed to give the not unjust impression that Britain and France had been thwarted in a necessary task by American prejudice and Socialist disloyalty, and the absurd claim that the operation had actually succeeded because it had provoked the United Nations into establishing a police force and the United States into inventing a Middle Eastern policy.

From the first, Sir Anthony Eden was in some difficulty from his own side. He received two resignations, that of Mr. Anthony Nutting (Minister of State for Foreign Affairs), a close personal friend of his who had been thought to have no other desire in politics than to follow faithfully the precept and example of his leader, and that of Sir Edward Boyle, the youngest member of the Government (he was Economic Secretary to the Treasury) and a man widely known, in the shorthand of journalism, as "an idealist". These men found some small support on what is roughly called the Left of the Conservative Party from people who thought that the Prime Minister was behaving unlawfully and being unkind to small nations; they also had some sympathy from incurable pro-Arabs, typified by a hitherto little-known back-bencher, Colonel Banks, who resigned the Tory Whip and later secured much publicity by acting as intermediary between the unhappy parents of Mr. Moorhouse and the Dictator of Egypt, with whom, Colonel Banks gave it to be understood, he was one of the few Englishmen now on speaking terms. This opposition, however, was at the outset insignificant; its martyrs passed almost unnoticed. The Government was in graver trouble, at the end of the crisis, from that other rather more numerous section of the party which held with Sir Francis Drake that the glory of an enterprise consists in its finishing rather than its beginning. The Suez Group, under the redoubtable leadership

of Captain Waterhouse—an extremely intelligent man who stands for hanging, economy and Empire—expanded and began to hold regular meetings; Mr. Julian Amery provided the element of fire and irresponsibility necessary to a minority movement, and Mr. Angus Maude gave it an intellectual distinction that it would otherwise have lacked. These men held that we should never have evacuated our Suez bases in the first place and that the Government had shown miscalculation and cowardice, and at one stage they led a movement for censuring the United States which the Party Whips found it prudent to encourage up to a point. Between these two extremes stood the honest gentlemen of the “great soft centre” who, as time went on, began to feel an ever deeper anxiety. They cheered the Government for going in, they cheered it for coming out (at first, it is true, under a slight misapprehension about what had actually happened), they championed the cause of independent British imperialism, then the cause of a renovated United Nations, and finally the cause of a reawakened America; they commiserated with their leader on his illness and expressed confidence in his recovery; when Mr. Macmillan, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, showed them the bill, they did not turn a hair, even though it included an electorally desperate item, petrol rationing; yet events were moving at a speed for which their philosophy did not provide, and it was impossible that loyalty should not be mixed with an ever deepening misgiving.

### The Opposition's Attack

FROM the first, the Opposition decided that patriotism required a ruthless assault on the Government to be persisted in while British forces were in action. The ground they chose consisted mainly of three propositions: the Government had acted without U.N. and was committing aggression; the Government had conspired with Israel in engineering aggression; the Government were splitting the British Commonwealth by alienating India, which, it was implied, would have withdrawn at the first shot but for the personal regard in which its countless millions held Mr. Aneurin Bevan. These points were presented with a degree of emotion that sober observers thought almost without precedent and many considered a danger to parliamentary institutions, particularly when the Speaker had to suspend a sitting for half an hour. The campaign was at first chiefly in the hands of Mr. Gaitskill, who, according to dispassionate connoisseurs, did his own reputation, already dwindling, infinite harm by attacks on the Prime Minister which were freely described as petulant, neurotic, and absurdly exaggerated. His appeal was addressed principally to the electorate, and here he certainly misfired: as a Socialist intellectual, he does not know that U.N. has been a standing joke among ordinary people, and that legal arguments do not seem to them to be a valid reason for failing to do justice to men like Nasser, even when the arguments are themselves valid; the point about collusion never had much force since, in view of the manifest intentions of Israel, collusion would have been unnecessary; the Labour Party did itself no good by persistently neglecting instances of Commonwealth support and deliberately exaggerating instances of Commonwealth opposition. In the last phase of

the crisis, when the general mess was there for all to see, the Opposition case was easily handled. It was then that Mr. Bevan enjoyed himself most conspicuously at the Government's expense; he turned the knife in the wound with a skill that even his opponents admired. Mr. Bevan plainly has enough self-command to be an effective agitator, and it is just this that Mr. Gaitskell lacks. It is Mr. Bevan who behaves like the cavalier, and Mr. Gaitskell like the angry governess who has lost control. If Mr. Bevan chooses his moment rightly, and he will, he will lead the Labour Party.

It is impossible to assess accurately the effect of this controversy on public opinion, but the evidence suggests that at first the country responded well to Sir Anthony's strong lead, and that such opposition as there has been to the Government's policy is chiefly on the score of its failure. That part of the press which joined in a hysterical chorus of abuse of Sir Anthony lost support, but the by-election trends are bad from the Government's point of view, though a by-election that immediately followed the cease-fire showed the Government in a comparatively strong position.

### Sir Anthony Eden

ON November 23 Sir Anthony left for Jamaica. The Chairman of the Conservative Party said that he had been exhausted by the Opposition's behaviour but that there was nothing physically wrong with him. When he returned shortly before the Christmas recess, it was apparent to those who saw him that he was extremely ill. On January 10 the Queen was pleased to accept his resignation, and shortly afterwards he left for New Zealand, refusing an earldom and applying for the Chiltern Hundreds. His doctors announced that there had been a return of his old abdominal illness, and it was clear that he was in a state of nervous exhaustion.

This tragic ending of a remarkable political career has aroused general sympathy. At 59 Sir Anthony Eden, who has supplied the material for headlines for over twenty years, goes into what almost certainly will prove perpetual retirement.

The whole of his political career derives (this may be its tragedy) from the part he played as an unusually young Foreign Secretary before the war, when, by virtue of his resignation in 1938 on an extremely narrowly defined issue, he became a symbol of resistance to the Chamberlain Government's policy of appeasement. He appeared to the world as the advocate of a clean and idealistic foreign policy appealing to the liberal sentiments which are strong in all British parties. When war came, it seemed that Eden had been right. After a brief interval at the Dominions Office and the War Office, he was back at his old post, and it is probable that in the war years, which presented so many knotty diplomatic problems, his most solid services were performed. It was natural that, as Sir Winston's old ally, he should rise high in his administration, and when he was entrusted with the leadership of the House of Commons his place in the succession was assured. In opposition after the war this was taken for granted, at any rate after the untimely death of the brilliant, and more widely experienced, Oliver Stanley. The matter was put a little in doubt again in the course of Sir Winston Churchill's last administra-

tion, when Sir Anthony suffered a prolonged and serious illness, but he recovered in time to succeed his leader and within a few months to win a brilliant electoral victory.

Sir Anthony came to the post of Prime Minister, however, in the face of serious though silent misgivings among the great bulk of his party. He had never been one of the products of the Tory machine, an instrument that, for all its well-known limitations, is peculiarly sensitive to the more constant and prosaic demands of the electorate (a fact that may illumine the future as well as the past), and the virtues of which are epitomized in the persons of Baldwin and Chamberlain. There were those who said that his brilliance was as a negotiator rather than a statesman; he knew little of home policy; he was an extremely platitudinous speaker though his appearance had a magnetic effect; some said that he was not of the tough emotional fibre of which party leaders were made; others said that the lofty international idealism with which he was identified had ceased to be relevant and that, in the popular imagination, he was beginning to be a man of the past.

His action in Suez came at a time when these taunts had for some months been heard more loudly than before. It seemed to many like a desperate striving after heroic virtues with which Nature had not endowed him; it seemed out of character even to those who approved it. The experience of Suez seemed to carry his mind back to the days of his youthful glory when he tried to rally the world against Mussolini, in whose rôle he now saw Nasser. His last public utterance as he left for New Zealand was to this effect, and to the effect that Britain had been defending the cause of democracy against dictatorship. Of all possible comments this was assuredly the most irrelevant, and that least in sympathy with the feelings of any section of the country. There are those, however (and it is legitimate to speculate that the majority of his fellow countrymen are in this category), who regard the last phase of Sir Anthony's political career as the most striking instance of personal courage in their memory, and there are those who suspect that history, while not congratulating the Government on its competence, may see its Suez policy as a worthy attempt to uphold a vital national interest against the overwhelming force of prejudiced allies and factious political opponents. Sir Anthony is not now unlamented, and his memory will not be without honour.

### The New Prime Minister

WHEN Sir Anthony resigned, leaving the House of Commons as well as the Premiership, the largest party in the Commons had no leader, and it therefore fell to the Queen, acting with the advice of senior members of the Privy Council, notably Lord Salisbury and Sir Winston Churchill, to choose one of the two possible candidates, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Butler. Mr. Butler's services to the party were legion, and as Chairman of the Cabinet in Sir Anthony's absence he was in some sense second in command. When he was at the Exchequer, he would have been the obvious successor, and before Suez his reputation had greatly rallied as a result of his success at the Party Conference. Central members of the Conservative Party in the

Commons probably assumed that he would succeed. During the Suez crisis, however, the rôle that Mr. Butler played did not serve his reputation. The impression, partly founded on gossip and partly on his not very successful interventions in debate, was that he had never been wholehearted in any direction, and this was thought consistent with his character, that of a statesman apt in diagnosis of public feeling, careful in conceiving plans, cautious though energetic in their execution. He had the misfortune of appearing to be primarily responsible for the Government's policy at a moment when the Government was being peculiarly incompetent.

Mr. Macmillan had his brilliant record of success at the Ministry of Housing behind him, more poise, a more extrovert nature than his rival, and was easier in his relations with the Commons during the great debate. Above all, he was not number two, and might be expected to inaugurate a new era. His admirers on the Left said that he had got us quickly out of a mess that was primarily of Sir Anthony's making; his admirers on the Right said that but for Mr. Butler's politician-like meekness we should never have had the cease-fire and that Mr. Macmillan would have shown what the Empire was made of. Mr. Macmillan was the public leader of both movements. He was 62, Mr. Butler 54.

The upshot seems to have been that the articulate members of the parliamentary party, who felt above all the need for a change, met together in private houses and informed the Chief Whip of their preference for Mr. Macmillan as soon as the condition of Sir Anthony's health became obvious, that the potential Butlerites were silent, doubtful and lukewarm, and that the Cabinet, according to rumour, was almost unanimous in its support for Mr. Macmillan. Lord Salisbury no doubt conveyed these facts to the Queen, and they were no doubt illuminated by personal observations from Sir Winston Churchill, with the result that, by the consent of all except the Labour Party, whose arrangements are different, Her Majesty acted with the infallibility which is her essential constitutional property.

Mr. Macmillan, who is the scion of a famous publishing house, has a first in Mods and is the author of numerous books on contemporary politics. He first attracted attention as a young M.P. by his criticisms of Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy and his advocacy of moderate concessions to collectivism in home policy. He rose to distinction during the war as Minister of State in North-West Africa, where his tactful handling of the divisions between Frenchmen who were united only in resisting the Germans, and his good relations with American soldiers, won him just praise. In Sir Winston Churchill's administration after the war he distinguished himself by his masterly house-building programme, which did much to accomplish the Tory revival. His tenures of the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office were too brief to give more than high promise. At the Exchequer he has been admired on the strength of his one Budget for having somewhat reversed the optimistic policies of Mr. Butler, and it is to this that he owes his reputation in the City, which, as Mr. Asquith said, is so deficient in political judgement, as a man of the Right. The press speaks of him as an Edwardian, easy, unflustered, and, in brief, "ever such a gentleman". It is hypnotized by his

connexion with literature and is apt to represent him as reading Jane Austen while his political future is decided, a speculation that does less than justice to the energetically modern character of his interests, though it is a high tribute to his tact, a quality in which he far exceeds Mr. Butler. He has everyone's goodwill, and his first task is to unite the Conservative Party.

### The New Government

THIS task he has begun with characteristic virtuosity. His new Cabinet is carefully balanced, though the method of achieving this is revealing. Ministers may be divided roughly into two categories, the enterprising (described by the critics as "the smart Alecs") and the staid (described by the critics as the "old guard"). Pre-eminent in the first category are Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, ex-Tory-Reformer, almost a doctrinaire Free Trader and a man of mercurial quality generally, who goes to the Exchequer; Sir David Eccles, who is delighted to get back to business and won early popularity by telling his constituents that a bit of unemployment was no bad thing, and who takes a brilliantly unconventional mind to the Board of Trade; the tough Mr. Duncan Sandys, who goes to the Ministry of Defence with *carte blanche* to interfere in all the services; and (a really high-class novelty) Sir Percy Mills, who becomes head of a new Ministry grandiloquently known as the Ministry of Power, which is to look after all sources of power in the strictly technical sense of the word. Sir Percy, who was immediately provided with a seat in Parliament as Lord Mills, is a business man who helped Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Marples build the houses; he is the sort of man who, in the Socialist imagination, starts every day with a prayer to Mammon and a working-class baby for breakfast; his cautious approach to the language suggests a preference for deeds. His Ministry will be represented in the Commons by the thoughtful Mr. Maudling, who will temper business efficiency with Civil Service orthodoxy. To this list, though he is not in the Cabinet, must be added the brilliant and amiable Mr. Marples, who brings life and glamour to the Post Office. To these men Mr. Macmillan looks for the new spirit.

They are balanced pre-eminently by Mr. Butler who has the posts of Lord Privy Seal, Home Secretary and Leader of the Commons, by Mr. Henry Brooke, who becomes Minister of Housing, and by Lord Hailsham, who is a pugnacious advocate of moderation and goes to the Ministry of Education. Dr. Charles Hill becomes Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster with special responsibilities for publicity, a much neglected field hitherto.

The principle of balance has been most charmingly illustrated among the junior appointments by the simultaneous readmission of Sir Edward Boyle (who goes to assist Lord Hailsham) and the promotion of the Prime Minister's son-in-law Mr. Julian Amery, the most fiery member of the Suez Group, to be Parliamentary Secretary to the War Office. Sir Edward, who having resigned on an issue of principle at the beginning of November now thus finds himself fully restored, may be said to have bought an incorruptible crown in an unusually good market; his presence in the same government as Mr. Amery is almost as good a joke as his inclusion in the same Ministry as Lord Hailsham, than whom no Minister of the Crown derived more visible enjoy-

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ment from the operations against Egypt, and who should have a toughening effect on the calm and reasonable Sir Edward.

### The Future

TWO large answers to the question "What will this Government do?" have already become clear. Mr. Thorneycroft is pressing ahead with a plan for a common European market, and Mr. Sandys, who has been given unprecedented powers over the service Ministries, is making a new plan for defence, the essence of which is economy. Those who think that British industry needs the fresh air of competition will welcome the common market so long favoured by the United States. There is general satisfaction that there is to be a defence policy, and the disciples of Captain Liddell Hart confidently expect a streamlining process which will put all the emphasis on air power and confront the world with a clean choice between total peace and total war. More cautious minds hope that Mr. Macmillan will not be seduced too far by the desire for economy and point with alarm to the prospect of defence arrangements that would deprive us of the power to withstand the first impact of a military attack without recourse to a weapon the use of which might involve our destruction. There are those who say that the tendency of Mr. Macmillan's policies will be an ever greater dependence on the United States, and there are those who say that this is inevitable. Support in the Tory Party for his government will certainly go some way beyond the limit of conscience, for after the rocking and rolling to which the party has lately been subject, there is feeling that no more disturbances can be afforded; yet there are plenty of controversies on the horizon and the Labour Party can afford several more major blunders without anything like the certainty of defeat at the next election.

As this survey goes to press, indications of the new Government's policy flow thick and fast and confirm the expectation that it will be enterprising. Mr. Sandys, fresh from America, has made a broad statement on defence which has made it clear both that the Government is radically revising its policy to bring it into line with the conditions of nuclear warfare and that it has no hope of dramatically and suddenly reducing expenditure. The end of the call-up is still merely an ambition and the need for Britain to contribute to the land defences of Europe has been reaffirmed, though she wishes to reduce the disproportionate contribution which she has so far made. The Labour Party has seized the opportunity to emerge as the advocate of extreme economies and of the Liddell Hart thesis.

The idea which was for some time current that the Government hoped to avoid the need for reviewing civil expenditure by making defence cuts has thus been disproved, to the comfort of many cautious Conservatives and the disappointment of those who believed that Mr. Macmillan could produce a rabbit from the hat. On the contrary, important though judicious departures in the direction of economy on local government and the social services have been announced: Mr. Henry Brooke has sketched a scheme for replacing many specific percentage grants to local authorities by general block grants,

leaving the authorities to decide how these are to be spent; there is to be a rerating of industrial property which was exempted from part of its burden of rates during the economic crisis of 1929, and this will relieve the financial dependence of local authorities upon central government; the Government's motive is economy but it emphasizes that these arrangements will increase the freedom of local authorities.

There is to be an extra charge for school meals and welfare milk and an increase in National Insurance contributions. The aim is to save money without reducing services, and the saving to be effected will be about £57½ m. Now, as the last straw, the doctors are threatening to leave the Health Service if their pay claims are not met or submitted to arbitration.

On the other hand, the Government has been obliged to make some concessions to the Opposition in the matter of rent restriction. The Rent Restriction Bill, which is having a heavy passage through committee, is intended to relieve private landlords of the necessity of subsidizing their tenants by letting houses to them at ridiculously uneconomic rents; it is a natural corollary of the withdrawal of the Government's housing subsidy, and it is essential if more houses to let are to be brought on to the market, a development which is in turn essential to the mobility of labour. Many cases of hardship have arisen, and Mr. Brooke has now agreed that nobody should have his rent raised or be evicted for 15 months after the Bill comes into law. This has annoyed property owners without placating tenants.

Anxiety over rent restriction was considered to be one of the main reasons for the sharp decline in the Conservative vote which led to the loss of North Lewisham at a by-election, but the contest was complicated by the intervention of a powerful lady called Miss Greene who, standing as an Independent Loyalist, no doubt helped to split the Tory vote. Miss Greene, who may be roughly classified as a "Britain can go it alone" girl, made an impact on the public imagination first when she had to be forcibly removed from the platform during a speech by Sir Anthony Eden. A long series of impending by-elections will show whether the Tories can do any better when unencumbered by independent loyalty.

In foreign affairs, the parties are now united in deploring President Eisenhower for his insistence that Israel should withdraw from Gaza without guarantees. Mr. Bevan is sorry that we are not in a position to be morally superior to the President, but most people take the view that the new Middle Eastern crisis shows that the problem with which Sir Anthony Eden had to contend was not so simple as it appeared to the Opposition. Public relations between Britain and the United States, however, are now sufficiently restored to enable a meeting to have been arranged between Mr. Macmillan and President Eisenhower; it is to take place from March 21 to March 24 in Bermuda.

### Royal Excursions

THE Queen has a busy social programme ahead, taking up one of her important symbolic tasks as representative of her subjects to friendly foreign nations. Visits to Portugal, France and Denmark are on the list for this

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year. That to Portugal, which has already taken place, was made the occasion for an informal reunion on foreign soil between the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh, who was on his way back from his five-month tour round the world. He happened to reach Portugal a few days early for the time-table, and decided to await the Queen there rather than hurry home and put London to the embarrassment of anticipating the ceremonial reception which had been arranged for his definitive return.

Out of this exiguous material the lively imagination of a young lady correspondent of a newspaper in Maryland conjured a surprising story of a "rift" between the Queen and her consort. It was taken up with enthusiasm and repeated under sensational headlines all over America and many foreign countries, while most of the English press maintained an embarrassed silence. It was possibly with some thought of indirectly answering this fantastic fiction that Her Majesty chose the occasion of the Duke's return to give him the titular dignity of a Prince, which George VI curiously omitted to confer with the style of "His Royal Highness", but which has long been in popular use as a kind of courtesy title.

Great Britain,

February 1957.

#### NORTHERN IRELAND

THE catalogue of violence perpetrated during the past two months leaves no doubt that Northern Ireland is confronted with the gravest threat to peace since the turmoil that attended its birth in 1921. Yet it may be recorded at once that the attacks are almost entirely the doing of a group of subversive bodies based in the Irish Republic, and that internally there is no evidence of general unrest amounting to a revolt against the established order. The Government, indeed, is in the difficult position of having to defend the country against little less than an invasion without a declaration of war or of a state of emergency. A limited number of British troops have been called out, but the brunt of the incursion has fallen on the forces of the civil authority, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Special Constabulary. By now the situation is one in which guerrilla fighters are operating without any obvious degree of aid from the inhabitants; were riot and commotion to be provoked it would be much more disastrous. By good fortune this has not yet happened, although the danger will remain until the conspiracy is at an end. Meantime some satisfaction can be derived from the fact that a deeply divided society has been able to meet so vicious a campaign of outrage with such restraint. As for the terrorists, they have no more than demonstrated that the long-standing problem of Partition knows no solution by force. The elected leaders of the Republic itself, while reiterating the case for reunification of the island, have been brought to make this admission more frankly than ever before.

Neither Government has been without warning of a resort to force by the irreconcilables. The Irish Republican Army has remained in existence since the Rebellion of 1916; it has not recognized the Parliament in Dublin any

more than it has recognized the Parliament in Belfast. Its lawlessness was long a challenge to Mr. de Valera, and it was not slow to show that, contrary to the fond expectations of Mr. Costello, its ambitions were not appeased by the proclamation of a republic in 1949. This event was soon followed by arms raids in England and, since June 1953, by a series of attacks on Northern Ireland to which two or three satellite organizations have also been committed. Together these illegal bodies have paraded their preparations for a revolution by propaganda, recruiting and drilling with weapons, and, in the storming of army and police barracks in Ulster, have exhibited the fanatical nature of their beliefs. Certainly the Northern Irish Government has been under no misapprehension; for all the control it has been able to exercise over subversives within its jurisdiction, it has kept in readiness for a war in the open launched from the underground in the Republic.

The moment came early on the morning of December 12, when, as has since been confirmed by captured documents read in court in Dublin, there began a comprehensively planned assault on key points throughout Northern Ireland by columns from the southern counties supported by extreme republicans at home. In this opening phase bombs exploded at the Territorial Army barracks at Enniskillen, the B.B.C. transmitter at Londonderry, and several bridges, and only the vigilance of the police prevented the bombing of the Army barracks and Post Office telephone exchange at Armagh and the R.A.F. radar station at Torr Head. Even now it is not known how many other operations failed or were thwarted as this night took its place in Ireland's melancholy chronicle of disorders. The element of invasion became even more apparent during the succeeding weeks, when four attacks were made with bombs and machine guns on village police stations close to the border in Co. Fermanagh. In one of these a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (it is notable that he was a Roman Catholic) was shot dead, and in another the police fire killed two of the raiders who proved to belong to Limerick and Monaghan in the Irish Republic. Thereafter, partly by reason of the counter measures taken by both Governments, the massed raids across the frontier ceased, but a campaign of sabotage continued at various points in the interior. Explosions destroyed a new drill hall for the Territorial Army at Dungannon, and a number of posts of the Special Constabulary; several country houses were burned down, and road communications between Belfast and Londonderry and Enniskillen were partially dislocated by the wrecking of three bridges spanning rivers.

The captured operational orders have shown that these were among a long list of targets, comprising military and police establishments, railways, customs houses, power stations, telephone exchanges and other public buildings, together with the ambushing of the defence forces. The plans, however, have made no mention of Belfast, nor has it appeared that the terrorists intend to pursue their ends by assassination. Nevertheless, it has been fully established that the objective is to overthrow law and order and to render impossible the continued functioning of the Government of Northern Ireland. In this conspiracy the Irish Republican Army, with its emulators Saor Uladh (Free Ulster) and the Irish Liberation Movement, disposes of perhaps 1,000

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persons well supplied with arms, explosives and money (the sending of dollars from the United States has also been proved by papers found in Dublin). The great majority of these men are known to live in the Republic, but Northern Ireland is, of course, not without its share, more especially in the wilder parts of the countryside where more primitive attitudes prevail. The minds and motives of the rebels are a study in themselves, but from the Northern Irish viewpoint no further proof is required of their wantonness and their ability to sustain a reign of terror which could well be even more costly of life and property and bring about a descent into chaos.

The Government, by meeting the emergency calmly and firmly, has gained in public confidence. The use of the Army for patrol and guard duties was necessary from an early stage, but it has been able to rely on the efficient Constabulary as the main line of defence and to make a not excessive use of the extraordinary measures open to it under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts. New regulations have reintroduced the power of internment and about fifty men have been lodged in prison. A number of others detained in incriminating circumstances, most of them from the Republic, are being duly arraigned. A further decree has proscribed Sinn Féin, the political party affiliated to the Irish Republican Army, and another subversive movement named Fianna Uladh. Statements by the Prime Minister, Lord Brookeborough, have been characterized by reason and moderation and by earnest appeals to his supporters not to engage in acts of retaliation. Northern Ireland has not least been fortified by a declaration by Sir Anthony Eden, the then Prime Minister, that "the defence of Northern Ireland is as dear to the heart of the British Government as that of any other part of the United Kingdom".

The rest must be considered to turn on the Republic and its will to put down the illegal armies formed within its territory. Even after the first onslaught the Coalition Government in Dublin still appeared reluctant to move, but as the attacks on the North increased in severity it was left with no choice but to make the attempt to reassert its authority, a fact that must have been implicit in a communication made by the British Ambassador. Mr. Costello's broadcast of January 6 marked the start of a stronger policy and since then action has been taken to seek out the irregulars gathered on the border and to dissipate the threat of further raids in force. Nevertheless, the misgivings of the people of Northern Ireland have not been entirely removed. They have observed a wave of popular sympathy in the South for the "freedom fighters", manifested in the large attendances at the funerals of the two victims, and in the resolutions passed by numerous public bodies. They have also had cause to ask, for all the good impression made by Mr. Costello's undoubtedly courageous words, whether sentences of six or three months' imprisonment passed on members of the Irish Republican Army who have been charged with carrying arms or failing to give an account of their movements are sufficient to break up this and other unlawful organizations. In the opinion of the authorities here much more salutary punishment, and the use of internment, if necessary, is required to prove a real determination to uphold the law and preserve the peace. Moreover, there is still an

absence of the police co-operation which is a normal part of the relations of peaceful neighbouring countries and essential to the full maintenance of security.

In contrast to such a broadening of the gulf between North and South, however, is the comparatively stable situation in Northern Ireland. The crisis has not exacerbated feeling to the point of explosion, as it would have done twenty years ago, and in that way it has tended to vindicate the judgment expressed in these pages that the divided province has been attaining to a greater sense of common interest and community living. Despite the slowness of anti-Partition M.P.s to make an open condemnation of the cult of violence, it has been evident that the greater part of the Catholic population have deplored the re-emergence of the gun, and have no wish to see a return of the "Troubles". In this they share the general fear, not only of danger to life and liberty, but of a setback to the material progress Northern Ireland has made since the war. In particular there is much apprehension lest the disturbances should have the effect of stopping the flow of new industries from Great Britain and abroad, of which the latest and most striking example has been the decision of the Du Pont Corporation of U.S.A. to found a factory at Londonderry for the manufacture of synthetic rubber.

Looking back, the Northern Irish Government has reason to feel ill-used by the resurgence of hatred and the failure of the Government of the Republic to take earlier steps to prevent it. It has given many tokens of tolerance in its policy at home; it has devoted itself to the raising of the standard of living without distinction of creed, and it has shown its desire to co-operate with the Republic in matters of mutual concern. In doing so it has taken its stand on the Treaty of 1925, in which it joined with the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State in ratifying the division of the country. In recent weeks many speakers in the Republic have rightly declared that reunion cannot be brought about by force, but the political parties, far from accepting the 1925 Treaty, have consistently sought to repudiate it and to deny to the people of Northern Ireland the right to determine their own future without dictation from any outside source. If this right should now be borne in upon the leaders and the led in the South, the present disturbances may not have been endured in vain.

Northern Ireland,  
February 1957.



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